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Abstract
On April 30, 1803, the Jefferson administration purchased French Louisiana. Initially American
lawmakers rejoiced at the prospect of American domination of the Mississippi River. Yet within a
few short months this optimism was replaced with uncertainty and alarm as lawmakers faced the
task of incorporating Lower Louisiana into the Union. As Americans tackled the many unintended
consequences of the Louisiana Purchase, Louisianans also had to confront the ramifications of the
landmark acquisition and the encroachment of a new American government in their lives. From
1803 to 1815, American lawmakers and Louisianans embarked on a parallel journey to incorporate
Lower Louisiana into the political, social, and cultural infrastructure of the young republic.
The American part of this historic journey has been well documented as many historians explore
how American lawmakers passed key legislation and implemented programs of Americanization to
bring Lower Louisiana into the Union. Louisianans’ perspective, however, has remained quite
secondary. By exploring the lives of individual Louisianans, this project examines how they too
shaped the incorporation of Lower Louisiana and how their class, race, and ethnicity influenced
their participation in that process. In highlighting the experiences of Creole elite families, prominent
political figures, and Lower Louisiana’s free people of color, it becomes clear that Louisianans
employed vital strategies of negotiation to sufficiently assimilate to gain American citizenship and
acceptance, while also preserving vital aspects of their French identity. By utilizing tools such as
political activism, military service, and the conversation of attachment, Louisianans came into the
Union on their own terms and ultimately created a Franco-American culture that still pervades
Louisiana today.
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Introduction: “A Beloved First Mistress”: Setting the Stage for a Franco-American Culture
in Lower Louisiana
On December 20, 1803, Pierre Clément de Laussat, the French colonial prefect for Louisiana,
left his home rehearsing in his head the order of events that would transpire that day. As he
walked through the streets of New Orleans, he not only noticed the uncharacteristically warm
weather, but also the group of French commissioners, military officials, and loyal citizens that
followed closely behind him. As he hurried to City Hall, Laussat looked upon familiar administrative
buildings, local businesses, as well as balconies full of French women and children gathering for
the upcoming ceremony. Laussat and his entourage passed by American soldiers lined in
formation along the Place d’ Armes as the sound of drums beat in the distance. Upon arriving at
City Hall, Laussat exchanged pleasantries with American commissioners including newlyappointed territorial governor William C.C. Claiborne.1 Laussat, Claiborne, and American General
James Wilkinson made their way to the City Hall balcony overlooking a large crowd who had come
to watch the official transfer of French Louisiana to the United States.
In a solemn moment, spectators watched as the French flag was lowered and replaced by the
American stars and stripes. When the two flags met in the middle there was a brief pause as
cannon fire marked the momentous event.2 Following the flag raising ceremony, Governor
Claiborne addressed the crowd congratulating them on “an event so advantageous.” He welcomed

William C. C. Claiborne was born in Sussex County, Virginia in 1775. In 1794, he moved to Tennessee and
served on the state’s Supreme Court until 1797 when he was elected to the House of Representatives. After several
years in Congress, he was appointed the Governor of the Territory of Mississippi in 1801. In October of 1803, he and
General James Wilkinson were assigned commissioners to take possession of Lower Louisiana from France. Later
that year he would be appointed the official governor of the Orleans Territory.
1

Pierre Clément de Laussat, Memoirs of My Life to My Son During the Years 1803 and After, Which I spent in
Public Service in Louisiana as Commissioner of the French Government for the Retrocession to France of That Colony
and for Its Transfer to the United States, ed. Robert D. Bush (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978),
90.
2

1

Louisianans as fellow countrymen and promised them the benefits and privileges of American
citizenship. He went on to encourage Louisianans to foster a strong attachment to the United
States and to become acquainted with the American political apparatus so that they and their
children would one day “appreciate the intrinsic worth of the Government transmitted to them.”3
The day’s festivities culminated with dinner, dancing, and a string of loquacious speeches. The
final toast of the evening brought Spanish, French, and American diplomats together in a “toast to
the three nations” accompanied by an orchestra of cannon fire.4 Late that evening Governor
Claiborne sent a letter to Secretary of State James Madison happily reporting “that we are now in
possession of this City.”5 This atmosphere of merriment and show of international friendship in
reality masked the feelings of anxiety, apprehension, and anguish Americans and Louisianans
shared regarding the Louisiana Purchase.
Most Americans first learned of the Louisiana Purchase in June 1803 when newspapers such
as the Boston Independent featured such bold headlines as “Louisiana Ceded to the United
States!”6 Following months of negotiations and rumors of a possible war, the Jefferson
administration had peacefully secured not only New Orleans, but all of French Louisiana. Many
celebrated the purchase hoping that it would ensure American economic and political mastery of
North America. Congressman David Campbell of Tennessee jubilantly commended the Jefferson
administration for securing free navigation of the Mississippi River and an “immense and fertile

3 William C.C. Claiborne to a Large Assemblage of Citizens in the Grand Salee of the City Hall, 20 December 1803,
The Letter Books of William C.C. Claiborne, 1801-1806, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson: Mississippi State Archive,
1917), I: 309-10.
4

Laussat, Memoirs of My Life, 90-91.

5

Claiborne to James Madison, 20 December 1803, Letter Books, I: 306.

6

Boston Independent, 20 June 1803.
2

country.”7 Many others shared Campbell’s pleasure and admiration. Yet apprehension soon
tempered this excitement as many American lawmakers were confronted with the daunting task of
incorporating a large foreign population into the United States. Pennsylvania Representative John
Lucas, for example, expressed serious reservations regarding Lower Louisiana’s foreign
population. He believed Louisianans’ colonial past infused them with despotism, rendering them illprepared for a republican government.8 Lucas’s perceptions reveal how many congressional
members came to the realization that the constitutionality of the purchase and the task of
incorporating such a diverse population into the Union engendered many challenges to the fragile
republic.
In Lower Louisiana the news of the purchase also generated an assortment of reactions. For
the majority of inhabitants, Creoles born under the French and Spanish colonial regimes, the
purchase shattered their hopes of living under the rule of their mother country. For Lower
Louisiana’s Spanish, German, Acadian, and free black population that had adopted the French
language, culture, and legal and political institutions, the transfer created feelings of displacement
and trepidation over an uncertain future. The cession treaty between the United States and France
did, however, offer some assurances for concerned Louisianans. The third article of the treaty
guaranteed them a quick and easy incorporation into the United States, stating that Louisiana
inhabitants “shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights,

7

Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 325.

1st Congress, 2nd sess., Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 1789-1856 (New York: D. Appleton & Company),
III: 145-147. John Lucas was born in France and moved to Pittsburg in 1784. He later became a district judge in the
Louisiana District serving until 1820.
3
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advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.”9 It also provided protection of private
property and promised that Louisianans would be extended the same rights guaranteed all
Americans. While such measures allowed many inhabitants to take solace in the prospect of living
under a free government, there still remained many more who resented the new American
presence and the threat it posed to their French heritage. Although the events of December 20
appeared to mark the peaceful transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, they also ushered
in a twelve-year long struggle for American lawmakers and Louisianans to incorporate Lower
Louisiana into the ideological, cultural, and political infrastructure of the United States.
Historians have produced a prolific historiography examining this incorporation process and its
impact on the United States. Everett Somerville Brown’s The Constitutional History of the
Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1812 examines the major constitutional questions raised by the
unprecedented acquisition, providing valuable insight into the larger political issues occurring within
the young republic and how lawmakers attempted to redefine the bounds of the Constitution to
accommodate the purchase. Beyond constitutional history, many historians examine the Louisiana
Purchase and its impact on American expansion. In This Affair of Louisiana, Alexander DeConde
argues that the acquisition of Louisiana was not just a case of good fortune, but rather a byproduct
of a strong expansionist ethos inherited from early Anglo-American settlers. In Filibusters and
Expansionists, Frank Owsley and Gene Smith contend that the Louisiana Purchase planted the
early antecedents to Manifest Destiny, perpetuating Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an “empire of
liberty.” These works demonstrate how the Louisiana Purchase served as a harbinger for further
American expansion. More recent works explore how the Louisiana Purchase redefined ideas of

Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Article III, 30 April 1803. Found in
Records of U.S Government; Record Group II: National Archives.
4
9

American identity. Peter Kastor’s The Nation’s Crucible explores “the way the Louisiana Purchase
shaped people’s conception of what it would mean to be American and a nation.”10 Kastor’s
methodology opens many new channels of inquiry concerning not only Louisiana, but also the early
republic. The purchase of a vast amount of land containing an ethnically diverse population was
unprecedented in American history. Such a monumental event brought many new challenges to
national values and institutions that historians need to further address.
These works have greatly enhanced the field of Louisiana history. Yet they tend to focus on how
the Louisiana Purchase affected American policies, ideas, and aspirations, while overlooking the
experiences of Louisianans. Although these studies include key Louisiana leaders and events,
they fail to examine and address how Louisianans from different socio-economic, ethnic, and racial
backgrounds transitioned from French and Spanish colonial rule to life in the American republic.
Coming at such a precarious time in American history, the incorporation of Lower Louisiana forced
American lawmakers and Louisiana inhabitants to embark on a parallel course of self-discovery.
The American path has been well documented, while Louisianans’ journey has remained
secondary. The following chapters will illustrate how Louisianans actively took part in the
incorporation of Lower Louisiana and how their class, race, and ethnicity shaped their participation
and influence in that process. This work examines how Louisianans responded and adapted to the
new American government and actively negotiated a place for themselves in the young American
republic, ultimately creating a Franco-American culture that still pervades Louisiana today.
****

Everett Somerville Brown, The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1812 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1920); Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976);
Frank Owsley and Gene Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa:
The University of Alabama Press, 1997); Peter J. Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the
Creation of America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
5
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To fully understand the challenges Louisianans faced during the territorial period, one must first
understand how the confluence of a century of migration, settlement, and ethnic and racial
blending characterized colonial Louisiana. In 1504, French explorers claimed the vast expanse of
Canada for the French Crown. Nearly a century passed before the French managed to erect a
permanent settlement in Quebec. By the 1660s, French settlers learned from their Indian allies
that a great river bisected the continent from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. Control of such a
strategic waterway would greatly enhance France’s position in the imperial struggles for North
America. A French exploration party set out from Quebec in 1673, following the Mississippi River
to its mouth located at the 33rd degree of latitude.11 Robert de LaSalle, ten years later, made
another voyage down the Mississippi River naming the land where the great waterway met the Gulf
of Mexico Louisiana in honor of King Louis XIV. Hoping to attract settlers to its newest southern
colony, the French Crown in 1718 granted John Law a twenty-five year contract to send 6,000
white settlers and 3,000 slaves to Louisiana. Under Law’s Mississippi Company, hundreds of
French families made the voyage to the swamps and fertile farms lands of Louisiana. These first
settlers made their new homes in New Orleans, Natchitoches, and Alexandria. Immigration to the
new colony proved erratic and at times stagnant, never quite reaching the Crown’s initial hopes.
By 1765, the colony’s population stood at only 5,556 inhabitants.12
Following the Seven Years’ War, France lost most of its North American possessions including
Canada to Great Britain and Louisiana to Spain. Life under the Spanish colonial regime changed

11 Francois Barbe-Marbois, The History of Louisiana: Particularly of the Cession of That Colony to the United States
of America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, org. pub. 1830, reprint 1977), 104-103.

Lewis William Newton, “The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study of the Process of Adjustment Between
the French and the Anglo-American Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860” (Ph.D. diss., Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1929), 6-7.
12

6

very little for many Louisiana inhabitants as Spanish officials were unsuccessful in supplanting the
predominance of the French language and culture. The port in New Orleans continued to draw
traders and merchants from up and down the Mississippi River, including Anglo-American
businessmen from the Northeast. Beginning in 1769, a prolific flour trade between Philadelphia
and New Orleans marked the first extensive Anglo-American presence in the Spanish colony. By
the 1790s, American merchants monopolized the incoming and outgoing trade in Louisiana and
soon relocated their families and businesses to New Orleans and other Mississippi trading ports.13
Southeastern planters also found the rural areas of Louisiana and the West Florida parishes ideal
locations for expanding their enterprises. Planters from Georgia and the Carolinas were drawn to
the isolated northern tip of Louisiana to expand their sugar and cotton operations.14 Some AngloAmericans migrated to Louisiana seeking more then just economic prosperity; a small group of
Catholics from Pennsylvania moved to Opelousas in search of a religious haven. Anglo-Americans
found their connections to Lower Louisiana quite advantageous during the Revolutionary War.
Merchants from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia utilized the port of New Orleans to ship
needed supplies to Continental forces, while British sympathizers migrated to a small Englishspeaking settlement just above Baton Rouge to escape the war.15
In 1795, Spain and the United States solidified their mutual commercial interests by signing the
Treaty of San Lorenzo. The treaty granted American merchants free rights of navigation on the
Mississippi River and unrestricted deposit at the port of New Orleans. Just five years later,

13 Dolores Egger Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners: A Multicultural Population in a New Land,” The
Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, ed. Dolores Egger Labbe (Lafayette: University of
Southeastern Louisiana, 1998), III: 543.
14

Ibid., 543.

15

Newton, “The Americanization of French Louisiana,” 24-25.
7

however, this partnership crumbled as Spanish leaders began negotiations with France for the
retrocession of Louisiana. The Treaty of San Ildefonso returned Louisiana to France and shattered
American aspirations for unrestricted commercial access to the port of New Orleans and the
Mississippi River. The return of France to North America also posed a potential threat to continued
American migration into the lucrative region.
These events created a sense of urgency for American lawmakers. Some advocated peaceful
diplomacy and the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida, while more aggressive
congressional leaders argued that war was the only method of securing American commercial
interests. President Thomas Jefferson himself asserted bellicosely that “the day that France takes
possession of New Orleans …. we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”16
Ultimately, Napoleon solved Jefferson’s dilemma by agreeing to sell his North American colony.
Facing an impending war with England and a massive slave revolt in St. Domingue, Napoleon
looked to sell French Louisiana as a means of securing much-needed funds to finance his dreams
of European dominance. Although, on their diplomatic mission to France, American
representatives James Monroe and Robert Livingston were only instructed to purchase New
Orleans and West Florida, on April 30, 1803, they bought all of French Louisiana for $15 million.17
Along with a vast amount of land, the United States also acquired Lower Louisiana’s diverse and
alien population. The most numerous inhabitants were Creoles who resided in urban centers such

16 Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 18 April 1802, Thomas Jefferson Writings, ed. Merrill Peterson (New
York: The Library of America, 1984), 1105.

The American government agreed to pay $11.5 million and forgave $3.5 million in debt that France owed the
United States from the Quasi-War (1798-1801) to equal the $15 million dollar price tag for French Louisiana. French
Louisiana consisted of 530 million acres of land. It includes the modern-day states of Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa,
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and portions of North Dakota, Minnesota, Texas, Colorado, Wyoming,
and New Mexico.
8
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as New Orleans and on plantations in rural areas such as Attakapas and Natchitoches. A small
Spanish population also resided in Lower Louisiana, yet its numbers remained low throughout the
colonial period. Two distinct groups of Spaniards remained prevalent in Louisiana. The first group
settled near Attakapas and renamed the area New Iberia. A larger group, from the Canary Islands,
established themselves in small settlements outside New Orleans. These Spaniards managed to
maintain their native language and customs, unlike their counterparts living in New Orleans who
were more inclined to speak French.18
Colonial Louisiana also served as a place of refuge for displaced peoples. The Acadians,
descendants of French Acadians in Canada, migrated to Lower Louisiana following the Seven
Years’ War. From 1764 to 1803, nearly 2,500 Acadians dispersed throughout Attakapas,
Opelousas, and in the Bayou Lafourche, later called the Acadian Coast. Today old Acadian
settlements make up the famous Cajun country of Louisiana.19
Other ethnic groups of European descent were also attracted to Louisiana. German immigrants
were some of Lower Louisiana’s first settlers. They first established themselves along the
Arkansas River, but later transferred their small settlements to the banks of the Mississippi River.
Waves of German immigration continued throughout the 1700s, with influxes in 1754 and 1774.
Most Germans, old and new, made their homes on what Louisianans called the German Coast
(present day St. Charles and St. John parishes).20 The Irish also sought a new life in Lower

18

Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners,” 541.

19 Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (New Orleans: Armand Hawkins, Publisher, 1885), II: 116, 120-122; Carl
A. Brasseaux, “The Emergence of Classes in Antebellum Period,” The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in
Louisiana History, ed. Vaughan Burdin Baker (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 2000), XV: 28-29. Brasseaux’s
other work Acadian to Cajun: Transformations of a People, 1803-1877 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,
1992), along with others such as The Cajuns: Essays on Their History and Culture, ed. Glenn R. Conrad (Lafayette,
LA, 1978) argue that Acadians over time created the Cajun culture of today.
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Louisiana, settling mainly in New Orleans. Yet their numbers remained small until the 1830s and
1840s. Many worked alongside American merchants on the docks and commercial houses of the
thriving port city, while others took on menial jobs for the Creole elite.21
Lower Louisiana also contained a distinct racial mixture. The first African slaves arrived in
Louisiana in 1719 along with French settlers in John Law’s Mississippi Company. As the slave
population steadily grew over the next several decades, it took on a unique role in colonial
Louisiana. Ill-prepared for the harsh conditions of the wilderness and lacking a strong defense
force, white settlers relied heavily on slaves to provide much needed labor and military protection.
By 1739, French colonial officials created a permanent company of slave soldiers to assist in
combating neighboring Indians.22
Within a decade of settlement, free people of color appeared in colonial Louisiana. While little is
known about the origins of these free blacks, over time their numbers steadily grew. Much like
their slave counterparts, free people of color were also recruited into the French military to fight in
Louisiana and other colonial outposts. These free black militiamen were even allowed to serve
under black officers.23 Lower Louisiana’s free black population continued to grow under the
Spanish regime.24 Spanish officials helped to enhance these numbers through the O’Reilly Laws
that codified the practice of coartacion which allowed slaves to purchase their freedom from

20

Newton, “Americanization of French Louisiana,” 11-12.

21

Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners,” 539.

22 Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” Creole: The History and Legacy of Louisiana’s Free
People of Color, ed. Sybil Kein (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 10; Kimberly S. Hanger,
Bounded Lives, Bounded Places: Free Black Society in Colonial New Orleans, 1769-1803 (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1997), 118.
23

Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” 11-12.

24

Ibid., 12.
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imperial courts rather than from benevolent masters. 25 Spanish policies also granted free blacks
more rights and freedom. Free blacks could arrange contracts, own and transfer property, and
bring suit in civil litigation. Such privileges allowed many free blacks to accumulate enough wealth
to own thriving businesses that contributed to the commercial vitality of New Orleans and adjoining
areas. Besides participating in the commercial activities of colonial Louisiana, free blacks
continued to serve in the military. The Spanish recruited more free black militiamen than their
French counterparts by extending them the right of fuero, a set of military privileges that included
the right to carry weapons and receive the same pay and retirement benefits as white soldiers.26
These favorable policies placed free people of color in a middle stratum in between white
Louisianans and slaves. By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, Lower Louisiana possessed not
only a bourgeoning free black population, but also a distinct three-tiered racial hierarchy.
Despite colonial Louisiana’s ethnic and racial patchwork, by 1803 most inhabitants spoke
French, adopted French cultural mores, practiced Catholicism, and adhered to civil law. Yet these
strong ties to French colonial traditions and institutions created an assortment of problems for
Louisianans during the territorial period. American lawmakers expected Louisianans to cultivate
not only a political but also a cultural attachment to the United States. Although many Louisianans
looked forward to receiving the political and economic benefits that the Louisiana Purchase
imparted, they did not expect that such rights should come at the expense of their cultural identity.
Here rests the central dilemma facing Louisianans: As American lawmakers demanded that they
relinquish ties to their colonial customs, language, and way of life, Louisianans were forced to find

25

Ibid., 25.

26

Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Place, 111-113.
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ways of demonstrating sufficient assimilation to gain American approval, while preserving their
French identity.
To illustrate the experiences of Louisianans and their attempt to create a Franco-America
culture, this project will focus on the lives of individuals. By examining specific Louisianans one
can gain a better sense of how they responded to such challenges and employed different
techniques in order to integrate into the American system without surrendering aspects of their
French heritage. These individuals have been selected based on their activities in the social,
political, and economic landscape of territorial New Orleans as well as their inclusion in various
social-economic, ethnic, and racial groups. Each chapter will feature the life of one or several
individuals in order to examine how these factors determined their level of participation in the
incorporation process. Although each chapter highlights the life of certain individuals, the
experience of the larger group that they represent is not overlooked—rather these individuals serve
as characters that exemplify the shared experience of different Louisianans.
The following chapters explore the years between 1803 and 1815. The United States purchased
French Louisiana in April 1803, so naturally this is where the story begins. Although the territorial
period ended in 1812 when Louisiana became an American state, I have decided to extend this
study to the Battle of New Orleans. I argue that statehood was not a product of American
lawmakers’ willingness to bring Louisiana into the Union, but rather an expedient wartime measure.
Statehood, therefore, failed to secure Louisianans’ acceptance as Americans, and as war with
Great Britain seemed imminent many Americans continued to question the loyalty of their newest
countrymen. Only after the Battle of New Orleans did Americans accept and welcome Louisianans
as true citizens. Moreover, the Battle of New Orleans reveals how Louisianans used loyal military
service as another vehicle of negotiation that allowed them to shape their place in the Union.
12

The central geographic focus of this study is New Orleans which served as the social, political,
and economic nexus of Louisiana and was the backdrop for the major events of the territorial
period. Consequently some groups are excluded from this study including the many Indians living
in Lower Louisiana as well as Louisianans in rural parishes. They played some role in the
incorporation of Lower Louisiana; however, the availability of sources and time in large part
determine their absence here. This project examines the lives of historical participants who had
the greatest ability to shape the incorporation process. Although recent scholarship demonstrates
that slaves had a certain amount of control over their private lives through kinship networks and
religion, they were deprived of the ability to influence public affairs or access instruments of power.
For this reason, a discussion regarding slaves and the incorporation of Lower Louisiana is not
present.
Furthermore, Lower Louisiana’s rich ethnic and racial composition often makes identifying
various groups quite complex. For the sake of clarity, I need to explain the terminology used
throughout this project. As previously mentioned, Creoles made up the majority of inhabitants
residing in Lower Louisiana. The term Creole has become a hotly contested term in the historical
community. Creole derives from the Portuguese word crioulo meaning a slave of African descent
born in the Americas. Yet in Louisiana, Creole took on a much different connotation following the
Louisiana Purchase. Used as an ethnic distinction, the label Creole came to differentiate those
born in Louisiana of French or Spanish descent from Americans. Creole, therefore, came to
designate a native identity to combat the encroachment of Americans in territorial Louisiana.27
Over time, however, white Creoles wanted to distinguish themselves further from Creoles of color
Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., “Creoles and Americans,” Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization, ed. Arnold R.
Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 138.
27

13

and began referring to themselves as the ancienne or ancient population showcasing their
ancestral ties to white French and Spanish settlers. In the following chapters, the term Creole and
ancients will be used interchangeably in discussions regarding native-born white Louisianans.28
By rigidly defining Creole, I have intentionally excluded free people of color from this category.
Although many historians consider Lower Louisiana’s free people of color to be Creoles, since they
too were born in colonial Louisiana, I have decided to refer to them as free blacks or libres. Under
the French and Spanish regime, free people of color were called gens de couleur libre while gens
de couleur was the name designating African slaves. The cornerstone of their racial identity rested
in the word libre, meaning free in both French and Spanish. Since libre characterized their free
status and separation from the slave population, free blacks often referred to themselves simply as
libres. Following their lead, I will continue the use of this term throughout my discussion of Lower
Louisiana’s free people of color.
In trying to be precise in identifying the historical characters that make up this project, I have run
the risk of almost being too specific. I have been careful not to refer to white or black Louisianans
as Americans. Although the cession treaty between the United States and France guaranteed
Louisianans immediate citizenship and the constitutional rights apportioned to all Americans, I
hesitate to lump them together with natural-born or naturalized American citizens. Since the bulk
of this work aims to illustrate how Louisianans shaped and manipulated the incorporation process, I
have intentionally separated Creoles and free people of color from Americans as a means of
highlighting Louisianans’ specific activities from those of their American counterparts living in the
territory. Therefore, in this work, American refers exclusively to either those natural-born or
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naturalized Americans living in the United States or those in the territory that moved to New
Orleans before or after the Louisiana Purchase.
****
Although this project focuses on the experiences of Louisianans, it would be incomplete without
mentioning American involvement in the incorporation process. Chapter Two, therefore, examines
the major political events of the Orleans territorial period. It will center largely on the territorial
government and policies Washington lawmakers implemented in Lower Louisiana. This chapter
reveals how most Americans looked askance at Louisiana’s foreign population and their ability to
become true Americans. Yet such misgivings required lawmakers to define what made a “true”
American. In turn, congressional members had to devise a plan or process to “Americanize”
Louisianans and a means to judge their progress and suitability for citizenship. Since the major
policies and regulations created by Washington lawmakers would be the very things that
Louisianans confronted and even combated during the territorial period, this chapter provides a
historical framework for the rest of the project.
Following the explanation of the American perspective, the rest of this work will focus solely on
four groups of Louisianans exemplified by key individuals. Chapter Three highlights the political
careers of Edward Livingston and Daniel Clark. After having a successful political career in New
York and in the Jefferson administration, Livingston’s involvement in an alleged money laundering
conspiracy forced him to relocate to New Orleans shortly after the Louisiana Purchase. Unlike
Livingston, Daniel Clark had lived in Lower Louisiana since 1786. Besides setting up a thriving
shipping business, Clark also worked for Spanish Governor Don Esteban Miro. As the United
States began negotiations for the acquisition of Louisiana, Clark was appointed the American
consul to New Orleans and worked vigorously to assist Washington lawmakers in securing the
15

coveted port of New Orleans. After the Louisiana Purchase, Clark’s cordial relations with the
American lawmakers soured when President Jefferson failed to appoint him the territorial governor
of the newly-created Orleans Territory. As the United States took possession of Lower Louisiana,
both Livingston and Clark allied themselves with the ancient population and soon became the
leaders of a growing anti-American faction. The territorial government erected by the 1804
Governance Act left many Creoles disappointed by their low grade of territorial status and the lack
of a representative government. They also disparaged the Governance Act’s prohibition on the
importation of slaves into the territory. Many Louisianans viewed this provision as a violation of
their most basic rights since the nationwide prohibition would not go into effect until 1808. Creoles
also bewailed the excessive use of English instead of French in government documents and public
proceedings as well as the introduction of common law into their court system.
Mostly for their own self-interest, Livingston and Clark became unexpected advocates for the
Creole cause. Using his experience as a former politician, Livingston provided much needed
insights into American political thought. He drafted the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana
(1804), which outlined Louisianans’ main grievances with the territorial government. Livingston
ensured that the memorial would appeal to American sympathies by invoking revolutionary rhetoric
from the Declaration of Independence.29 Besides drafting several petitions, Livingston used his
legal expertise to help Creoles fight for the continuation of civil law. As Livingston provided vital
political ammunition for Louisianans, Clark used his longtime influence to antagonize the Claiborne
administration and to incite anti-American feelings. He even took his resistance campaign to the
floor of Congress, serving as the Orleans territorial delegate in 1806. Although it seems strange to
Julien Paul Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil”: Opposition to United States Territorial Government in
Orleans, 1803-1809” (Ph.D. diss,. Syracuse University, 2002), 129.
29
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dedicate a chapter about Creole resistance to two Americans, in actuality without the support of
Americans such as Livingston and Clark, Creoles would have had little visible organized
resistance. Handicapped by limited education as well as knowledge of American republican
institutions, Creoles needed allies to aid them in their struggle.
As Livingston and Clark exemplify Louisianans’ path of resistance, Julien Poydras represents
the more accommodating stance that many Creoles adopted. Born in France, Poydras made his
way to New Orleans via St. Domingue in 1768. Once in New Orleans, he began a trading business
that stretched from Baton Rouge to St. Louis. Poydras’s business interests kept him closely tied to
New Orleans and he soon befriended Governor Claiborne. In 1804, Claiborne appointed Poydras
to the Board of Directors for the new Bank of Louisiana and to the territory’s Legislative Council.
He served as president of the council for three years. In 1809, Poydras moved to Washington D.C.
to serve as the Orleans territorial delegate to Congress. Upon his return in 1812, he was elected
the president of the constitutional convention responsible for drafting Louisiana’s new state
constitution.
Chapter Four examines Poydras and his fruitful political career during the territorial period.
Although many Creoles were active members of Livingston and Clark’s anti-American faction,
some also shared Poydras’s belief that the key to Louisiana’s success rested in working with
American officials for a common purpose. Many Louisianans, through Poydras’s urging, hoped to
provoke change through cooperation rather than resistance. By accepting key positions in the
Claiborne administration, Poydras became quite influential in territorial policymaking that helped to
promote Louisianans’ interests. More importantly, he served as a vital link between the American
government and ancient Creoles. Poydras proves to be a complementary figure to Livingston and
Clark. Their paths and careers were parallel in many ways even though they were almost always
17

at odds politically. They all represent the myriad of political strategies Creoles used to shape the
incorporation process.
As the early chapters examine the more public forum of New Orleans politics, Chapter Five
highlights the personal experiences of Creole families by exploring the life of the Favrots. PierreJoseph Favrot’s ancestors arrived in Louisiana in 1732. His father, Claude-Joseph, served as a
second lieutenant in the French Army. Pierre-Joseph would go on to serve in the Spanish military,
reaching the rank of captain. Following the Louisiana Purchase, Pierre-Joseph ended his thirtyyear long military career and became a full-time planter and slaveholder. The life of Pierre-Joseph
Favrot provides an excellent example of how Creole families made the transition from French and
Spanish colonial rule to life in the American republic. His extensive correspondence with his wife,
children, extended family, and friends reveals the strategies French elites utilized to secure their
status under the American system, while still remaining closely tied to their French heritage.
Pierre-Joseph’s children Louis, Philogene, Josephine, and Octavine all grew to maturity during the
territorial period. He constantly instructed them on how to adapt to the new American presence
while also ensuring that they did their part to assimilate into their new country.
Beyond public matters, the family itself remained Pierre-Joseph’s central focus. Both at home
and in their correspondence, the Favrots continued to communicate in French. They also
remained strong Catholics and celebrated French holidays such as Mardi Gras. Moreover, they
maintained strong ties with extended family to reinforce their French colonial roots and family
status. The Favrot family shows how publicly many Louisianans did their part to assimilate into the
American system while privately, within the enclave of the family, clinging to their French identity.
Much like the Favrots, Lower Louisiana’s free black population also faced many challenges to its
colonial heritage. Libres were forced to overcome unique obstacles in their quest for assimilation.
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They not only had to combat Americans’ strong white supremacist ideology, but also struggled to
maintain their former colonial rights. Governor Claiborne and other American officials saw
Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy as one of the most troubling issues facing the new territorial
government. In 1806, territorial officials passed a new Black Code in hopes of establishing the
same strict racial barrier found elsewhere in the United States. The primary aim of these laws was
to solidify white supremacy within the territory while gradually forcing free blacks to a subordinate
position. Within a few years, the new Black Code created a society of whites and non-whites
leaving very little room for free people of color. 30
Chapter Six of this project focuses on the struggle of libres, demonstrating how race played a
vital role in determining how some Louisianans participated in the incorporation process. Despite
their gradual marginalization in the political and social landscape of territorial New Orleans, libres
made substantial efforts to maintain their colonial privileges. Kimberly S. Hanger’s Bounded Lives,
Bounded Places argues that during the colonial period free blacks used several strategies to
express their autonomy. Through a variety of kinship relationships, real and fictive, free blacks
were able to enlarge their economic and social standing.31 Moreover, such bonds often provided
free blacks with opportunities to interact with white society and secure valuable allies.32
Archdiocese and census records reveal that this practice continued during the territorial period as
libres attempted to cultivate beneficial kinship ties that improved their position in an increasingly
hostile environment. Militia service also provided free blacks many advantages. Although
American officials within the territory seemed reluctant to arm libres, Governor Claiborne allowed
30
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two battalions of free black troops to remain intact. According to Hanger, “Militia service provided
free blacks in New Orleans … with an important instrument for political expression as a corporate
body, an avenue for social advancement, and a means by which to gain honor, prestige, and
recognition.”33 As in the colonial period, free blacks in territorial New Orleans hoped that their
loyalty and noble military service would gain them respect and a means to negotiate their status.
The life of Noel Carrier Jr. illustrates the experience of New Orleans libres in the territorial
period. Carrier’s father, Captain Noel Carrier, had an eventful career as a black officer in the
Spanish military. He also gained notoriety as a leader in the libre community. With his father’s
death just one year after the Louisiana Purchase, Noel Jr. faced the challenge of maintaining the
privileges his father and other libres enjoyed. Noel Jr. employed political activism to secure a
military position and turned to kinship networks to reinforce his status and the vitality of the libre
community. The younger Carrier’s activities reveal how free blacks continued to use the same
strategies of self-preservation during the territorial period as they did during the colonial era. In
many ways, men like Noel Carrier Jr. would invoke the legacies left by their fathers, hoping to
secure a legitimate place as free men in the United States.
The project’s concluding chapter focuses on the Battle of New Orleans. The Battle of New
Orleans was a watershed event in American history—especially for Louisianans. Louisianans’
sacrifice at the concluding battle of the War of 1812 earned them national recognition as heroes
and ended their twelve-year long struggle to gain acceptance as true American citizens. In 1812,
Louisiana joined the Union as the newest American state. Yet Americans continued to question if
Louisianans were loyal American citizens. These suspicions only intensified as a British invasion
of New Orleans seemed imminent. Many, including Governor Claiborne, feared that Louisianans
33
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might join the British or assist the Spanish in conquering Louisiana. In the midst of such
accusations and suspicions, Louisianans joined together in the fall of 1814 to prepare the city for
an attack. Civil and military organizations worked in unison to procure ammunition and repair
fortifications. Louisiana militia and volunteer units from all over the state mobilized for war.
Concomitantly, Louisianans ardently professed their loyalty and attachment to the United States.
By the time General Andrew Jackson arrived in New Orleans, he was greeted by Louisianans who
were ready, willing, and able to defend their new country.
Immediately following the victory at Chalmette, American attitudes toward Louisianans changed.
Many welcomed Louisianans with open arms as countrymen, seeing their gallant efforts during the
Battle of New Orleans as an indication of their loyalty and affection. Furthermore, in the chaotic
weeks leading to the historic battle, the major characters of this project--and the groups that they
represent—came together to defeat a common foe and marched forward to take their rightful place
in the young American republic. Although Daniel Clark died mysteriously in 1813, Edward
Livingston and Julien Poydras came together to create the Committee of Defense, hoping it would
allow Louisianans to show their loyalty. Louis and Philogene Favrot, coming from a strong military
lineage, did not hesitate to fight for their new country. For libres like Noel Carrier Jr., the Battle of
New Orleans allowed them to prove that they too were citizens of the American republic, and many
hoped their military service would help secure the status their ancestors once enjoyed. The Battle
of New Orleans, therefore, provided another means for Louisianans to negotiate their place in the
Union and gain acceptance in the great American family.
Yet more importantly, the Battle of New Orleans and the acceptance it imparted showed how
Louisianans were successful in creating a Franco-American culture. For years, American
lawmakers and Louisianans fought over what was required of them to become American citizens.
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At the end of the day, valor on the battlefield helped secure what political protests, fighting in the
streets, harsh editorials, and petitions alone could not: Louisianans gained acceptance because
they were loyal. Even libres gained short-lived accolades for their gallant efforts and show of
devotion to the United States. It did not matter if Louisianans spoke French or continued to
practice civil law; what mattered was that they showed that they were willing to sacrifice their lives
to protect the United States.
****
Today Americans love to joke about the many idiosyncrasies of Louisianans who still practice
civil law, call counties parishes, and suck the heads of crawfish. Tourists continue to flock to New
Orleans to take in the unique cemeteries, French architecture, beignets, and Mardi Gras. Street
signs still have French names and balconies, like the ones Laussat passed centuries before, still
overlook festivities in the streets. Yet what few realize is that many of these famous anomalies
were formed in the years of toil and struggle by territorial Louisianans who actively and often
aggressively negotiated their place in the American republic. In 1837, one Louisianan explained
his state’s unique contours and culture by explaining that “a country is like a beloved first mistress:
you can abandon her, you may love another, but you can never forget her.”34 This statement
accurately portrays the impact Louisianans had on the incorporation process. Territorial
Louisianans made the needed sacrifices to become Americans citizens, yet they never forgot or
abandoned their French cultural ties. Ultimately, they found a balance between their old and new
country and created a distinct Franco-American culture that is still celebrated today.
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Chapter One: “The greatest curse that could at present befall us”: Making True Americans
in Lower Louisiana
On October 25, 1803, New York Representative Samuel Mitchill walked through the streets of
Washington D.C. Although the fall breeze sent a chill down his spine, he decided to take the
scenic route to the Capitol in hopes of clearing his mind. When he had heard the news of the
Louisiana Purchase just a few months before, he applauded the calculated and appropriate
measures utilized by the Jefferson administration in acquiring land that yielded endless benefits to
the young nation. As the Eighth Congress reconvened in early October, the unprecedented
purchase turned the Capitol into a political war zone. Federalists assaulted President Thomas
Jefferson’s abuse of executive power, while Republicans defended the diplomatic prowess of their
fearless leader. Yet even the most ardent Jeffersonian could not deny that the Louisiana Purchase
engendered many questions and challenges. As many of his congressional counterparts fought
over the constitutionality of the purchase or succumbed to partisan bickering, Mitchill became
consumed with one important question—How were American lawmakers going to incorporate
Lower Louisiana’s foreign population?1
A famous doctor and renowned scientist, Mitchill hoped that his keen sense of reason would
help him find solutions to this pressing concern. For weeks he pondered the new congressional
impasse from all perspectives. He felt conflicted about Louisianans’ future in the United States,
fearing the ramifications of allowing a foreign population into the Union while also worrying that
Samuel Mitchill described his reaction to the Louisiana Purchase in a letter he wrote to a friend in January 1804.
This letter can be found in Transactions of Oneida Historical Society at Utica (Oneida Historical Society, 1898), 166168; 8th Congress, 1st sess., Annals of Congress: The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States,
1789-1824 (Washington D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1854), 477-80. Here Mitchill stood before the House and specifically
asked, “What would the gentlemen propose we do with them [Louisianans]?” Also see Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible,
49. Samuel L. Mitchill was born in North Hampshed, Long Island, on August 17, 1764. He served as a New York
Representative in Congress in the Seventh and Eighth Congresses. In 1807, he was elected to the Senate where he
served until 1809. Before his political career he studied medicine and natural science. He died in September 1831.
For more readings on Samuel L. Mitchill see Transactions, 161-166; David Aberbach, In Search of an American
Identity: Samuel Latham Mitchill, Jeffersonian Nationalist (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 64-69.
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depriving Louisianans of basic rights would prove an imprudent and perhaps a dangerous
decision. As he walked past city buildings and meandered down unfamiliar streets, Mitchill soon
approached the Capitol ready to divulge his plans for Lower Louisiana. Little did he know that on
this day he would change the scope of the Louisiana debates and Louisianans’ fate.
News of the Louisiana Purchase hit American newspapers in the summer of 1803 and
immediately created a rush of enthusiasm and excitement. The National Intelligencer featured a
poem that referred to Louisiana as a land “overflowing with milk and honey” that would serve as a
new frontier for freedom and opportunity. Many American citizens and congressional leaders alike
fashioned grand visions of American commercial prosperity and economic domination.
Massachusetts Representative Jacob Crowninshield, for instance, contended that “we have
acquired this country … that offers immense advantages to us as an agricultural and commercial
nation.”2 Even President Jefferson’s archrival Alexander Hamilton could not deny the importance
of the acquisition, claiming that it provided the United States “unmolested” navigation of the
Mississippi River.3
Just months later, however, this initial enthusiasm was eclipsed by apprehension as Congress
confronted unprecedented questions engendered by the Louisiana Purchase. Just a few days
after the Eighth Congress convened, Delaware Senator Samuel White bemoaned the United
States’ land acquisition, asserting that “this new, immense, unbounded world … will be the greatest
curse that could at present befall us.”4 White’s statement seems quite contrary to earlier reactions,
yet it reveals an unexpected downside to the Louisiana Purchase. The economic and commercial
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advantages the purchase rendered undoubtedly made it essential to American prosperity, but
coupled with these benefits came many questions regarding its constitutionality and how to
incorporate Louisiana’s diverse foreign population into the Union. These issues soon dimmed the
initial fanfare of the purchase while intensifying partisan rivalries and concerns over the stability of
the young republic.
Following the speedy ratification of the cession treaty with France, the constitutionality of the
Louisiana Purchase consumed congressional deliberations. At the center of the debate was the
question of whether or not the Constitution authorized lawmakers to acquire territories beyond the
nation’s original borders. Attention centered on how to interpret Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution which stated, “New States may be admitted by Congress, into the Union…Congress
shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”5 As it made no mention of acquiring
new territories, congressional members undertook the task of interpreting this provision.
Constitutional questions regarding the purchase proved divisive, pitting a Federalist minority
against a strong Democratic-Republican (or simply Republicans) Congress. Jefferson’s
ascendancy to the presidency in 1800 fostered strong Federalist suspicions of a political
conspiracy. The Louisiana Purchase exacerbated these fears. Unable to defeat Republicans with
votes, Federalists exploited the Louisiana debates in hopes of challenging Jefferson’s growing
power. In turn, the deliberations engendered a partisan rift that exposed the dwindling power of the
Northeast but also Federalists’ fears regarding the long-term implications of the Louisiana
Purchase.
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Concomitantly, lawmakers had to decide how to prepare Louisianans for statehood. On that
cold October day, Mitchill began these proceedings by suggesting that Louisianans undergo an
“apprenticeship to liberty” that would serve as a probationary period to give them time to cultivate
the skills necessary to be good Americans. Mitchill’s plan met bipartisan support and helped
shaped the Governance Act of 1804 that established the contours of Louisianans’ territorial
government and incorporation process. Partisan animosities subsided as both Federalists and
Republicans harbored serious reservations regarding Louisiana’s diverse population and their
desire and readiness to become Americans.
The precedents set by the Eighth Congress left a lasting imprint on American history. The
constitutional issues reconciled by congressional leaders alleviated future apprehensions regarding
American expansion and also solidified conceptions of citizenship. The many congressional
deliberations and acts passed, furthermore, had a lasting impact on the lives of Louisianans. They
exposed the strong misgivings lawmakers had about Louisianans and would condition their future
relationship and interactions. Moreover, lawmakers set specific criteria and expectations for
Louisianans that would shape the incorporation process and territorial period. Ultimately, the
Eighth Congress sought to address Mitchill’s important question regarding Louisianans’ future
while making true Americans in Lower Louisiana.
****
Following the official confirmation of the United States’ acquisition of French Louisiana on July 4,
1803, President Jefferson began making preparations for the incorporation of French Louisiana. On
July 17, Jefferson asked Daniel Clark, an American businessman who had lived in New Orleans for
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nearly sixteen years, to collect information on the ceded land and its inhabitants.6 He sent Clark and
Mississippi territorial governor William C.C. Claiborne a list of questions regarding French Louisiana’s
borders, military apparatus, educational facilities, and legal systems.
As Jefferson attempted to become more acquainted with the new territory, he also began to tackle his
own reservations over the constitutionality of the purchase. During his tenure as Secretary of State,
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans strongly advocated a strict construction of the Constitution. For
Jefferson, the Constitution served as a guide for Americans and their republican government. To him,
deviation or loose interpretation only undermined the very substance of the sacred document. The
Louisiana Purchase forced Jefferson to reconcile his strong desire to secure access to the Mississippi
River with his strict constructionist views. Jefferson finally chose to endorse the purchase, an act that
the Constitution did not specifically authorize.
To alleviate the contradiction between his early beliefs and his executive actions, Jefferson suggested
adding an amendment to the Constitution that would place the acquisition well within the bounds of the
Constitution. As early as January 1803, Jefferson mentioned his plans to Albert Gallatin, admitting that
“it will be safer not to permit the enlargement of the Union but by an amendment to the Constitution.”7
Once the Louisiana Purchase treaty was signed Jefferson immediately began preparing this
amendment. On August 12, 1803, Jefferson sent a draft to friend Senator John Breckinridge for his
approval. 8 Days later a sense of urgency consumed the Jefferson administration when rumors

6 Jefferson to Daniel Clark, 17 July 1803, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
Ellery Berch (Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), X: 406.
7 Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, January 1803, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York:
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905), X: 3n.
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circulated that French officials were becoming reluctant to cede Louisiana.9 Jefferson quickly notified
Breckinridge of the new development and urged him to remain silent about a constitutional amendment
that could jeopardize a quick ratification of the cession treaty.10 This threat forced Jefferson to abandon
his hopes for a new amendment. Jefferson, however, felt assured that Congress’ “good sense of our
country” would be able to address any constitutional issues the purchase engendered.11 Thus Jefferson
was unwilling to sacrifice Louisiana for the sake of his own strict constructionist convictions. Instead, he
looked to the Eighth Congress to reconcile this constitutional quandary, encouraging its members to
quickly ratify the cession treaty to secure the vast new territory.12
Heeding Jefferson’s advice, the Senate immediately began examining the cession treaty. Feeling the
pressure of expediency, congressional leaders were forced to avoid any major debates on the
constitutionality of the purchase and ratified the treaty within three days. Although initial deliberations
regarding the purchase provoked little debate, the months that followed allowed lawmakers to voice
their concerns on a variety of issues regarding the acquisition and incorporation of French Louisiana.
These debates exposed a strong partisan rift in Congress, but also generated vital questions concerning
the stability of the young nation.
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After Jefferson’s election in 1800, Federalist leaders saw their political power dwindling as
Republicans secured both the presidency and a congressional majority.13 The growing prominence of
the Republicans convinced Federalists, particularly Massachusetts Senator Timothy Pickering, that
there existed a Jeffersonian conspiracy to eradicate Federalist opposition.14 One issue that shaped
Pickering’s suspicion was Jefferson’s assault on the federal judiciary. The judiciary crisis, which
claimed the career of one Federalist judge, appeared to Pickering as an effort by Republicans to destroy
the independent federal judiciary by removing Federalist judges through the impeachment process.15
Yet, ultimately the acquisition of French Louisiana became the Federalists’ major point of contention
against the Jefferson administration.
Pickering’s conspiracy theories spread amongst Federalist circles. William Plumer, James Hillhouse,
Uriah Tracy, and Roger Griswold all came to share similar fears. This coalition became so convinced of
a Republican coup that they began making preparations to secede from the Union to save their party.16
In devising this radical action, Pickering admitted that “I will rather anticipate a new confederacy, exempt
from the corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic Democrats of the South.”17 This
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confederacy was to include the New England states, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Moderate Federalists empathized with their political brethren, but most saw separation as impractical
and quite detrimental not only to the Federalist Party but also to the nation. Rufus King, Alexander
Hamilton, and John Quincy Adams all expressed disapproval of Pickering’s calls for secession. These
moderate Federalists ignored the proposed confederacy, dooming it to failure.18
It is difficult to ascertain Jefferson’s real intentions or the validity of Pickering’s accusations. Jefferson
did, however, express his desire to unite moderate Federalists with Republicans, while eradicating the
menacing presence of radical Federalists like Pickering who he viewed as political insurgents.19 During
the Louisiana debates, Jefferson mocked Federalist accusations of a political conspiracy, contending
that Pickering and his Federalist coalition created a Republican straw man made “of certain Jacobinical,
atheistical, anarchical, imaginary caricatures … created to frighten the credulous.”20
As plans for a northern confederacy subsided, Federalist leaders continued to lament the
acquisition of French Louisiana. In his personal correspondence, John Quincy Adams bewailed
the Louisiana Purchase, predicting that it would “diminish the relative weight and influence of the
Northern section.” Like his Federalist counterparts, he believed that states emerging from the new
territory would enhance the clout of the slave South.21 Adams feared that this rising slave power
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would emasculate northern political influence in Congress and destroy the economic welfare of
New England. Fellow Northeastern congressional leaders mirrored Adams’s apprehensions. New
Hampshire Senator William Plumer was particularly vexed by what he saw as a major threat to
northeastern political leverage. He envisioned that the new states carved out of the Louisiana
Purchase would eventually be more inclined to the interests of the South both politically and
economically. Thus the incorporation of Louisiana would serve to “destroy with a single operation
the whole weight and importance of the eastern states in the scale of politics.”22 Northern
newspapers articulated this same anxiety, while depicting the Louisiana Purchase as the agent of
New England’s ultimate demise. In the Balance and Columbian Repository, a concerned
Federalist called “Calculator” contended that the new Louisiana territory threatened to undermine
the economic endeavors of older states. Calculator expressed alarm that Louisiana “would tend to
lessen, and finally almost to destroy” northeastern political influence.23
To protect Northern interests, Federalists tried to split Republican votes in Congress by adopting an
unlikely platform centered on a strict construction of the Constitution. Using this approach, Federalists
hoped to appeal to more conservative Republicans wedded to old Jeffersonian arguments regarding
constitutional interpretation. Federalist opponents were clearly afraid that the purchase would dilute the
political and economic influence of the Northeastern states. To cloak this potent concern, Federalist
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congressional members invoked strict constructionist rhetoric and assaulted Republican attempts to
evade the Constitution to solidify their own party power.
One of the major components of the new Federalist attack centered on Jefferson’s excessive
use of executive power in invoking the treaty-making power. According to Article II, Section 2 of
the Constitution, the president “shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”24 Federalist
leaders accused Jefferson of exceeding these powers when he promised the immediate
incorporation of Louisiana inhabitants. According to Senator Plumer, only Congress could admit
new states into the Union.25 In Plumer’s view, for Jefferson to guarantee citizenship and statehood
to Louisianans meant that he intended to bypass the proper channels for admitting new states,
which the Constitution vested in Congress. Connecticut Senator Uriah Tracy also expressed
severe reservations as to whether the treaty-making power actually authorized the president and
Senate to incorporate Louisiana on the same footing as other American states. He bluntly
asserted that from “a fair construction of the constitution … the President and the Senate have not
the power of thus obtruding upon us Louisiana.”26 Federalists depicted Jefferson as a despotic
executive who made conscious attempts to evade the Constitution to secure his own agenda.
Republican members of the Senate were prepared to defend Jefferson’s actions. Senator
Breckinridge reminded his Federalist rivals that the Executive branch was the most appropriate avenue
to negotiate with foreign diplomats. Yet, this power, according to Breckinridge, was not without scrutiny
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since Congress, not the president, ratified treaties and admitted new territories into the Union.27 Virginia
Senator Wilson Carey Nicholas held similar sentiments, asserting that Jefferson had not exceeded the
treaty-making power designated to him by the Constitution because Congress would check his actions
by ratifying and providing the funds for the Louisiana Purchase.28
Federalist leaders, furthermore, expressed serious concerns over the vast size of the purchase and
the sheer practicality of governing a distant territory. Senator Plumer avowed that adding more spatial
distance between the populace and the federal government in Washington would only dissolve the
republic.29 Senator Samuel White prophesied that Louisiana’s fertile, empty lands would draw
settlement away from the older states, causing settlers to sever ties with the federal government and
thus alienating their affections to the nation and its principles.30 Federalist leaders thought that the vast
size of Louisiana would strain the management capacity of the federal government and render the
republic useless. In attempts to counter such assertions, Republican congressional leaders argued that
the addition of French Louisiana strengthened the republic by making it “more safe and more durable.”
Breckinridge argued that in “proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of free
government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation.”31
Breckinridge and other Republican leaders dismissed Federalist arguments over the size of the republic
as anachronistic and looked to the purchase to strengthen the infant nation.
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Federalists also utilized constitutional rhetoric to strike at the heart of the Louisiana Purchase,
attacking Republicans’ blatant disregard for Article IV of the Constitution. The article gave Congress the
power to admit new states at its discretion. It failed, however, to mention the admission of states
beyond the original borders of the United States or land ceded by a foreign nation. Federalist leaders
argued that the early founders opposed such an acquisition, since they did not specifically mention it in
the Constitution. Senator Plumer asserted that the Founding Fathers made no provisions for acquiring
territory outside the original borders of the nation, thus never contemplating “the accession of a foreign
people, or the extension of territory.”32 Vermont Representative James Elliot believed the treaty itself
was unconstitutional, since the “constitution is silent on the subject of the acquisition of territory.” 33
Republican leaders, however, took a more liberal view. Virginia Representative John Randolph argued
that since the founders failed to outline specific American borders, contemporary lawmakers had
nothing hindering further expansion. A representative from Massachusetts, Samuel Thatcher, also
believed that since the Constitution failed to prohibit the acquisition of new territories Congress and the
American people should resolve the issue together.34
In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting arguments, John Quincy Adams tried to convince his
fellow lawmakers that a new amendment to the Constitution would alleviate the pressing congressional
quandary. He strongly believed an amendment allowed Congress, in good conscience, to make the
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needed appropriations for the purchase and begin incorporating Louisiana into the Union.35 Pickering
also contended that Louisiana could be incorporated only by a constitutional amendment. He argued
that failure to do so proved that Republicans sought to render the Constitution “a convenient instrument,
to be shaped by construction, into any form that will best promote the views of the operator.”36 As
Federalist leaders scoffed at Republicans’ disregard for the Constitution, only two Federalists supported
Adams’s proposal for a new amendment.37 This indicates that Federalists had failed to whole-heartedly
adopt a strict constructionist platform, but merely used it to disguise real concerns regarding the erosion
of Northeastern influence.
During the first session of the Eighth Congress, the constitutional questions created by the Louisiana
Purchase touched on many concerns pertaining to the infant nation. The proper size of the republic, the
national political balance, and the durability of the Constitution took center stage in both the House and
Senate. Federalists and Republicans alike wrestled to find the most appropriate means to decode the
true meaning of Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution. Federalists chose to take a strict approach in
hopes of salvaging their political influence, while Republican leaders abandoned their former misgivings
about a liberal constitutional interpretation to reap the benefits the purchase imparted. Ultimately,
Republicans won this battle as they proceeded with the incorporation process despite the absence of a
constitutional amendment that sanctioned the purchase.
Although the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase proved a potent issue, members of the
Eighth Congress also had to decide exactly what to do with Lower Louisiana’s ethnically diverse
population. Both Federalists and Republicans agreed that Louisianans were not prepared for immediate
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statehood. Yet congressional leaders seemed perplexed over what territorial government could assist
Louisianans in becoming more acquainted with American political and legal institutions. Concerns over
the diminishing power of the Northeast or fears over the size of the burgeoning republic were fused with
apprehensions that Louisianans’ ethnic background and colonial past made them unique and in need of
a special territorial government that could effectively incorporate them into the young republic.
****
As Jefferson dealt with the constitutional issues of the Louisiana Purchase and growing Federalist
unrest, he also began to prepare a government for the newly ceded territory. He first looked to the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as a useful model. The one great achievement of the Articles of
Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance established uniform guidelines for the admission of new states
into the Union. Confederation lawmakers looked to the Ordinance to supply a three-step process for
statehood. The first grade of territorial status treated territorial inhabitants as subjects under the
jurisdiction of Congress. Therefore, lawmakers appointed all territorial officials such as the governor
and judges. When a territory’s population reached 5,000 free white males it was elevated to the second
stage. Here territorial inhabitants were allowed to form a legislative body and send a non-voting
delegate to Congress. During this phase, however, Congress still had the power to appoint top officials
and veto any territorial legislation. The third and final stage of the statehood process occurred when the
territory’s population reached 60,000 people. At this point, territorial inhabitants could hold a
constitutional convention and apply for statehood. Once Congress approved the constitution, the
territory entered the Union on an equal footing with other American states.38
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Initially Jefferson hoped to implement the guidelines outlined in the Northwest Ordinance in Lower
Louisiana. Having 5,000 free white men, the Orleans Territory should have entered the second stage of
the statehood process. Yet as Jefferson received answers to his early inquiries from William C.C.
Claiborne and Daniel Clark, he developed strong reservations. Claiborne and Clark both reported that
the colony had few existing educational programs and that most inhabitants were barely literate enough
to write their own names. In his observations, Claiborne concluded that Louisiana’s ignorant population
needed a well-regulated government that could instruct them on every aspect of American political and
social life. 39 This new information convinced Jefferson that the Northwest Ordinance would only turn
Lower Louisiana’s laws “topsy-turvy.”40 Thus Jefferson began looking for a new territorial apparatus that
could address Lower Louisianans’ special needs and perceived inadequacies.
Although the country’s short history provided few constitutional precedents about how to incorporate
new territories, it did supply lessons on how to absorb immigrants into the Union. American theories of
citizenship were adaptations of English ideas concerning the subject-king relationship. Sir Edward
Coke’s ruling in the Calvin Case (1608) became the definitive understanding of English subjectship.41
According to Coke, there existed a reciprocal allegiance between subject and king. The subject
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provided his loyalty and service to the Crown in exchange for protection and security. There existed,
however, a hierarchy of subjectship based on what type of allegiance one had with the Crown. For
those born in England, the bond between subject and king was a natural, self-perpetuating allegiance.42
These subjects, therefore, received full rights of property ownership and access to certain political
offices. For subjects born outside the protection of the King and owing loyalty to another sovereign,
Parliament could naturalize them or the King could grant royal patents of denization. Naturalization
placed aliens on the same footing as natural born subjects, while denization conferred limited rights,
restricting subjects from owning property and holding pubic office.43
In British North America, these early notions of the subject-king relationship became blurred, as
Anglo-Americans developed their own ideas of subjectship to accommodate their particular colonial
experience. The vast size of British North America necessitated a large and constant flow of new
immigrants to make the colonies secure and economically viable. As England failed to supply needed
colonists, Anglo-Americans looked to other European countries to furnish new arrivals. By the end of
the seventeenth century, colonial assemblies took it upon themselves to naturalize and incorporate
these newcomers, eradicating old distinctions between natural-born or denizen subjects and granting all
new subjects full rights as Englishmen. Survival and economic expansion, not doctrinal compliance to
old English standards, dictated colonial policies.44 Parliament’s indifference to colonial naturalization
policies also allowed colonists to create their own absorption methods with little interference from the
mother country. As a result, old European conceptions of subjectship faded as more immigrants
became assimilated into British North America.
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As colonists constructed their individual naturalization policies they also altered Coke’s original
theories of the subject-king allegiance. Foreign immigrants’ military service and economic endeavors
were major factors in the success of British North American colonies. Native-born colonists soon
realized that their own lives were improved by naturalizing incoming foreigners who contributed to the
welfare of the community—creating a common assumption that foreigners who chose to work towards
the common good justly deserved the same rights as Englishmen. The allegiance that once existed
between the King and his subjects was replaced with a communal bond between a community and an
individual citizen. This process also included consent and choice. Since immigrants chose to come to
certain colonies and contribute to their existence, this choice and commitment signified their right to full
citizenship in British North America.45
With the formation of the Confederation government following the American Revolution, the
independent thirteen states took over the naturalization duties once exercised by colonial assemblies.
Qualifications for citizenship varied, yet all states sought to encompass key aspects of the new
government within their policies. Ultimately, two main prerequisites for citizenship were consistent in
every state’s naturalization policy. First, immigrants had to display a strong attachment to the United
States, which included taking an oath of loyalty and disavowing affection to another nation. Second,
aliens had to demonstrate or obtain a basic knowledge of republican principles. This usually required a
probation or apprenticeship period that provided subjects with ample time to become acquainted with
the intricate workings of the American government.46
Under the Articles of Confederation, states held sovereign power over naturalization, yet many
lawmakers, such as James Madison, began to advocate a national policy to alleviate problems of
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interstate variations.47 As the Constitutional Convention attempted to provide a federal political system,
it also worked to devise a standardized procedure for the absorption of immigrants. Although
convention delegates failed to pass a comprehensive naturalization policy, they did address the utility of
providing immigrants a proper probation period. As evidenced by convention deliberations regarding
residency requirements for congressional officials, delegates hoped to ensure that immigrants seeking
office possessed both an attachment for the Union and essential political knowledge.
An early draft of the Constitution stated that an individual seeking a seat in the House of
Representatives needed to have been an American citizen for at least three years while prospective
senators required four.48 These debates exposed a particular concern regarding the proper time
allotted an immigrant to foster the needed attachments and political expertise to become a public
official. Virginia delegate George Mason asserted that three years failed to supply ample time for a
subject to sever ties to his mother country. He feared that naturalized congressional leaders could
introduce an unwanted foreign presence into the legislature.49 Mason also argued that three years was
not long enough to ensure that new citizens had become acquainted with the workings of a republican
government. Remarks such as these reflect American apprehensions regarding how much time it took
an immigrant to become a good American. The final vote revealed that many convention delegates held
similar concerns as they extended the proposed residency requirement to seven years for
representatives serving in the House.50
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Similar debates occurred when discussing the four-year requirement for those seeking a seat in the
Senate. Delegates such as South Carolina’s Charles Cotesworth Pinckney felt that foreign-born citizens
should be prohibited from the Senate, since this legislative body had foreign and diplomatic powers. He
contended that “there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign
attachments” that could subvert congressional decisions on foreign affairs.51 Gouverneur Morris
reiterated Pinckney’s warning, arguing that foreign-born citizens would impair the judgment of Senate
members in dealing with international diplomacy and trade.52 Morris suggested that prospective
Senators must be citizens for at least fourteen years rather than four. Convention delegates finally
compromised and established a nine-year residency requirement for Senate members.
The residency issue discussed in the Constitutional Convention exposed many anxieties about
naturalized subjects and their ability to take part in the republican government while at the same time
severing their former attachments. Although the Constitutional Convention set key requirements for
naturalized citizens seeking congressional office, it would be up to congressional members to create a
national naturalization policy for the absorption of immigrants.
In 1790, Congress passed the first federal Naturalization Act. The act required all immigrants seeking
naturalization to have lived in the United States for at least two years. Many American lawmakers
argued that a longer tenure of residency was needed for subjects to sever former attachments to foreign
nations. To alleviate this concern, the act contained a clause requiring each subject to take an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution, thus relinquishing all ties to his/her homeland. Despite this added
stipulation, most congressional leaders saw the act as too weak to ensure good American citizens.
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Massachusetts Representative Benjamin Goodhue contended that the new law “made our citizenship
too cheap,” and proposed a longer residency period for aliens seeking citizenship. Connecticut
Representative Benjamin Huntington concurred that only through a probationary period could
immigrants have “an opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the principles of the Government, and of
those who are most proper to administer it.” 53 Despite calls for a more stringent policy, the 1790 act
served as the first of many naturalization laws that sought to secure attached and politically
knowledgeable citizens. Over the next ten years, congressional leaders would struggle to find a
standard process of naturalization that provided immigrants a proper apprenticeship period in which to
cultivate these vital requirements.
International strife in France and the West Indies prompted lawmakers to revise the 1790
Naturalization Act. As refugees from revolution-torn France and Haiti sought safe asylum in the United
States, Washington lawmakers began developing a new naturalization policy in December 1794.54
Virginia Representative William Branch Giles proposed that each subject seeking naturalization must
have two witnesses to testify to his/her attachment to the country and good moral character. He also
argued that all aliens needed to swear an oath of allegiance to be “attached to a Republican form of
Government.”55
In January 1795, the revised Naturalization Act extended residency requirements for prospective
citizens from two years to five years. The act stipulated that these subjects needed to announce their
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intentions to be naturalized three years before admission. This allowed subjects time to display their
knowledge of and attachment to the principles of the Constitution. Also new citizens were required to
renounce any previous titles of European nobility and swear an oath of allegiance to the United States.56
Many Federalist leaders such as Fisher Ames believed that a five-year apprenticeship period was still
not long enough. Rather Ames suggested that American lawmakers should “oblige foreigners to wait
seven years…till their habits as well as interests become assimilated with our own.”57 Even though
Federalist and Republican congressional members differed over how rigid the naturalization law should
be, they shared a basic assumption that the federal government had a vested interest in the character,
knowledge, and attachment of potential citizens.
In 1798, Federalist leaders were successful in implementing a more stringent naturalization act as a
part of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Moreover, the Federalist Congress used a possible war with France
to undermine Republican support.58 According to historian John C. Miller, Federalists sought to deplete
their rivals’ support by attacking the ethnic population that tended to vote in favor of Republicans.59
They also hoped to keep new immigrants who populated middle or southern states of the country from
threatening New England’s political influence. In an effort to eradicate this ethnic threat, Federalists
utilized the crisis with France to impose a stricter naturalization policy under the auspices of national
security. Although the debates regarding the new Naturalization Act and the Alien and Sedition laws
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illustrated extreme political factionalism, they also mirrored earlier discussions on citizenship and what
was required for immigrants seeking naturalization.
In House deliberations regarding the new naturalization policy, South Carolina Representative Robert
Goodloe Harper argued that foreigners should never become American citizens, contending that
“nothing but birth should entitle a man to citizenship in this country.”60 Harper did not wish incoming
immigrants to be deprived of property rights, but he believed their former attachments to foreign nations
made them unfit to vote or hold public office. In May 1798, the new naturalization act passed in both the
Senate and House. The act included a fourteen-year residency requirement for those seeking American
citizenship, stipulating that subjects announce their intent for admission at least five years prior to
naturalization. The act also contained a new clause that banned immigrants from belligerent countries
from seeking citizenship.61 The 1798 Naturalization Act exposed deep-seated fears that incoming
immigrants would destroy not only the federal government but also American domestic security if they
were not subject to a longer apprenticeship period.
Upon Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800, the Naturalization Act of 1798 was repealed and replaced.
The new act reinstated requirements delineated in the 1795 act with a residency requirement of five
years, requiring subjects to take an oath of allegiance. The heart of the act still rested on the
assumption that an apprenticeship period was crucial to allow immigrants time to foster political
knowledge and an attachment to republican principles. According to Pennsylvania Representative
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Michael Leib, this probationary period “was the surest standard by which to test the desire for
citizenship.”62
By 1803, Congress had passed various naturalization policies. These pieces of legislation reveal a
common consensus that naturalized citizens had to be loyal and politically competent. The
incorporation of Louisiana altered this absorption process. Previously, American lawmakers extended
citizenship on an individual basis or to small groups. Yet in the case of Lower Louisiana citizenship
would have to be extended to thousands of foreigners at one time. Congressional leaders began to
question how best to handle this mass naturalization. Article III of the cession treaty with France, which
guaranteed Louisianans immediate incorporation, only exacerbated the difficulty of this task. Many
worried about the long-term implications of allowing a population they deemed unfit into the Union.
Others, however, feared that by depriving Louisianans of citizenship, congressional leaders might force
their newest inhabitants to look unfavorably on their new government and perhaps incite rebellion.
Ultimately, congressional members chose to ignore Article III and continued to look at a probationary
period as necessary for Louisianans. It is here that Samuel Mitchill, after weeks of contemplation,
argued that the territorial period was to serve as an “apprenticeship to liberty” that gradually assimilated
Louisianans into the Union, explaining that:
It is intended, first to extend to this newly acquired people the blessings of law and
social order. To protect them from rapacity, violence, and anarchy…. In this way they
are to be trained up in a knowledge of our own laws and institutions. They are thus to
serve an apprenticeship to liberty; they are to be taught the lessons of freedom; and by
degrees they are to be raised to the enjoyment and practice of independence. All of
this is to be done as soon as possible; that is, as soon as the nature of the case will
permit; and according to the principles of the Federal Constitution…. Secondly, after
they shall have been sufficient length of time in this probationary condition, they shall,
as soon as the principles of the Constitution permit, and conformably thereto, be
declared citizens of the United States. Congress will judge of the time, manner, and
expediency of this. The act we are now about to perform will not confer on them this
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elevated character. They will thereby gain no admission into this House, nor into the
other House of Congress. There will be no alien influence thereby introduced into our
councils. By degrees, however, they will pass on from the childhood of republicanism,
through the improving period of youth, and arrive at the mature experience of manhood.
And then, they may be admitted to the full privileges which their merit and station will
entitle them to.63
Mitchill certainly tried to find a middle ground. He hoped to provide Louisianans enough rights to meet
the most basic requirements stipulated in the cession treaty with France. He, however, believed that an
apprenticeship to liberty or probationary period protected the United States from a foreign and “politically
ignorant” population by allowing Congress to set the incorporation timetable. Moreover, he hoped that
such an apprenticeship period would instill Louisianans with the skills to meet crucial requirements for
American citizenship.
Mitchill’s plan soon met the approval of not only Congress but also President Jefferson. After
abandoning hopes of using the Northwest Ordinance, Jefferson devised a new, more rigid territorial
government for Lower Louisiana that he believed would assist Louisianans in becoming true Americans.
Jefferson’s ultimate plan, modeled after Mitchill’s apprenticeship to liberty, placed Lower Louisiana on
the lowest grade of territorial status, depriving territorial inhabitants of representation and legislative
powers. Fears over Louisianans’ political ignorance and their ties to a “despotic” colonial past rendered
them, in Jefferson’s eyes, incapable of participating in and appreciating a representative government.64
Jefferson looked to Senator Breckinridge to set his plans in motion. Jefferson stressed the need to
keep his authorship of the government bill secret.65 On December 9, 1803, Breckinridge submitted
Jefferson’s plan, appropriately called the Breckinridge Bill, to the Senate for consideration. As
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expected, the bill made provisions to divide the purchase into two separate territories. Everything north
of the 33rd parallel was to be attached to the Indiana Territory, while Lower Louisiana was to become
the Orleans Territory. The legislative powers of the latter were given to the territorial governor and a
small legislative council appointed by the President. The bill also prohibited the further importation of
slaves into the new territory.
Debates concerning the Breckinridge Bill illustrate that many lawmakers shared Jefferson’s
sentiments regarding Lower Louisianans and the type of government they required. Daniel Clark’s early
reports and Governor Claiborne’s constant correspondence from the new territory supplied
congressional leaders further validation that Louisianans were not ready for a republican government.
In a letter to Secretary of State James Madison, Claiborne contended that “Republicanism among all her
Friends here will find but few who have cultivated an acquaintance with her principles.”66 Five days
later, Claiborne reiterated his early opinion, claiming that his contact with the territory’s inhabitants only
further convinced him that they were unfit for a representative government.67
Claiborne’s observations of Louisianans’ political ignorance convinced members of the Eighth
Congress that Louisianans were too unfamiliar with American institutions to elect competent territorial
officials. According to Senator Plumer, any sort of representative government was lost on Lower
Louisiana inhabitants “who are not only ignorant of our laws, government, and usages under them, but a
large portion of them wholly unacquainted with our language.”68 Senator Pickering repeated these
sentiments, claiming that Louisianans were “incapable of enjoying freedom and the blessing of a free
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government, they are too ignorant to elect suitable men.”69 There was considerable bipartisan support
for the Breckinridge Bill as Federalists and Republicans agreed that the Orleans Territory needed a long
apprenticeship period before admission into the Union.
With strong concerns about Louisianans’ political capabilities, American lawmakers found it easy to
abandon the guidelines delineated in the Northwest Ordinance. Much like President Jefferson,
members of the Eighth Congress saw the Orleans Territory as too unique to fall under the provisions of
the 1787 model. When Ohio Senator Thomas Worthington moved to allow the Orleans Territory to send
a delegate to Congress, many lawmakers recoiled at his motion. In the case of the Northwest and the
Mississippi territories, such a delegate was allowed to take part in congressional debates allowing
territorial inhabitants a voice in Congress. When it came to Lower Louisiana, however, many senators
felt that this precedent was not applicable. New Jersey Senator Jonathan Dayton claimed that the
Orleans Territory was a unique territory, thus altering the standard process of territorial representation.
Dayton avowed that Louisianans were neither guaranteed nor ready for a legislative delegate.70 Many
members of the Eighth Congress felt that Louisianans were too unfamiliar with American republican
values to elect or benefit from such a delegate.
Not all members of the Eighth Congress agreed that the Breckinridge Bill provided the best
government for Lower Louisiana. Some lawmakers felt that it not only violated the rights of the country’s
newest inhabitants, but that it undermined cherished national values. Tennessee Senator Joseph
Anderson asserted that “this bill has not a single feature of our government in it.” Rather, he saw the act
as merely a system of tyranny, detracting from a republican form of government.71 Perhaps John
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Quincy Adams was the strongest opponent of the Breckinridge Bill, believing that such a monarchial bill
not only deprived Louisianans of their most basic liberties but also threatened to destroy the rights of the
entire American citizenry.72 Virginia Representative John George Jackson also believed the bill failed to
perpetuate true American values. He asked his fellow congressmen, “What will the world say if we
sanction this principle? They will say we possess the principle of despotism under the garb of
Republicans; and that we are insincere.” Jackson wondered how members of the House could so
loudly proclaim that all men were created equal while passing such an oppressive, un-American bill.73
Despite strong opposition from Anderson, Adams, and Jackson, the Breckinridge Bill passed on
March 26, 1804. Its final version entitled “An Act Erecting Louisiana into two territories, and providing
for the temporary government thereof,” or commonly referred to as the Governance Act of 1804, split
lands acquired in the Louisiana Purchase into the Louisiana District and the Orleans Territory.74 This
act also set up the territorial government of the newly formed Orleans Territory, placing legislative
powers in the hands of the governor and a legislative council appointed by the president. The judicial
powers of the territory rested in a superior court of three judges who were also selected by the
Executive. The Governance Act made no mention of an elected legislative body for Lower Louisianans
or the population requirements for future statehood. 75
Furthermore, the bill also addressed the future of slavery in the Orleans territory. According to
Section X of the Governance Act, “It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to import or bring into
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the said territory, from any port or place without limits of the United States, or cause or procure to be so
imported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or slaves.”76 This
particular section prohibited the foreign importation of slaves into the territory, a restriction not imposed
on American slaveholders until 1808. Article X also limited the domestic slave trade to American
citizens and Louisianans who had resided in the territory for at least three years. This added provision
threatened the economic livelihood of many Louisiana planters and traders.
****
Although for years to come many Federalists would continue to disparage the Louisiana Purchase as
an unconstitutional and detrimental acquisition, members of the Eighth Congress adjourned until the
next congressional session with a sense of relief that “the curse” of Louisiana had temporarily been
lifted. French Louisiana had been officially transferred to the United States, the financial appropriations
for the purchase secured, and the republic remained intact. Concomitantly, congressional leaders
looked at the 1804 Governance Act, although uncharacteristically undemocratic, as the ideal
apprenticeship to liberty.
While congressional leaders took a short reprieve from the rigors of office, Lower Louisianans were
preparing for a heated dispute over the Governance Act and what they viewed as an oppressive
government that deprived them of their rights as new Americans. Furthermore, Louisianans were ready
to reveal their own hopes and aspirations for the incorporation process. As the debates regarding the
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Louisiana Purchase subsided in Congress, a new battle emerged between Washington lawmakers and
their newest inhabitants as Louisianans employed strategies of negotiation to carve out their place in the
young American republic.
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Chapter Two: “Designing intrigueing men”: Creole Resistance and Negotiation in Territorial
Louisiana
Territorial Governor William C. C. Claiborne grew accustomed to pacing around his office
pondering the many issues facing his administration. Lately he carried the weight of the recent
Burr Conspiracy that cast doubt on the loyalty of his constituents and the tranquility of his
precarious territory. He worried about the Legislative Assembly handicapped by ethnic feuds and
partisan rivalries. The territory’s legal code also caused Claiborne grave concern as the battle over
civil law left the court system in utter disarray. Yet on this balmy day in June 1807, Claiborne
paced a straight line with only one thing on his mind: his life. After slowly walking ten paces,
Claiborne turned and faced his adversary Daniel Clark. As Clark shot his pistol, Claiborne fell to
the ground as a bullet pierced his right thigh. Clark stood unshaken as his second man, Richard
Keen, went to check the extent of the governor’s injuries. Soon spectators carried the wounded
governor to a boat to take him to the nearest doctor. Leaving the duel ashamed and in pain,
Claiborne could not help but wonder how things had come this far.1
As Claiborne remained confined to his home unable to walk for nearly a month, territorial
inhabitants seemed mesmerized by the duel between the troubled governor and one of the
territory’s most trusted leaders. Virginian, and recent transplant to New Orleans, Elisabeth House
Trist narrated the sordid details to her good friend back home. She explained that the duel
stemmed from a longtime feud between the two men exacerbated when Clark spread erroneous
rumors about Claiborne. She also indicated that Clark’s actions were a result of his growing
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resentment with the American government.2 Although petty gossip often exaggerates the truth
behind such events, Trist’s understanding was quite correct. Months before the duel, Clark made
his way to Washington D.C. to serve as the Orleans territorial delegate to Congress. In December,
he took the floor to express his concerns regarding the state of Lower Louisiana. There he
disparaged Claiborne’s ineffective leadership that, he claimed, left the territorial militia in a state of
disarray.3
In the wake of Clark’s comments, Claiborne scurried to uphold the reputation of his
administration. In several correspondences with President Jefferson, Claiborne explained that all
necessary measures had been taken to strengthen the territorial militia. He went on to expose the
context of Clark’s fallacious statements, arguing that “there are men in New Orleans whose primary
object seems to be to embarrass every measure of the Government, at least such as it is my duty
to execute.”4 In the weeks to come, Clark refused to retract his statements, prompting Claiborne to
challenge him to a duel.
The famous duel was much more than an isolated event that captivated territorial inhabitants
and bruised the ego of the sensitive and often timid governor. Rather it served as a culmination of
an ongoing struggle between Claiborne and territorial inhabitants determined to resist American
policies. Claiborne himself always remained cognizant of this growing opposition, yet at times
misrepresented its true nature. To Claiborne territorial resistance was not the result of
Claiborne to the President, 17 June, 1807, Territorial Papers, IX: 743. Elizabeth House Trist came to New
Orleans with her son Horace Browse Trist in 1803 when he served as port collector. After her son died in 1804, she
stayed in New Orleans four more years before returning to her home in Virginia. She is most known for her longtime
friendship with Thomas Jefferson that later resulted in their grandchildren, Nicholas Trist and Virginia Jefferson
Randolph, marrying in 1824. Although only in the Orleans Territory for a few short years, Trist became immersed in
the turbulent political disputes and often recounted every incident to friends in Virginia.
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Louisianans’ dislike of the American government, but rather a small group of scheming men set on
destroying his administration. Claiborne often spoke of such men. On one occasion, he explained
to President Jefferson that “the Natives of Louisiana, are a pacific amiable people much attached
to this Country, and to peace and good order,” yet he worried that his constituents were susceptible
to being swayed by “a few designing intrigueing men” who sought to corrupt them.5 Later he
reiterated his fears to James Madison, contending that “I shall never cease to believe Louisianans
are an amiable, well disposed people, but I fear they are too easily influenced by the councils of
men who flatter them.”6
The designing men that Claiborne referred to were not native Louisianans, but rather Americans
living in New Orleans. These Americans included Claiborne’s duel partner Daniel Clark as well as
Jeffersonian and former New Yorker Edward Livingston. In Claiborne’s view, these men constantly
worked to arouse discontent among Louisianans and orchestrated opposition to American policies.
Indeed, both Clark and Livingston were the ringleaders to a resistance movement that dominated
much of Claiborne’s time and led to the fateful duel.
Claiborne, however, was often quite naïve in assessing Louisianans’ intentions and participation.
He remained convinced that Clark and Livingston maliciously encouraged unsuspecting
Louisianans to resist and stall Americanization and incorporation efforts. He seemed to believe
that Louisianans were just too uninformed and trusting to see that they were being adversely
influenced. Yet his views reveal his own ignorance. Although many territorial inhabitants were
quite happy with aspects of the American government, many harbored serious reservations. From
the moment France transferred Lower Louisiana to the United States, Louisianans worried about
5
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their future as Americans and the threat it posed to their economic, political, and cultural interests.
These fears were only exacerbated when the 1804 Governance Act deprived Louisianans of a
representative government and banned the slave trade. As Louisianans fought the hated act they
also worked towards the continuation of civil law. Louisianans had specific aspirations for the
incorporation process and did not passively sit back and wait for Washington lawmakers to
“Americanize” them. Rather they employed many strategies to shape the incorporation process on
their own terms.
Louisianans often turned to men with experience and knowledge to help them find the proper
vehicles for negotiation. Thus the resistance movement that beset Claiborne was much more than
a creation of a few disgruntled Americans; rather it was an attempt by Louisianans to receive the
privileges of American citizenship while preserving aspects of their French heritage. Lacking vital
political knowledge and experience, these Louisianans turned to people who possessed the skills
to make their resistant efforts most effective. Both Clark and Livingston, having former dealings
with the American government as well as proficiency in French, had the means to communicate
and guide members of Louisiana’s ancient population. Therefore, these “designing intrigueing
men” did not lead Louisianans astray, but rather led them in their attempts to shape the
incorporation process. What Claiborne failed to see was that Louisianans were ready and willing to
negotiate with American lawmakers. They turned to strong leadership to make this happen and
were not passive actors swayed by crooks and scamps.
That day, as he was carried away from his defeat, Claiborne not only bore years of worry about
Louisianans’ opposition to his administration, but carried a physical scar of his turbulent contest
with the anti-American resistance movement. Although many territorial inhabitants became
engrossed by the gossip and scandal of the famous event, to Claiborne it meant much more. He
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had succumbed to Clark’s trickery and now his reputation and life were put in jeopardy. Yet even
on that day, Claiborne remained hopeful that his constituents were loyal to the United States and
that they were just entranced by men with ulterior motives. It never occurred to him that
Louisianans were merely using such designing men to help them negotiate a place for themselves
in the young republic.
****
Governor William C.C. Claiborne in many respects could be described as a true optimist. When
he accepted his appointment as the governor of the Orleans Territory he recognized that it would
be an arduous task. He would not only be in charge of a large ethnically and racially diverse
people, but he was also responsible for implementing policies to prepare such a population for
statehood. Despite his years of loyal service to the American government as a congressional
member and the former governor of the Mississippi Territory, Claiborne came to his new position
with many shortcomings. Many worried that at the age of twenty-eight he lacked vital experience.
He was largely unfamiliar with Louisianans’ legal apparatus, he knew little of their cultural
mannerisms, and he did not speak French. New Hampshire Senator William Plumer ridiculed
Claiborne’s appointment, claiming that “the office is important & requires a man of talents,
information, & efficiency. He has not one of those qualities.” Even President Jefferson admitted
that he selected Claiborne because the candidates he found more suitable refused to take the job.7
Despite these inadequacies, Claiborne remained hopeful that he would obtain a knowledge and
appreciation for his constituents. He also believed that Louisianans would gradually become
accustomed to the American government and accept their place in the young republic. He
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constantly conveyed this optimism to Washington lawmakers, assuring them that Louisianans
possessed the desire to be good Americans and loyal members of the Union.
Yet Claiborne’s correspondence also revealed apprehension. Almost immediately after taking
possession of Lower Louisiana, Claiborne’s hopes for a smooth transition were dimmed by the
realties of his new position. One of Claiborne’s first tasks as territorial governor involved curtailing
French and Spanish influence lingering within New Orleans. Marques de Casa Calvo, the former
Spanish governor of Louisiana, failed to vacate the city following the transfer of Louisiana from
Spain to France. Calvo’s presence in the territory caused Claiborne great political distress and
fueled Spanish opposition to American occupation. French Colonial Prefect Pierre Clément de
Laussat also attempted to instigate anti-American sentiments among French and Creole
inhabitants. On several occasions Laussat promised Louisianans that Napoleon intended to retake
Louisiana once he defeated the British in Europe. Casa Calvo circulated similar gossip, claiming
Spain hoped to negotiate the exchange of Lower Louisiana for Spanish West Florida. 8 Both
French and Spanish military forces also loitered around their old posts and barracks until the later
months of 1804. This undesired colonial interference created an anxious atmosphere in New
Orleans and frustrated Claiborne’s efforts to begin the incorporation process.
As Claiborne tried to restrain colonial influences, he also confronted persistent complaints from
his constituents. Within a month of taking control of Louisiana, Claiborne admitted to James
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Madison that “a few of the French Officers and Citizens who are here, continue to evidence a
disorderly disposition; they are mortified at the loss of this delightful Country and seem to foster
great hatred to the Americans who are here.”9 Claiborne failed to mention that he was one such
American. Louisianans intently vocalized their disapproval of their new governor. They resented
Jefferson’s appointment of a leader who barely spoke French and possessed little knowledge of
their legal and political institutions. James Brown, a member of the Louisiana Superior Court,
complained that Claiborne was “Ignorant of the languages of the Country,” and labored “under
great disadvantages, and finds it impossible to withstand the general cry of unpopularity with which
he is assailed.”10 New Orleans inhabitants also protested Claiborne’s creation of the Court of
Pleas designed to introduce common law in the territory, while supplanting Louisianans’ civil
authorities with American judges unaccustomed to their legal procedures and language.
As he arbitrated complaints, Claiborne also had to curb ethnic feuds that became commonplace
in the streets and dance halls of New Orleans. On one particular night, hostilities broke out
between American and French partygoers who fought over the choice of waltzes played at a
dance. Another such feud took place on Bastille Day as Frenchmen hoisted a French flag and
sang national songs. Such festivities angered many Americans who attempted to take down the
flag. City authorities arrived before violence ensued, but many left the scene vowing revenge.11
Spaniards also had their own violent encounters with new residents when an American sailor was
attacked by a Spanish guard as he passed by Governor Casa Calvo’s house.12 Such ethnic
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clashes showed Claiborne that perhaps his sheer optimism would not be enough to soothe the
cultural tensions that existed between ancient Creoles and incoming Americans. Angry
constituents and lingering colonial officials aggravated Claiborne’s hopes for a smooth transition
and kept him quite busy. His first six months in office proved challenging as he confessed to
Washington lawmakers that “scarcely a week passes by, but something occurs to create anxiety
and to occasion me trouble.”13
Although rumors of a possible Spanish and French takeover as well as ethnic feuds in the
streets of New Orleans remained common occurrences throughout the territorial period, nothing
became more troublesome to the hopeful governor than the appearance of a small group of men
determined to hinder all of his administrative efforts. At first Claiborne attributed territorial
dissatisfaction to a group of Frenchmen who lamented the Louisiana Purchase. Yet soon
Claiborne recognized the source of discontent came not from a few disappointed Frenchmen, but
rather an anti-American movement “directed by a few intriguing; Designing Men,” who “Avail
themselves to excite fear and suspicion.”14
Claiborne continued to monitor the burgeoning resistance movement and by the summer of 1804
he clearly identified his “designing intrigueing men.” In the months following the transfer of French
Louisiana to the United States, Louisianans remained anxious to receive a permanent government
and statehood. As Washington lawmakers debated the Breckinridge Bill in Congress, Louisianans
waited for good news. In early March, before the Governance Act received final approval,
Louisianans heard that one of the provisions of the bill banned the importation of slaves into the
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territory. In response, a Bostonian named Mr. Tupper called a meeting in New Orleans to discuss
the rumored ban. At the small gathering, American John Watkins urged territorial inhabitants to
select a three-man committee to draft a memorial conveying their thoughts and concerns to
Congress. Watkins’s proposal was unanimously accepted.15 Although Claiborne saw this meeting
as a harmless assembly of concerned citizens, he did express concern, claiming that “the success
which this man Tupper has met with is a strong proof of the mischief a designing unprincipled Man
may do in Louisiana.”16
When the 1804 Governance Act finally passed, it reaffirmed Louisianans’ fears and generated
scorn. Louisianans immediately resented their low grade of territorial status as well as their new
government that deprived them of a voice in their political fate. In addition, Louisianans
condemned the prohibition on the slave trade, feeling that it violated their property rights and
challenged their economic livelihoods. The Governance Act’s failure to set guidelines for future
statehood also caused Louisianans grave concern regarding their future in the republic.
On June 1, 1804, nearly forty concerned citizens assembled in New Orleans including Mayor
James Pitot as well as Americans Daniel Clark, Edward Livingston, and Evan Jones.17 The
purpose of this meeting was three-fold. First, attendees hoped to make preparations for drafting a
memorial to Congress regarding the Governance Act. They selected Edward Livingston and three
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other prominent ancient Creoles to undertake this important task. Next, the assembly decided that
once completed the memorial would be circulated throughout the territory to procure signatures of
support. Finally, they agreed to select three agents to go to Washington and present the memorial
to Congress. When the meeting adjourned Livingston and Mayor Pitot personally met with
Governor Claiborne to disclose the proceedings as well as inform him of Louisianans’ future course
of action.18
Somewhat concerned about Louisianans’ large outpouring of dissent, Claiborne remained
supportive of their efforts. He recognized that the Governance Act engendered many complaints.19
He, however, also remained convinced that the meeting illustrated that certain men sought to
intensify Louisianans’ anxiety, explaining that “many adventurers … possess revolutionary
principles and restless, turbulent dispositions;--these Men will for some years give trouble more or
less to the local Government, and will unquestionably excite some partial discontents.” He went on
to argue that “although the Louisianans are by nature as amiable a people as I ever lived among,
yet for the want of general information they are uncommonly credulous, and a few designing
intrigueing men may easily excite some inquietude in the public mind.”20
As Claiborne hoped to curb political unrest, on July 1, 1804, nearly 140 white New Orleanians
reconvened and unanimously approved the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana Against the
Political System Adopted by Congress for Them. Although assisted by a Creole committee,
Edward Livingston wrote the bulk of the widely accepted memorial. He used respectful, but stern
language. He also tried to appeal to American sympathies by invoking rhetoric from the
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Declaration of Independence and other revolutionary tracts. He went so far as to challenge
Washington lawmakers by asking, “Do political axioms on the Atlantic become problems when
transferred to the shores of the Mississippi? Or are the unfortunate inhabitants of these regions
the only people who are excluded from those equal rights acknowledged in our declaration of
independence.”21 Livingston presented Louisianans’ grievances touching on issues from statehood
to the slave trade. Once his memorial was read aloud, attendees signed it and selected twelve
agents to take the Remonstrance to citizens throughout the territory. Daniel Clark, a respected
resident of New Orleans, led the signature campaign hoping his popularity could generate support
for the memorial. His efforts bore fruit when he obtained nearly 2000 signatures. In one last
meeting on July 18, Jean Noel Destrehan, Pierre Sauvé, and Pierre Derbigny were selected as
agents who would carry the completed and signed memorial to Congress.22
As Louisianans prepared to send their memorial, Claiborne identified his “designing intrigueing
men.” To him Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston served as instrumental leaders in Louisianans’
protest efforts against the Governance Act. Although he had originally believed Livingston had little
interest in New Orleans political affairs, Claiborne soon had a change of heart. He informed James
Madison that “he [Livingston] has late become the warm advocate of the Rights of Louisiana and is
21 Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana Against the Political System Adopted by Congress for Them, American
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among the most distinguished, and the most active of those who disapprove the measures of the
Government.” Claiborne also warned Madison about Daniel Clark, arguing that he “also manifests
much discontent at the proceedings of the Government. From the first period of my arrival to the
present day, Mr. Clark (in conjunction with one or perhaps two other persons) have made great
exertions to injure me here.”23
Within a few more weeks, Claiborne’s opinions turned from frustration to disdain when he
divulged to members of Jefferson’s administration that “I once thought that Mr. Livingston would be
an acquisition to Louisiana, where men of Science and political information are so much wanting;
but now I fear he will become a troublesome member of our political society, and I do sincerely
regret that he ever left New York.”24 As Claiborne disparaged his major political enemies, he also
bewailed New Orleans newspapers for being a tool for destruction. “The citizens of Louisiana
hereof Strangers to the Liberty of the press cannot well bear with its licentiousness” he confessed
to Julien Poydras. He feared that Louisianans were swayed by newspapers that disseminated
anti-American rhetoric.25
Although Claiborne remained certain that Clark and Livingston were out to destroy him, he never
wavered in his faith in Louisianans. In his many correspondences with Washington lawmakers, he
took pains to stress how peaceful and amiable he found his newest constituents. On one
occasion, he assured James Madison that “in a few years Louisianans will be among the most
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grateful of our citizens, and admirers of our Union and government.”26 He never could conceive
that Louisianans sought to oppose or challenge the American government nor stall the
incorporation process. He chose, rather, to believe that Louisianans, lacking knowledge and
experience, were too easily swayed to join resistance efforts. He depicted Louisianans as being
almost too naïve to understand that men such as Clark and Livingston were using them for
malicious purposes. To truly appreciate Claiborne’s accusations and to assess Louisianans’
participation in the growing resistance movement, one must first understand the governor’s political
adversaries.
Born in Sligo, Ireland, Daniel Clark arrived in Philadelphia in 1786, where he lived for several
months. He made his way to New Orleans when his uncle secured him a clerking position. Once
there he wasted little time in moving up the ranks of New Orleans society, becoming a partner in a
prominent law firm and making friends with New Orleans elites and Spanish governor Don Estaban
Miro. His relationship with Miro eventually earned Clark a position as a secretary in the governor’s
office. Soon Clark helped run every aspect of the Spanish regime in Louisiana. A resourceful,
ambitious young man, he used his new political connections to render economic profit. In 1793,
having entered into a business partnership with a former Philadelphia acquaintance, Clark began
manipulating Spanish shipping regulations to secure cheaper duties for his new partner and other
American merchants.
In 1798, Clark became an American citizen as his career took an unexpected turn. When
American lawmakers organized the Mississippi Territory, Clark was asked to serve as the interim
consul to New Orleans. His new appointment allowed him to continue to negotiate advantageous
trading concessions for American merchants, but also gained him considerable influence with
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Washington lawmakers. By 1802, President Jefferson made Clark New Orleans’ regular consul.27
Although Jefferson’s appointment honored Clark’s special skills, it also fulfilled the president’s own
diplomatic agenda. When the Spanish ceded Louisiana back to the French in 1800, Jefferson
sought to secure American access to the port of New Orleans as well as information about
Spanish/French relations. Perfectly suited to serve as Jefferson’s agent, Clark took great pains to
represent American interests. Within months of becoming consul, Clark personally went to France
to rendezvous with American diplomats Robert Livingston and James Monroe. There he met with
French officials hoping to ascertain their intentions. His time in France convinced him that
Americans needed to take decisive action to secure New Orleans. He crafted grand visions of
Louisianans’ diverse population uniting with American forces to overthrow the French regime in a
glorious bloodless revolution.28 When he returned to New Orleans in 1803 only to find that the
French had suspended American trade, he saw his opportunity to make his dreams of a new
Louisiana come true. He immediately enlisted the help of Mississippi Governor William C.C.
Claiborne and General James Wilkinson. He offered nearly $150,000 of his own money to assist in
the Louisiana revolt. Claiborne wavered, unsure of the expedition’s success.29
By 1803, Clark had become a trusted friend of the American government and a prominent man
in New Orleans. His relationship with Spanish officials gave him insights that advanced both his
A consul is the official representative of the United States in territories belonging to another nation. The consul’s
duties often include assisting and protecting American citizens in the territory and maintaining commercial relations.
Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. G.P.0.).
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political and economic career. Moreover, his attempts to help Americans secure Louisiana,
although often unorthodox, earned him the appreciation of Washington lawmakers. In the months
following the Louisiana Purchase, Clark continued to help the Jefferson administration. Utilizing his
extensive knowledge of Lower Louisiana, he submitted several reports providing information on
everything from the colonial militia to Indians. He even took time to write down suggestions
regarding the type of government necessary for Louisiana’s diverse population. He instructed
American lawmakers to “bear in mind that the People of this country are an assemblage of all
nations most of whom have no idea of a good government, are only kept in order by the Hand of
Power, are excessively ignorant and maybe easily imposed upon, therefore there will be the
greater necessity for being prepared for any event whatever.”30 Clark’s relations with the Jefferson
administration positioned him to be a key leader in the Orleans territorial government—or so he
thought.
In October 1803, Jefferson appointed William C.C. Claiborne the governor of the Orleans
Territory. Needless to say Clark was far from thrilled. Although he never openly admitted it, Clark
harbored aspirations of becoming territorial governor.31 Personal ambitions aside, Clark also
questioned Claiborne’s ability to handle his new appointment. He was particularly unimpressed
when Claiborne failed to take the initiative to seize New Orleans several years before. Being

Daniel Clark to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1803, Territorial Papers, IX: 28-47. Clark also sent Jefferson
An Account of the Indian Tribes in Louisiana, where he listed the location and population of local tribes. See Vernet,
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passed over for a position that he so clearly deserved would be a constant source of resentment
for Clark that continued to grow during the territorial period.32
Unlike Clark, Edward Livingston was a new transplant to the Crescent City. Originally from New
York, Livingston came from one of the United States’ most prominent political families. His brother
Robert was a member of the Continental Congress, a signer of the Declaration of Independence,
and one of the diplomats that secured the purchase of French Louisiana. Instrumental figures in
the Democratic-Republican Party in New York, both Livingston brothers became trusted supporters
of Thomas Jefferson. Despite his longtime friendship with Aaron Burr, Edward cast one of the
deciding votes in the New York congressional delegation that helped Jefferson capture his first
presidential victory.33 During his six-year tenure in the House of Representatives, Edward
continued to advance the Republican agenda. His efforts were soon rewarded when President
Jefferson appointed him as the United States District Attorney. In that same year he also became
the mayor of New York City. Both jobs provided an ample salary that allowed the younger
Livingston to continue to enhance his family’s political prestige.34
At times the rigors of holding two demanding political positions took their toll on Livingston’s
administration. In the District Attorney’s office, he placed a clerk in charge of the collection of
federal taxes. However, he failed to regulate the clerk’s activities and financial handlings. Soon an
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annual audit revealed that the clerk stole nearly $40,000 for his own personal use. Livingston’s
leadership skills and reputation were soon put into question as many wondered if the District
Attorney knew about the scandal. Livingston assumed full responsibility for the missing funds and
tirelessly tried to pay them back. As he succumbed to yellow fever, his political allies in the
Jefferson administration called for his removal. By August 1803, Livingston submitted his
resignation as District Attorney and mayor.35 Facing a federal investigation and accusations of
financial misconduct, the one-time feted New Yorker found himself a political outcast and in need
of a change of venue.
When Americans learned about the Louisiana Purchase, many heralded this new unbounded
world as a land of opportunity. Livingston could not escape the buzz about the United States’
newest acquisition. As his brother Robert disclosed many intimate details regarding Lower
Louisiana’s endless advantages, Edward was lured by the promise of new economic possibilities
and the escape Lower Louisiana had to offer. As the U.S. District Court met to decide his fate,
Livingston sailed for New Orleans with nothing more than $1000 he borrowed from his brother and
hopes for the future.36
Livingston quickly acclimated to his new surroundings. His refinement, former wealth, and
knowledge of French allowed him to integrate into New Orleans society with ease. He even
managed to meet and wed Madame Louise Moreau de Lassy, a French refugee from St.
Ibid., 93-97. Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin was Livingston’s most vocal opponent. He called for his
resignation almost the moment the scandal was revealed.
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Domingue. This union allowed Livingston to enhance his standing in Creole society and gain
valuable allies within the community. Livingston’s career also prospered. Within two months of
his arrival in New Orleans, he defended nearly twenty-nine cases before the Governor’s Court,
putting him in direct contact with Claiborne.37 Claiborne welcomed Livingston’s presence in New
Orleans, informing James Madison that “my former Congressional acquaintance Edward
Livingston, is now in New Orleans, and has acquired considerable influence among the inhabitants,
he manifests the best disposition towards the Government, and a desire to render my
administration pleasing and the present state of things acceptable to the people.”38 That same
month, Claiborne appointed Livingston to the Board of Regents of the newly-formed Bank of
Louisiana. In this capacity he mingled with New Orleans’ most prominent men including Pierre
Sauvé, Nicholas Girod, and Americans Benjamin Morgan, Evan Jones, and John McDonough.
Livingston’s duties as regent enhanced his standing in New Orleans and indicated that Claiborne
initially looked to him as an important ally.
Although longtime loyal servants to the American government, by the later months of 1804
Clark and Livingston’s involvement with the Remonstrance made them designing men. In a letter
to James Madison, Claiborne argued that “Mr. Clark is an Enemy of the Government in the United
States.”39 He went on to caution President Jefferson that “There is no doubt here, but that Messrs
Livingston & Clark are the Leaders of a opposition to me, & their ill-will is excited by a knowledge
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which they have of my dislike of them and all their measures … they are also great Intrigu’ers and
will probably do me injury (by their writings) in the United States.”40
Although Claiborne’s assessment of the two Americans was quite correct, many questions
remain regarding their motivation.41 Clark presents a special dilemma since not even a year before
the Remonstrance he told President Jefferson that Louisiana’s diverse population needed a rigid
territorial regime. So why did he fight the Governance Act that provided the type of government he
once advocated? The obvious answer rests in Clark’s resentment over Claiborne’s appointment as
governor. It seems only natural that Clark chose to antagonize the man that ruined his
gubernatorial dreams. Yet historians have also other explanations. Michael Stephen Wohl sees
Clark’s involvement in the Remonstrance as a means to further his chances for political office. If
Clark sided with Louisianans in their struggle against Congress, he could gain valuable allies.
Knowing that Louisianans would eventually receive the right to vote in their own elections, he
hoped that early support of their cause could earn him their political support in the future. Clark
also had a vested interest in the success of the Remonstrance since he himself imported African
slaves to New Orleans. It appears that hopes for revenge coupled with economic self-interest
drove Daniel Clark to lead Louisianans on a path of resistance.42
Edward Livingston’s participation in the Remonstrance, however, proves a bit more difficult to
comprehend. Livingston left New York under a cloud of suspicion and with a massive debt. He
originally hoped to go to New Orleans to remake his fortune and salvage his reputation. It would
seem logical, therefore, that he would assist American officials in Lower Louisiana in order to
40
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regain the trust of President Jefferson and those who questioned his character. Even his friend
John Armstrong warned him about getting too involved in local politics. Armstrong believed that
the Remonstrance only served to distance Louisianans from American lawmakers. To save his
own political career, he urged Livingston to abstain from writing petitions and memorials and to
leave such matters to Louisianans “who have more time and more money than yourself.”
Armstrong wanted Livingston to focus his energy on his family and creating a successful law
practice that would alleviate his financial woes.43
Despite Armstrong’s warnings and the possibility of further political alienation, Livingston did not
abandon Louisianans’ cause. Further examination reveals that Livingston’s motivation came from
various sources. According to historian William Hatcher, it is possible that Livingston harbored
some ill-will towards Claiborne. Early in their careers both Claiborne and Livingston served as
representatives in the Seventh Congress. Obviously, after that their careers took a much different
course as Livingston arrived in New Orleans as a political pariah while Claiborne resided as
governor. This, perhaps, engendered jealousy as Livingston worked to rebuild his career. Hatcher
also believes that Livingston’s affinity for the Louisiana cause was just in his nature. In his earlier
political career, Livingston seemed to always side with the underdog, having long supported the
Republicans.44 It seems more conceivable, however, that Livingston supported Louisianans
because they were his future clientele. He chose to align himself with those who promised to
assist him in his own fight for financial prosperity and political leadership. Whatever their
motivation, Clark and Livingston were ready to challenge the American government and the
Claiborne administration and encouraged Louisianans to do the same.
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As Louisiana delegates carried the Remonstrance to Congress, Claiborne hoped that his
dealings with “designing intrigueing men” had subsided. Yet he soon learned that his battle with
the resistance movement had just begun as Clark and Livingston continued their assault on the
American regime. In February 1805, Congress revised the 1804 Governance Act by providing
Louisianans with self-government through a bicameral Legislative Assembly.45 The amended act
gave Louisianans a long-desired representative government, yet it also gave Clark new
opportunities to arouse further resistance. One of the jobs vested in the new Legislative Assembly
was the selection of the territory’s delegate to Congress. Although Governor Claiborne secretly
hoped that Dr. John Watkins, a longtime friend, would receive the appointment, Creole delegates
chose Clark to go to Washington in their stead.46
Basking in his new appointment, Clark believed his election illustrated Louisianans’ disdain for
Claiborne. He smugly confessed to General James Wilkinson that “My nomination has been a
severe shock to W C.C. C and his Gang, they are much chop-fallen, and all the first Characters &
best men here have united against them.”47 On a more personal level, Clark’s new job gave him
the perfect opportunity to continue his campaign against Claiborne in Congress. In the months
leading to his departure for Washington, Clark sought to gather as much ammunition as possible.
He collected correspondence he had with members of the Legislative Council as well as editorials
written by New Orleans citizens. He also enlisted the assistance of General James Wilkinson who
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had worked closely with Claiborne since his days in the Mississippi Territory. Clark asked the
general to provide him with any information that could be used against Claiborne, arguing that “you
have it in your power to serve the people you preside over essentially by giving me such
information respecting the state of things.”48
Once Clark took his seat in Congress he wasted little time in staging his assault on Claiborne
and his administration. In December 1806, Clark stood before the Senate and criticized Claiborne
for making the territorial militia useless. He accused Claiborne of alienating white militiamen in
favor of the Battalion of Free People of Color, arguing that “The people of the Orleans Territory had
offered their services to the United States, and had been disregarded by the man put over them,
and a preference given to another corps.”49 That same month Clark wrote Livingston updating him
on events in the Senate. Clark almost seemed pleased to report that “Claiborne is universally
despised and the greatest part of the new members of the Senate have assured me individually
that they only voted for him after a long delay because they found no one else willing to accept the
Government.”50 This statement indicates Claiborne was the topic of many of Clark’s conversations
with Washington lawmakers and that he found an audience for his anti-Claiborne rhetoric.
As Clark attempted to agitate political opposition, Livingston focused much of his attention on
helping Louisianans fight to maintain their French heritage. The territory’s legal system proved one
of the most pressing issues facing both Louisianans and Washington lawmakers. When Pierre
Clément de Laussat took control as the colonial prefect of Louisiana, he abolished all existing

48 Ibid., IX: 660-661. Claiborne himself understood the threat Clark posed, confessing to President Jefferson that “I
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Spanish courts and neglected to put French substitutes in their place. Washington lawmakers and
Governor Claiborne, therefore, made early efforts to provide Louisianans with a stable legal
system. Jefferson himself hoped to introduce common law in the territory, seeing this as a vital
step in Louisianans’ incorporation process.51 Jefferson and Claiborne, however, learned that
creating a more Americanized legal system would be a strenuous undertaking.
In the early months of his administration, Claiborne established a nine-member Court of Pleas to
deal with minor civil and criminal cases. He also set up the Governor’s Court designed to deal with
civil actions and appeals from the Court of Pleas in cases involving more than $500. Finally, he
created county courts to hear civil and criminal complaints.52 The 1804 Governance Act furthered
Claiborne’s efforts by making provisions for a Superior Court of three judges to be appointed by the
President, as well as inferior courts with judges selected by the governor and the Legislative
Council. The act also required all courts to adhere to aspects of common law such as trial by jury
and the writ of habeas corpus. When the new government took effect in October 1804, the
Legislative Council divided the territory into twelve parishes, each with one judicial district and a
judge appointed by the governor.53
Despite Claiborne’s early efforts, the judicial system remained in utter disarray. Lawmakers
found it hard to fill benches since most Creole judges did not understand the new legal code. In
addition, many Creole legalists declined appointments out of disgust with common law. Historian
George Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975), 107. Civil law is rooted in Roman imperial law that lacked many of the aspects Americans had become
accustomed to under common law. Trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus do not exist in civil law. For a more in
depth description of civil law see Edward Haas Jr., “Louisiana’s Legal Heritage: An Introduction,” The Louisiana
Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, 324.
51

Mark F. Fernandez, From Chaos to Continuity: The Evolution of Louisiana’s Judicial System (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 22-23.
52

53

Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana, 106.
74

Mark Fernandez finds that out of the forty judicial appointments Claiborne made, only four were
native Louisianans.54 As they faced the growing encroachment of American judges in their
courtrooms, Louisianans found common law procedure perplexing. Civil law was based on general
doctrines set forth by legislation and doctrinal writing, while common law centered on court
decisions, which represent precedents for other laws and cases. Accustomed to written petitions,
Creoles found the adjustment to oral arguments in open court difficult, especially with the language
barrier. Historian George Dargo finds that even judges were “uncertain of what codes they are to
decide, wavering between the civil and common law, between the forms of French, Spanish, and
American jurisprudence.”55
Shortly after his arrival in New Orleans, Edward Livingston found the territory’s legal system
inadequate. In a concerned letter to his brother, Livingston explained that in any given court one
encountered “ordinances in English mixed with those of his predecessors in Spanish and French,
the laws of Castile, the Customs of Paris, the Leyes de Patidas, les Edits du Roi, the Statutes of
the United States and the omnipresent Common Laws of England.“56 Sympathizing with
Louisianans, Livingston wished to aid territorial inhabitants in their struggle to maintain their
colonial legal traditions. His knowledge of the civil code and French placed him in the ideal
position to serve as Louisianans’ spokesmen. To prepare a compelling defense for civil law,
Livingston translated the Corpus Juris Civilis in hopes of finding solutions to Claiborne’s deficient
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court system. Concomitantly, he began drafting the Practice Act of 1805 that introduced simple
modes of procedure throughout the territory.57
Livingston also hoped to provide Louisianans with important tools to fight for the continuation of
civil law. The 1805 Governance Act, much like its predecessor, remained vague on the territorial
legal system, only stating that legal procedures needed to follow common law practices. Both
members of the ancient population and Louisiana lawyers interpreted the provision as mandating
the practice of English common law. Yet Livingston took a different approach, contending that the
law already in force in Louisiana was Roman, not English, thus the phrase “common law” really
meant the “common law of Louisiana,” not England. Superior Court judge John Prevost agreed
with Livingston’s interpretation, pledging to maintain civil law since it was the common legal
procedure of the Orleans Territory. As Livingston supplied Creoles another means to combat the
intrusion of common law, he also worked alongside Judge W. Brown to prepare the territory’s civil
and criminal codes. Ultimately, Edward Livingston staked a vested interest in Louisianans’ legal
system and sought to help them preserve civil law even if it was by a case of mere semantics.58
In the early years of the territorial period, Clark and Livingston proved worthy political
adversaries to the Claiborne administration. They helped Louisianans craft the Remonstrance,
they sought to protect civil law, and they united many members of Louisiana’s ancient population in
opposition to the American government. Their resistance, however, reached new heights in 1806
as both Clark and Livingston found themselves involved in a mutinous scheme.
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Aaron Burr first arrived in New Orleans in July 1805. He stayed for nearly three weeks making
the rounds amongst New Orleans’ finest. He stayed several days with Edward Livingston and his
family, attended a dinner hosted by Daniel Clark, and met with Governor Claiborne.59 Burr also
became acquainted with members of the Mexican Association. The association emerged not long
after Americans took control of Lower Louisiana to facilitate the conquest of Spanish Mexico.
Many members of the ancient population joined the association hoping that a liberated Mexico
would secure Louisiana’s borders and promise future economic prosperity.60
Nearly a year later, Burr finalized his plan for a military expedition to capture New Orleans and
Mexico. Burr’s encounters with prominent Creoles and the Mexican Association convinced him
that Louisianans would prove useful allies in his plan. As he secured financial and naval support
from British Minister Anthony Merry and military backing from General James Wilkinson, Burr felt
assured of his success. He planned to move towards New Orleans in the summer of 1806,
mobilizing 500 to 1000 men along the way. Once he and his men rendezvoused with Wilkinson at
Natchez they would descend upon New Orleans. From there they would utilize British naval
blockades as well as money from New Orleans banks to complete their conquest of Mexico.61
Most Louisianans knew little of Burr or his impending expedition. New Orleans’ designing men,
however, were instrumental figures in Burr’s initial plans. Although he would deny even really
knowing Burr, there exists considerable evidence that implicates Clark in the Burr Conspiracy.

59

Thomas Perkins Abernathy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 29.

60 Louisianans had trouble defining the association’s true motives. On one occasion, Secretary John Graham
informed James Madison that it was merely a military organization erected to protect New Orleans from a Spanish
invasion. Yet many historians today agree that the Mexican Association hoped to conquer Mexico and attach it to the
Orleans Territory. Ibid., 24-25.
61

Claiborne to Captain Shaw, 1 December 1806, Letter Books, IV: 38-40.
77

Immediately after entertaining Burr in New Orleans in July 1805, Clark spent two months in Vera
Cruz on a supposed business trip. While in Mexico, Clark met with Spanish officials while
ascertaining information regarding the strength and location of Mexican military units. Upon
returning home he informed General Wilkinson that he acquired valuable knowledge.62 Clark made
a second trip to Vera Cruz in February 1806.
Along with his questionable business trips to Mexico, Clark also made several statements
throughout his career that indicated his approval and interest in the conquest of Mexico. Orleans
territorial secretary John Graham recalled a conversation where Clark admitted that he did not
approve of a government expedition to Mexico. Graham did, however, remember that Clark
expressed “himself willing to join in such an enterprise, undertaken and carried out by
individuals.”63 It is apparent that Burr considered Clark an ally, even going so far as to make him a
key figure in the execution of his expedition. In correspondence with Minister Merry, Burr indicated
that Clark would inform British naval personnel when to lift their blockade once New Orleans had
been secured.64 To give Clark such an integral role in his plan, Burr must have received
assurances of his full support.
Much like Clark, Livingston was quite friendly with Burr and perhaps his expedition. Livingston
first met Burr during his early political days in New York. They fostered a strong friendship that
became strained when Livingston voted for Jefferson in the Election of 1800. When Burr first came
to New Orleans his first stop was to see Livingston. This visit turned out to be much more than a
nostalgic meeting among old friends. Years before when Livingston fell on hard times, Burr loaned
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him $2000. During his visit, Burr informed Livingston that he had transferred his debt to Dr. Erick
Bollman, a longtime business associate.65 Nearly a year later, Bollman traveled to New Orleans to
gather reconnaissance for Burr. While there he met with Livingston to make arrangements for the
repayment of his debt. It is perhaps here when Livingston learned of Burr’s plan and even offered
his support.
Outside of their individual interactions with Burr, both Clark and Livingston fostered ties with the
Mexican Association. The ancients involved in the association were the same men Clark and
Livingston consorted with in resisting American policies. Although they both denied membership in
the Mexican Association, Clark and Livingston had enough indirect contact with the organization to
know of Burr’s scheme.
Aaron Burr never came to New Orleans as a liberator. General James Wilkinson exposed the
conspiracy, leading to Burr’s arrest in January 1807. Yet Clark and Livingston’s former dealing
with Burr and their connection to the Mexican Association put them in a precarious position. Upon
turning on Burr, General Wilkinson attempted to distance himself from the conspiracy. To create a
much needed diversion, he fashioned himself the protector of New Orleans bent on purging the city
of Burrites. On December 14, 1806, he unlawfully arrested many of Burr’s associates including Dr.
Bollman.66 Louisianans expressed outrage over Wilkinson’s brute force and blatant disregard for
the due process of law. New Orleans judges scurried to issue writs of habeas corpus to protect
Bollman and other detainees, but they too were soon arrested. As many judges and lawyers sat in
jail, Edward Livingston took it upon himself to stop Wilkinson’s “reign of terror” by suing for writs of
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habeas corpus on behalf of Dr. Bollman and his lawyer James Alexander.67 His efforts made him
Wilkinson’s next target as the general accused Livingston of treason. Before the Superior Court,
Wilkinson claimed he had proof of Livingston’s involvement in the Burr Conspiracy, which included
a written affidavit from a Dr. W. Rogers. Livingston demanded to see the affidavit which Wilkinson
failed to ever produce.68 Livingston was soon released and cleared of all charges, but he remained
determined to alleviate doubts of his innocence. On December 26, 1806, he circulated An Address
to the Public in order to explain his relationship with Burr and Wilkinson. That same day he signed
an affidavit swearing that “he hath never had any communication, written or verbal, direct or
indirect, with Aaron Burr or other persons whom he knows or has reason to suspect”69
As Livingston sought to prove his innocence, Clark found himself in a bitter war with General
Wilkinson. In an attempt to clear his own name, Wilkinson publicly exposed Clark’s involvement in
the Burr Conspiracy. Now one of the territory’s most trusted leaders faced public scorn and
serious accusations. Clark emphatically denied Wilkinson’s charges and began drafting Proofs of
the Corruption of General James Wilkinson and His Connexion with Aaron Burr. Here he provided
a detailed account of how Wilkinson helped orchestrate Burr’s failed expedition. More importantly,
Clark used Proofs to absolve himself of any connection with Burr. He explained the details of his
one and only encounter with the former vice president, exclaiming that he only met with Burr out of
respect for Wilkinson who arranged the dinner. Clark went on to point out that many New
Orleanians entertained Burr on his first trip to New Orleans, including Governor Claiborne. Clark
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also spent considerable time explaining his trips to Vera Cruz, mocking public assumptions that
they were anything more than business trips. Clark concluded Proofs swearing that he would
never risk his fortune, friends, character, or political career for a treasonous plot.70 Although
Wilkinson continued to implicate him in the scandal, Clark was never indicted nor tried for treason.
Since the Burr Conspiracy, historians have dissected every correspondence, meeting, and
accusation to ascertain the extent of both Clark and Livingston’s involvement. Paul Vernet, for
example, finds that Clark abandoned the scheme long before Burr’s descent on New Orleans. It
appears that Clark lost interest in the expedition once he became a congressional delegate.
Vernet argues that it was at this time that Clark attempted to disassociate from Burr, seeing public
office as more important than any expedition to Mexico. Clark further showed his loyalty to the
United States when he informed ancients Pierre Derbigny and Joseph Bellechasse of the plot and
encouraged them to support the American government.71 Even Governor Claiborne, who once
identified Clark as one of Burr’s main agents, believed Clark to be loyal, confessing that “I find
nothing to justify an opinion, that he is a Party in the existing conspiracy. “72
As historians probe for evidence that might explain Clark and Livingston’s involvement in the
Burr Conspiracy, it seems more fruitful to examine how this particular event fit into the context of
their ongoing battle with the American government. Both men spent years undermining not only
Claiborne, but American policies throughout the Orleans Territory. The Burr Conspiracy supplied
Daniel Clark, Proofs of the Corruption of General James Wilkinson and of his Connextion with Aaron Burr
(Philadelphia, Wm. Hall, Jun. & Geo. W. Pierie, Printers, 1809). Clark also argued that he would never be foolish
enough to travel to Spanish Mexico where officials were already suspicious of him and other Americans.
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them the opportunity to continue their dissent, realizing that an expedition would further draw into
question Claiborne’s leadership skills. Their own political aspirations also explain their dealings
with Burr. Both Clark and Livingston sided with disgruntled Creoles in 1804 as a means to secure
political support. Their continued contact with territorial inhabitants and the Mexican Association
perhaps convinced them that Louisianans were predisposed to follow Burr in his attempt to rid
Lower Louisiana of the American government. Their support of Burr, therefore, would allow them
to remain in the good graces of the most prominent men in New Orleans who they looked to for
political support. No matter their motivation or involvement, the Burr Conspiracy marked the
beginning of the end for Claiborne’s designing men. After years of leading Louisianans’ resistance
efforts, Clark and Livingston lost their audience as Creole politicians took matters into their own
hands.
****
Governor Claiborne faced a formidable threat in Clark and Livingston. Both exerted strong
influence over the territory and continued to frustrate his attempts for a peaceful transition in Lower
Louisiana. These men served as the vocal leaders of a resistance movement that stalled and
impaired Americanization and incorporation efforts. What Claiborne failed to understand and
appreciate was the extent of Louisianans’ involvement. True, Clark and Livingston orchestrated
many resistance efforts, yet behind every memorial, editorial, and attack were Louisianans.
Although Claiborne usually attributed Creoles’ support to the devious ways of agitators who
swayed their opinions, a closer look at Louisianans’ resistance reveals that they fought unfavorable
American policies willingly and often exploited the experience and popularity of resistance leaders
to achieve such goals. Ultimately, Clark and Livingston’s actions represented Creole efforts to
negotiate with American lawmakers.
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In the months leading to the official transfer of Lower Louisiana, Louisianans had an assortment
of feelings and concerns. Many lamented the fact that they would never live under mother France.
Others felt the displacement from having switched regimes three times in less than four years.
Louisianans also had many practical concerns regarding their future as Americans. To ascertain
his new constituents’ thoughts and questions, Claiborne sent his special agent, Dr. John Watkins,
on a tour throughout the territory. Above all, Watkins found that “No Subject seems to be so
interesting to the minds of the inhabitants of all that part of the Country, which I have visited as that
of the importation of brute Negroes from Africa.” Watkins also discovered that Louisianans desired
a permanent government and “to enter [the Union] immediately into all the benefits and advantages
of a State Government.”73
Furthermore, Louisianans conveyed their own hopes for the incorporation process. Etienne
Boré, the mayor of New Orleans, personally wrote President Jefferson to inform him that
Louisianans anxiously awaited a new government to ease the confusion of the regime change. He
also hinted that Louisianans expected the Orleans Territory to become a state as soon as their
population totaled 60,000 as the Northwest Ordinance stipulated. In the meantime, Boré explained
“we shall be given what you call your Second degree of Government: it is the continual object of
our hopes and of our conversation among all Louisianans.” He also disclosed Louisianans’
bitterness over the excessive use of English in Claiborne’s administration which left many feeling
alienated.74
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The territory’s legal system also remained a potent concern for Louisianans who wished to retain
civil law, as evidenced by New Yorker and longtime New Orleans resident, Evan Jones. In his
Hints of Evan Jones: Administration of Justice, he discussed the chaotic state of Lower Louisiana’s
court system and urged American officials to appoint judges to hear civil cases in order to maintain
colonial legal traditions. Jones urged American lawmakers to make such legal concessions to
Louisianans, ensuring that they would “induce the inhabitants at large, to regard the people of
America, rather as their fathers & brothers, than as their masters or tyrants.”75
The observations put forth by Watkins, Boré, and Jones provide valuable insights into
Louisianans’ desires for the incorporation process. They sought the same property rights that
other Americans enjoyed with the continuation of the slave trade. They also wanted a territorial
government that gave them a chance to participate and enjoy American republican institutions.
Louisianans wanted statehood and to be full members of the republic. More importantly, they
wanted all of this while maintaining their French language and civil law.76 Undoubtedly,
Louisianans’ hopes were dashed when the 1804 Governance Act did none of this. The act also
subtly addressed the legal issue by giving judicial powers to a Superior Court. Section 5 of the
Governance Act stipulated that in criminal cases trial by jury would be used and Orleans
inhabitants would be extended the writ of habeas corpus. Although these judicial procedures were
universal in common law, they were unfamiliar to Louisianans. Finally, Congress made little
distinguished by his vanity & blind attachment to the French Nation.” See Characterizations of New Orleans
Residents, 1 July 1804, Ibid., IX: 248.
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mention of the lingual discrepancies found in the territory. The Governance Act of 1804 thus
largely ignored Louisianans’ requests.77
Although early efforts to protest the Governance Act came from Americans such as Tupper and
Clark, Louisianans soon united to present their grievances to Congress. Even though they
selected Edward Livingston to draft the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana, this document
illustrated what they truly felt. In the opening lines they expressed their joy of becoming American
citizens which “implied every thing we could desire, and filled us with that happiness that arises
from the anticipated enjoyment of a right long withheld.”78 The Remonstrance showed
disappointment that Congress failed to approve immediate statehood as Article III of the cession
treaty with France stipulated.79 It also exposed Louisianans’ disgust that they were demoted to
second-class citizens with no say in their government or the same rights as Americans. These
inadequacies of the Governance Act prompted Louisianans to ask “what valuable ‘privilege’ of
citizenship is allowed us?”80
The Remonstrance also reproached American lawmakers for their assumptions regarding
Louisianans’ capacity for self-government. Aware that congressional members based most of their
opinions on reports submitted by American travelers and diplomats, Louisianans contended that
“we have been represented as too ignorant to exercise it [self-government] with wisdom, and too
turbulent to enjoy it with safety.”81 They criticized congressional leaders for allowing these
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erroneous depictions to justify a despotic territorial government. They hoped that further
knowledge of territorial inhabitants would prove that they deserved and were ready to receive the
benefits of citizenship.
Finally the Remonstrance attempted to once more convey Louisianans’ most important
demands. The memoralists insisted that the people should directly choose territorial governors,
secretaries, and judges.82 They also requested that all court and legislative records be printed in
French and English to oblige all territorial inhabitants. They ended their memorial by strongly
encouraging American officials to take prompt action to make the Orleans Territory into a state.83
The Remonstrance demonstrated Livingston’s eloquence and craftsmanship, yet it was
Louisianans’ sentiments that filled its pages. It was their concerns, their desires, and their
frustrations put before Congress. When it came to this early protest, Louisianans used Livingston
to make their resistance efforts more potent. Why not turn to someone who understood the
American government? Why not seek assistance from a man proficient in French and English who
could clearly convey their grievances? Ultimately, Louisianans supplied Livingston with the
content, as he merely composed a document that American lawmakers could understand.
As Louisianans used Americans such as Livingston and Clark to draft and circulate their
memorial, they made their own efforts to fight the hated Governance Act. Mayor Boré asked the
New Orleans Municipal Council to formally protest the act, contending that it was a complete
violation of the principles of the Constitution and an “infringement on the natural rights of the
people of the territory and of the third article of the treaty of cession.” Despite Boré’s impassioned
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argument, municipal officials refused, prompting the mayor to resign his post in anger.84 Other
prominent Creoles followed Boré’s example including Colonel Joseph Bellechasse, commander of
the New Orleans militia, and Pierre Derbigny, the Secretary of Registrars. Initially Bellechasse
blamed poor health for his resignation, while Derbigny confessed to Governor Claiborne that more
“powerful motives” prompted his departure from the government. The fact that both men resigned
the same day as Boré indicates that they worked in unison to show their discontent for the
Governance Act.85
As Claiborne dealt with the loss of key government officials, he soon turned his attention to
helping Jefferson staff the thirteen-member Legislative Council. Both Claiborne and Jefferson
hoped to select members from Louisiana’s ancient Creole population as well as leading Americans.
Jefferson’s nominations illustrated this desire as his list included Creoles such as Etienne Boré,
Bellechasse, Pierre Derbigny, Pierre Sauvé, and Noel Destrehan and Americans John Watkins,
Benjamin Morgan, Evan Jones, and Daniel Cark. Jefferson’s plan soon backfired as Derbigny,
Destrehan, and Sauvé all withdrew their names since they would be in Washington presenting the
Remonstrance when the Council convened. Other nominees, including Boré, Jones, and
Bellechasse, emphatically rejected Jefferson’s nomination in protest.
Claiborne seemed puzzled by the ancients’ refusal to serve in the government. He immediately
blamed Livingston, contending that “Mr. Ed. Livingston has found that their acceptance would
betray a Dishonorable Inconsistency, and the opinions of those who advised and wrote the
Memorial.” Jones did little to dispel Claiborne’s conclusions, personally writing the governor to
84
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inform him that “I cannot therefore, with any Degree of consistency accept an office, under a law, of
which I have from the beginning so openly exprest my Disapprobation.” Many of Jefferson’s
appointments were men who had some connection to the Remonstrance. It seems that many
declined to serve in order to make their campaign against the Governance Act more believable.
Jones’s rejection letter, however, demonstrates that he was not just influenced by Livingston, but
made a personal decision, arguing that “I was born an American—I glory in that name—In defense
of that happy land which gave me birth … I cannot consent, for any consideration, to do an act,
which I think subversive to the rights and liberties of my fellow Citizens!” 86 Jones believed that by
serving in the Legislative Council he was acquiescing to a government that violated his most
cherished American principles. He felt so confident in his actions that he sent his resignation letter
to New Orleans newspapers for all to see. He provided an example that his ancients counterparts
followed. Many chose to boycott the Legislative Council, an institution that would enforce policies
they scorned.87
Louisianans also used their pens to articulate disapproval of unfavorable American policies. In
August 1804, Boré provided his own commentary on the Governance Act when he circulated a
letter that Congress wrote to the inhabitants of Quebec in October 1774. The thirty year old
document, written by Henry Lee, stressed that subjects had the “grand right” to have a share in
their government by representatives chosen by them and to live under laws that they approved.
Anything less, Lee argued, was tyrannical. Boré used the letter to expose Congress’ hypocrisy in
giving Louisianans a government that Lee and other Americans deemed “tyrannical” just years
86 Claiborne to Madison, 8 October 1804, Ibid., II: 349. Also see Evan Jones to Claiborne 8 October 1804, Ibid., II:
350-351.
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before. Boré went on to encourage Louisianans to examine the “relation there is between the
present situation of the Inhabitants of Louisiana, and that of Canada at the time when Congress put
them in mind of their rights and privileges.”88
As the Governance Act received plenty of criticism, Claiborne himself was not immune from
published attacks. In View of the Political and Civil Situation of Louisiana, from the Thirtieth of
November 1803 to the First of October 1804 by a Native, an anonymous author argued that the
Claiborne administration left Louisiana in a state of disarray. Attacking his leadership skills, the
author contended that “Governor Claiborne fell as it were from the clouds, without knowledge of the
country, its inhabitants, their manners, their customs, their very language, or their laws made his
bad administrative system worse.” View also assaulted the governor’s inadequate policies that
challenged Louisianans’ French heritage. It ridiculed the creation of the Court of Pleas that
embarrassed and excluded Louisianans who did not speak English. The judges appointed to the
court also had little knowledge of civil law, which only complicated the chaotic court system.
Ultimately, the anonymous author argued that Claiborne’s administration made Louisianans
“STRANGERS ON THEIR NATIVE SOIL!!89
Pierre Derbigny also took time to present his views on Claiborne before he departed for
Washington with the Remonstrance. His Esquisse de la Situation Politique, which openly scorned
the governor, became one of the most widely published pamphlets in territorial Louisiana. He
88
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disparaged Claiborne’s weak policies that made the militia ineffective. He also bewailed
Claiborne’s appointments and the fact that the governor conducted all official business in English.
Derbigny seemed particularly vexed by Claiborne’s handling of the legal system, asking his readers
to “Imagine the astonishment of the peaceful but ignorant citizen, when a sheriff or Constable,
came to give him court orders of a new variety, in a language which he didn’t understand. Imagine
the difficulties of the judges themselves who had the vaguest idea of these strange forms, that they
were supposed to follow and that had to be combined with the Spanish laws.”90
The press soon became a vital outlet for Louisianans to disseminate their grievances. Editorials
and pamphlets coupled with political boycotts proved Claiborne’s assessment of Louisianans’
involvement in the resistance movement incorrect. Not only did Creole leaders express their
opposition on their own volition rather than through Clark and Livingston, but used their seats in the
Legislative Assembly as another vehicle of resistance.
The first Orleans House of Representatives met on November 4, 1805. Members pledged an
oath of allegiance to the United States and selected Jean Noel Destrehan as speaker of the
House.91 The majority of elected representatives were Creoles, including those that originally
rejected Jefferson’s nomination to the Legislative Council in 1804. The predominance of these
Creole legislators illustrates that Louisianans hoped to use ancient politicians to further resistance
efforts. These Creole delegates soon flexed their new political might in submitting nominations for
the upper Legislative Council. Despite Claiborne’s suggestion that the council represent all
districts and ethnic groups in the territory, House members nominated men exclusively from New
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Orleans and all but two were ancient Louisianans.92 More specifically, four of the ten nominees
were vocal critics of Claiborne while others had strong attachments to Livingston and Clark. As
Jefferson and Claiborne attempted to appoint what they considered loyal Louisianans to the
Legislative Council, House members created a Legislative Assembly monopolized by ancient
Creoles.93
The first piece of legislation Creole delegates passed through the House of Representatives was
an act that stipulated that anyone holding other government offices was not permitted to serve in
the Legislative Assembly. Although this act appeared as an attempt to impose some form of
checks and balances within the territorial hierarchy, in reality it targeted Claiborne supporters since
many Americans and pro-American Creoles were already serving in government posts. Seeing
this as an attempt to challenge his administration, Claiborne vetoed the bill.94
The Legislative Assembly soon became a battleground as ancient Creoles sparred with the
determined governor. Claiborne’s reports to Washington revealed that his constant feuds with
Creole delegates rendered the Legislative Assembly virtually useless. “The territorial Legislature
makes but little progress in dispatch of Business,” Claiborne confessed to President Jefferson.95
Despite his frustrations, Claiborne remained steadfast in his fight against a Creole assembly
determined to circumscribe his administration.96
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As Louisianans exploited their new political power to combat the new American government,
they also used their new representative government to preserve their most cherished traditions.
Like so many of their constituents, members of the Legislative Council bewailed Claiborne’s
haphazard judicial policies and campaigned for the continuation of civil law.97 One of their earliest
efforts came in the form of a proposed memorial to Congress opposing sections of the 1805
Governance Act dealing with common law. Representative Hazure Delorme recommended that
the memorial demand the “repeal of that part of the act … as provides for the introduction of
common law, owing to the great confusion it will introduce in the courts of justice.98 Although this
resolution was postponed, it reveals that the Legislative Assembly remained determined to stall the
introduction of common law as long as possible.
Members of the legislature continued their efforts by proposing several pieces of legislation that
sought to keep colonial legal traditions in place until lawyers drafted a new civil code. Most of
these acts were vetoed by Governor Claiborne. Undeterred, in March 1806, legislators passed a
bill that protected civil law.99 Immediately Claiborne vetoed the measure, arguing that it was “a
useless measure, and one that might prove injurious.” Hearing of the governor’s veto, Creole
Outside New Orleans, territorial inhabitants also disparaged the new legal system. In November 1805, a group
of rural inhabitants published Instructions from the Inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans to Their Representatives in
the Legislative Council. These farmers expressed their preference for the old French and Spanish system that had
one court for each parish: “formerly, all the parishes were of moderate extent; the commandant, or judge resided in the
center, or at least, within reach of the inhabitants …. Now he has to go several days’ journey, on horse back, in spring,
when the paths are impracticable; for as to roads there are none, but at times when the journey cannot be made by
land, a boat with oars must be hired at a great expense … “ They also complained about the new laws that
complicated their court systems prompting them to ask “What right have you then, to fall upon a system established
already and organized, and which moves of itself; which is made respectable by the usage of attachment of those who
are governed by it?” Besides exposing the problems with new territorial courts, Instructions also provided proposed
reforms suggesting simplified procedures, limits on juries in civil cases, and the termination of the circuit function of the
Superior Court. According to George Dargo, this document reveals that the debate was not confined to New Orleans
but was felt by all. Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana, 133-135.
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councilmen Pierre Sauvé, Noel Destrehan, and Joseph Bellechasse resigned. Soon Pierre
Derbigny proposed the immediate dissolution of the entire Legislative Assembly and it was quickly
adjourned.100
Delegates composed a manifesto to justify their actions to Congress. Here Creole lawmakers
argued that they dissolved the legislature because of Claiborne’s persistent vetoes that made their
efforts useless. They also used the manifesto to further crusade for the continuation of civil law,
contending that “The most inestimable benefit for a people is the preservation of its laws, usages,
and habits. It is only such preservation that can soften the sudden transition from one government
to another.”101 Creole delegates went on to provide strong legal and constitutional arguments in
favor of civil law. To them, Article 4 of the 1805 Governance Act granted Louisianans the right to
keep their own laws in force as long as they did not contradict the Constitution when it stated that
“The laws which shall be in force in the said territory at the commencement of this act, and not
inconsistant with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force, until altered, modified or repealed
by the Legislature.” The delegates went on to conclude that the “laws” mentioned in the Article 4
included civil law, arguing that:
It is evident that they are the old laws which were in use in this country before its
cession to the United States of America. For Congress took care to apply to us all
of the common law which it considered indispensable to prescribe for us to the end
that our regime might not conflict with that which is in force in all the States of the
Union, that is to say, the right to be judged by one’s peers and the writ of habeas
corpus, the two great palladiums of civil liberty. In this regard we cannot change
anything of what Congress has thus, constitutionally, determined; but it is clear
that regarding all the rest we are free to adopt or to reject any of the common law
which shall appear proper to us.
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Creole delegates took a compromising stance, acknowledging that there were aspects of common
law that needed to be applied in Louisiana courts. They, however, contended that outside the “two
great palladiums of civil liberty,” Congress could not “deny that advantage to us of remaining under
a system to which we are accustomed.”102
As territorial legislators used the manifesto to preserve their old legal traditions, they exploited
the opportunity to discuss lingual issues that had long plagued the territory, explaining that:
The present composition of the courts, the judges presiding over them and the
jurists who plead before them being almost all strangers to the French language
and still more so to the language in which the greater part of the laws of this
country are written, the very scarcity even of the elementary authors who deal with
them, everything renders indispensable the adoption of a measure which tends to
place within the reach of all citizens, both in the French and the English language,
a complete collection of the laws governing us.”103
Since the creation of the Orleans Territory, Louisianans sought to maintain two vestiges of their
colonial past: civil law and the French language. By using political boycotts to dissolve the
Legislative Assembly, Creole lawmakers brought some of their most overlooked concerns to the
forefront.
Before the Legislative Assembly disbanded, delegates appointed James Brown and Louis
Moreau Lislet as jurisconsults “whose duty it shall be to compile and prepare, jointly, a Civil Code
for the use of this Territory.”104 Despite Claiborne’s veto, the assembly moved forward by setting
up a code committee to work alongside Brown and Lislet. Their tireless efforts paid off. On March
31, 1808, hoping to appease his constituents, Governor Claiborne signed the Digest of Civil Laws
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Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, marking a pivotal turning point in the territorial period.
After years of toil and political manipulation, Louisianans resolved long-standing legal issues and
secured one of their most cherished French institutions. Concomitantly, they learned valuable
lessons about the incorporation process. The 1804 Governance Act, in many respects, made
Louisianans passive actors in the story of the Louisiana Purchase. It relegated them to secondclass citizens and neglected their most basic and potent concerns. Despite obvious handicaps,
Louisianans refused to sit back and be “Americanized.” Rather they chose to employ resistance
and political activism to negotiate with American lawmakers.
****
Nursing his gunshot wound, Governor Claiborne lamented the outcome of his duel with Daniel
Clark. For years Clark worked tirelessly to destroy Claiborne’s reputation and now he could boast
that he defeated the governor in an old-fashioned duel. Yet what Claiborne failed to realize was
that he would emerge as the true victor. In the months following the duel, Clark’s stint as
Louisiana’s most trusted leader came to an end as territorial inhabitants bewailed him for shooting
the governor. Edward Livingston faced similar contempt as his economic aspirations put him in
direct conflict with Louisianans and their beloved legal system. By 1808, both Clark and Livingston
had fallen from grace.
Clark’s downward spiral began during the Burr Conspiracy. Despite his emphatic denials and
the publication of his Proofs, territorial inhabitants could not shake their suspicions of their longtime
leader. Also they resented the fact that Clark’s involvement often caused Americans to mistrust all
Louisianans.105 Clark’s resistance efforts went too far and alienated him from the people he once
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helped. Livingston also faced his own decline. In 1807, he purchased a tract of land in the Batture
St. Mary. Hoping to increase the value of his property, Livingston made preparations to build a
levee, dig a canal, and erect a dwelling. New Orleans residents were outraged, having long used
the Batture as a communal plot for all city dwellers. The Batture dispute put Livingston at odds
with Louisianans. In his many legal battles over his new property, Livingston also attacked major
components of Louisianans’ legal traditions. The one-time advocate of civil law despised its use in
court when it did not serve his own interests. As the Batture controversy waged on for several
years, Louisianans gradually turned away from Livingston.106
In the early years of the territorial period, Louisianans lacked the experience or knowledge to
combat the hated Governance Act, forcing them to turn to Clark and Livingston who took the lead
in their resistance efforts. Over time, however, Louisianans’ reliance on Clark and Livingston
lessened as they took matters into their own hands. They used the power of their pens to enhance
resistance efforts while also drawing national attention to their aspirations for the incorporation
process. Louisianans also learned how to exploit their growing political power in the Legislative
Assembly. Voters chose Creole officials to make their demands into law. Creole lawmakers used
their political offices to undermine their unpopular governor and challenge unfavorable American
policies. They also used boycotts and manifestos to shape public policy and preserve their most
cherished colonial traditions. Far from being passive actors or manipulated by “designing
intrigueing men,” Louisianans were a people ready to create and employ vital strategies for cultural
self-preservation and assimilation. As they sharpened their negotiation skills, Creole politicians
soon learned that resistance was only one means to deal with American lawmakers.
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Chapter Three: “Real and Pretended Patriots”: Shifting Creole Strategies of Negotiation in
Territorial Politics
On March 4, 1809, Julien Poydras stood before the Legislative Council to deliver his last speech
to the governing body he had addressed many times before. On this day, he bid farewell to
Louisianans as he looked forward to heading to Washington D.C. to serve as the Orleans territorial
delegate to Congress. The Creole businessman, planter, and politician looked upon his fellow
councilmen with hope and gratitude. He encouraged them to continue to work with American
lawmakers and promised to make Louisiana statehood his top congressional priority. Although he
was dressed more like a common artisan, his audience acknowledged his elite status and
prominence in the Orleans Territory. A transplant from France, Poydras had come far from his
humble beginnings as a French soldier and traveling peddler. As one of Louisiana’s wealthiest
planters, Poydras spent years accumulating property and slaves as well as establishing merchant
stores and shipping companies. He also built an impressive political resume which included his
three-year tenure as the president of the Legislative Council. His support of the Claiborne
administration earned him the respect of Americans, while his stellar reputation gained the
confidence of Louisianans. As he came to the end of his final speech, Poydras could not help but
marvel at how far Louisianans and the Orleans Territory had come.1
Much had changed in Lower Louisiana since Poydras first became president of the Legislative
Council in 1804. Louisianans had gained self-government and were on the path to statehood.
They resisted the intrigues of Aaron Burr and secured the passage of the Digest of Civil Law.
Notably absent from the New Orleans political scene were Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston.
The Burr Conspiracy and Batture controversy took their toll on the one-time resistance leaders. By
Le Moniteur de La Louisiana (New Orleans), 4 March 1809 ; Brian J. Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of
Julien Poydras (Jon & Noelie Leurent Ewing, 2001), 33.
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October 1808, Clark lost his congressional seat to Poydras and failed to secure a single
nomination for any vacant legislative position. Even Governor Claiborne enjoyed more pleasant
relations with the Legislative Assembly, happily reporting to James Madison that “the Louisianans
begin to distinguish between the real and pretended Patriots, & I persuade myself, that the hitherto
great influence of certain unprincipled Americans will very soon be at an end.”2 Creole politicians
also seemed to have undergone a profound transformation. From their legislation to their
encounters with American lawmakers, they demonstrated a much more cooperative posture.
Although Clark and Livingston’s departure from the New Orleans’ political scene seems logical in
the wake of their recent indiscretions, the Legislative Assembly’s new attitude is harder to explain.
What caused Creole lawmakers, once bent on resisting and stalling American policies, to be more
willing to work with American lawmakers? Had the issues that once generated scorn
disappeared? Despite the appearance of a new political landscape in the Orleans Territory, in
reality what had really changed were Louisiana leaders’ strategies. Louisianans always remained
mindful of their precarious position. No matter their disdain regarding the Governance Act or their
hatred for common law, at the end of the day they desired American citizenship. Although
resistance proved a useful tool, Louisianans realized that it could only be used sparingly so as not
to jeopardize their chances for statehood. Therefore, they often turned to cooperation as a means
of negotiation. By working with American lawmakers, Creole politicians often offset their resistance
to unfavorable policies. One of the reasons Poydras was so revered was because he encouraged
and helped Louisianans in their cooperation efforts. His career and political approach guided
Louisianans in their attempts at accommodation. Ultimately, Louisiana leaders employed the
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strategy that best suited their interests at a particular time. Although the abrasive nature of political
resistance seemed to overwhelm and disguise politicians’ accommodating stance, they used
resistance and cooperation interchangeably to shape the incorporation process.
Creoles’ shifting strategies became even more important as the Eighth Congress demanded that
Louisianans undergo an “apprenticeship to liberty.” Article III of the cession treaty with France
guaranteed Louisianans citizenship and they expected the Jefferson administration to fulfill this
promise. In 1803 American lawmakers, however, felt that Louisianans’ colonial past, cultural
differences, and political inaptitude rendered them ill-prepared for statehood. Instead of allowing
Louisianans to join the Union, Washington lawmakers hoped to devise an apprenticeship program
that gave Louisianans time to fulfill the requirements for American citizenship. The Eighth
Congress looked to the 1804 Governance Act to do just that, providing a well-regulated territorial
government. Furthermore, lawmakers turned to several vehicles of Americanization to enhance
the aims of the act while remedying Louisianans’ perceived deficiencies.
Washington lawmakers and the Claiborne administration tried to devise programs most suitable
to help Louisianans make the needed transition. They decided that education and military service
provided the ideal conduits. Governor Claiborne possessed a strong faith in the power of
education, contending that “I consider that the diffusion of information among this people is so
essential to their political happiness and to the Welfare of the American Government.”3 Like many
early American leaders, Claiborne valued education as a means of creating Louisiana citizens
schooled in the virtues of republicanism. He also looked to militia service as a key component of
the Americanization process that promised to instill his constituents with a sense of civic duty and
3
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attachment to the United States. Ultimately, these vehicles of Americanization promised,
lawmakers hoped, to instill Louisianans with the skills to assimilate and become ideal Americans.
As Congress handed down a set of guidelines for the incorporation process, it was left to
Creoles to determine the best strategy that allowed them to fulfill lawmakers’ demands while also
preserving their French identity. Political activism and resistance proved a potent tool that allowed
Louisianans to manipulate territorial policymaking. It allowed them to negotiate the contours of the
1804 Governance Act to gain self-government. It also supplied them a means to reject aspects of
Americanization programs that they deemed contrary to their French cultural identity. In turn,
cooperation allowed Louisianans to work with American lawmakers and demonstrate their
willingness to assimilate enough to gain the benefits of American citizenship.
One important aspect of Creole leaders’ accommodation efforts rested in the conversation of
attachment or open professions of loyalty and affection. Despite lingual barriers as well as cultural
and political differences, both lawmakers and Louisianans were fluent in this discourse, both
understanding its value and influence on Lower Louisiana’s incorporation process. For
Louisianans, the conversation of attachment allowed them to verbally show their allegiance to the
United States and their affection for American political institutions. No matter how much they
resisted or clung to their French heritage, attachment provided Louisianans an avenue through
which to bolster their claims for citizenship. Concomitantly, American lawmakers equated
Louisianans’ right to citizenship with their pledges of loyalty and affection. As American lawmakers
and Louisianans worked towards bringing the Orleans Territory into the Union, the conversation of
attachment served as their primary dialogue.
As Poydras made his way to the nation’s capital, he left the Orleans Territory confident that Creole
politicians had developed sophisticated skills of political negotiation. They demonstrated an ability to
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use both the art of resistance and cooperation and were articulate in the conversation of attachment. As
Louisianans determined their best response to Washington lawmakers’ assimilation demands, these
strategies enhanced Creole leaders’ ability to shape the incorporation process to fulfill their own needs
and interests. Ultimately, Creole politicians’ use of shifting strategies allowed them to fashion
themselves as true patriots crusading for American citizenship while preserving their French heritage.
****
On January 2, 1804, Isaac Briggs wrote to President Thomas Jefferson congratulating him on
the Louisiana Purchase. He also took the time to show his approval of Jefferson’s choice of
William C. C. Claiborne as territorial governor. Despite his cordial tidings, Briggs also conveyed his
concerns regarding Lower Louisiana. He criticized the Spanish regime and the aristocratic class
for allowing Louisiana to fall to “Despotism and Licentiousness.” Briggs, however, seemed more
concerned about Louisianans’ expectations for American citizenship. He contended that, “The
people, as is usual in all cases of great and sudden change, are unreasonable in their expectations
…. They expect unbounded license in many of their vicious, luxurious and oppressive habits, and
at the same time, the full fruition of all those blessings of Republican liberty.” He hoped that
Governor Claiborne would exercise caution in addressing these unrealistic demands and that all
lawmakers would remember that “considerable time is necessary to change, radically, long
established habits.”4
Briggs’s comments illustrate the difficult task facing American lawmakers in dealing with Lower
Louisiana. Since the British colonial period, Anglo-Americans attempted to devise methods of
naturalization and assimilation within their borders. A newly independent United States, however,
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necessitated that the federal government assume this role. Congressional leaders crafted
legislation that provided a universal naturalization policy that encompassed colonial procedures
with American notions of citizenship. As federal lawmakers sifted through varying interpretations
and redefined ideas of “Americaness” in the new republic, they deemed obtaining knowledge of
republican principles and displaying a strong attachment to the United States as the premiere
prerequisites for citizenship. As the Louisiana Purchase forced Washington lawmakers to massnaturalize a diverse population, they continued to cling to these time-honored requirements hoping
that they would ensure Louisianans’ successful incorporation into the Union.
Congressional lawmakers, as discussed in Chapter Two, created the 1804 Governance Act to
safeguard the republic from what they deemed a politically ignorant population. The act also
provided Louisianans with an “apprenticeship to liberty” that sought to give them ample time to
fulfill the cherished preconditions for American citizenship. However, the Governance Act lacked
important features of Americanization. It failed to provide Louisianans opportunities to participate
in self-government. It also largely overlooked the implementation of programs that could assist
Louisianans in understanding their role as Americans or giving them the means to cultivate a
greater attachment to the United States. Recognizing these deficiencies, Washington lawmakers
and the Claiborne administration worked together to create policies to complement the Governance
Act and enhance Louisianans’ incorporation period while also allowing their “long established
habits” to dissipate. Yet creating effective Americanization programs proved a massive
undertaking. What types of programs or policies could “Americanize” a diverse population? How
much time was necessary to allow Louisianans to undergo the “apprenticeship to liberty”
congressional leaders deemed necessary? Washington lawmakers and Governor Claiborne
contemplated such questions and crafted an incorporation blueprint that Claiborne presented to his
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newest constituents in his first formal address on December 20, 1803. The new governor began
by welcoming Louisianans as brothers and countrymen. He assured them protection of their
liberty, property, commerce, and religion. “In return for these benefits,” Claiborne reasoned, “the
United States will be amply remunerated, if your growing attachment to the Constitution of our
Country, and your veneration for the principles on which it is founded, be duly proportioned to the
blessings which they confer.”
Claiborne’s speech provides insights into how he and American lawmakers envisioned
Louisianans’ apprenticeship to liberty. The governor wasted little time in stressing the importance
of Louisianans’ attachment and loyalty. He indicated that the most basic American rights came
only as Louisianans showed their growing acceptance of the United States and its most cherished
principles. More importantly, he instructed Louisianans on how they could Americanize and foster
this attachment by cultivating “with assiduity among yourselves the advancement of Political
information.” He went on to suggest that Louisianans “should guide the rising generation in the
paths of republican economy and virtue; you should encourage Literature, for without the
advantages of education your descendants will be unable sufficiently to appreciate the intrinsic
worth of the Government transmitted to them.”5 In Claiborne’s inaugural address he stressed the
two basic requirements for American citizenship and promised to give his constituents the means
to fulfill them.
As his speech indicates, Claiborne’s early thoughts turned to education. Before the official
transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, both Daniel Clark and Claiborne submitted
reports regarding Lower Louisiana’s deficient education system. According to Clark, only one
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public school existed in New Orleans, and Claiborne expressed concerns that most of the
population remained illiterate.6 After assuming his role as governor, he became even more
distressed over the territory’s school system. He admitted to James Madison that “the greater part
of the people are deplorably uninformed.” Claiborne blamed the Spanish colonial government but
also Louisianans themselves for their lack of education. He argued that “Frivolous diversions seem
to be among their primary pleasures, and the display of Wealth and the parade of power constitute
their highest objects and admiration.” He found that such priorities left little room for education
amongst the majority of the population.7 Claiborne hoped to remedy these inadequacies by
providing Louisianans with more educational opportunities. In January 1804, he attempted to enlist
the help of Washington lawmakers, arguing that “I would think it wise policy in Congress to
appropriate one hundred thousand dollars annually for the encouragement of education in
Louisiana.”8 Claiborne’s request reveals that he hoped to infuse Louisianans with more than just
literacy, but looked to a public education system as a means of Americanization.
Early American leaders shared a strong faith in education, insisting that an educated citizenry
served as the foundation for a virtuous republican society. Perhaps the most prominent advocate
for a free public school system was Thomas Jefferson, who attempted to implement such a plan in
his home state of Virginia. In a “Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” (1779) he
outlined a three-step educational program.9 Children would be sent to elementary school at public
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expense. The most promising young men would further their education at a grammar school that
taught an advanced curriculum of Greek, Latin, geography, and arithmetic. Only the brightest
young men would advance to the state college Jefferson hoped to erect.10 Jefferson’s theories
were revolutionary at the time, advocating universal and state-sponsored education for all free
white young men.
Jefferson’s strong faith in education stemmed from his belief that “every government
degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves therefore are
its only safe depositories.” To ensure the citizenry upheld its duties to society, Jefferson contended
that “their minds must be improved to a certain degree.”11 Education ensured that American
citizens actively prevented the corruption and tyranny of a bad government. In a letter to George
Wythe in 1786, Jefferson reiterated this sentiment, claiming that education provided the foundation
for “the preservation of freedom, and happiness.”12
Jefferson’s proposals met only a lukewarm reception. The establishment of the University of
Virginia was the only portion of his plan that came to fruition, but not until 1818. Many states
adopted bills to promote elementary education, yet only a few northeastern legislatures
implemented Jefferson’s three-tiered educational program. Massachusetts, for example, passed a
law in 1789 requiring towns with fifty or more families to set up an elementary school, while towns
consisting of 200 or more families were responsible for establishing a grammar school. In New
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York, the state legislature supplied annual subsides for education to be divided among each
community.13
Other prominent Americans shared many of Jefferson’s early affirmations regarding education in
the republic. Noah Webster saw education as a key element in the evolution of a distinct American
character. By teaching the country’s youth about republican principles, they would in turn harbor a
greater affection and “an inviolable attachment to their country.”14 Webster also saw an educated
citizenry as synonymous with good government, asserting that “Education, in a great measure,
forms the moral characters of men, and morals are the basis of government.”15 Pennsylvania
physician Benjamin Rush, known most notably for his contributions to American medicine, left
scores of pamphlets, letters, and speeches dealing with a variety of social and political issues
facing the young republic. Rush dedicated much of his attention to the importance of education in
the growing nation. In his essay Education Agreeable to A Republican Form of Government, Rush
contended that only through education could the country’s youth become more accustomed with
and committed to republican principles. He hoped that a federal university would allow future
leaders to be schooled in all aspects of republicanism. According to Rush, such a university would
“convert men into republican machines” which in turn ensured that these leaders performed “their
parts properly in the great machine of the government of the state.”16
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The educational theories of Jefferson, Webster, and Rush illustrate the indispensable place of
public education in the young republic. More importantly they demonstrate why Claiborne and
other American leaders looked to education as an important tool in Lower Louisiana. They hoped
a new public school system would provide Louisianans lessons in republican principles and
enhance feelings of attachment and civic duty.17
In May of 1804, Claiborne requested federal funds and land from President Jefferson to
establish new schools.18 He also looked to the new Legislative Council to further his educational
plans. He begged Louisiana lawmakers to provide money and land for schools in order to “rear up
our children in the paths of science and virtue, and to impress upon their tender hearts a love of
civil and religious liberty.”19 Claiborne’s request convinced the Legislative Council to pass “An Act
To institute a University in the Territory of Orleans” in April 1805. The opening lines of the act
reveal that Louisiana lawmakers shared Claiborne’s faith in the power of education:
Whereas the independence, happiness, and grandeur of every republic, depend, under the
influence of Divine Providence, upon the wisdom, virtue, talents and energy of its citizens and
rulers. And whereas learning hath ever been found the ablest advance of genuine liberty, the
best supporter of rational religion, and the source of the only solid and imperishable glory, which
nations can acquire. And considering that in a commonwealth, whose humble citizens may be
elected to the highest public office, the knowledge which is required for a magistrate should be
widely diffused.20
The act made provisions for territorial officials to establish the University of Orleans. Governor
Claiborne was vested with the powers to appoint a Board of Regents to handle the details of the college.
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The bill also stipulated that the regents were responsible for establishing parish schools throughout the
territory. These schools would provide elementary education for Louisiana children in French, English,
grammar, and arithmetic. To provide the financial support for the university and parish academies, a
lottery, held twice a year, would raise funds for the new school system.21
Within months, the newly-appointed Board of Regents convened to organize a fund-raising lottery.22
The lottery began on December 17, 1805, offering 10,000 tickets in hopes of raising at least $30,000 for
the new university.23 As the Board of Regents attempted to raise money for a school system, the
territory’s Legislative Assembly worked towards providing public lands in and around New Orleans for
schools and administrative buildings.24
As the Claiborne administration attempted to erect schools, it also worked towards reorganizing what
little existed of the colonial militia. Claiborne hoped that, much like education, militia service could
facilitate the Americanization process and aid Louisianans in becoming more American. In 1804, Daniel
Clark reported that the City Battalion consisted of 500 men including an artillery company of 120 men,
and two separate mulatto companies with nearly 300 free blacks. In adjoining districts Clark estimated
that Natchitoches County contained one infantry and one cavalry unit while the counties extending to
the German Coast and Iberville totaled ten companies of 1,000 men.25 With Lower Louisiana’s close
proximity to Spanish Texas and Florida, Claiborne realized that a stronger defense force was needed.
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Also persistent rumors of a French or Spanish takeover made domestic defense imperative. Security
measures aside, Claiborne had ulterior motives for reorganizing the militia—engendering Louisianans’
attachment to the Union.
Anglo-American tradition placed a high premium on the citizen-soldier. According to historian
Lawrence Cress, English political theorists like John Trenchard and James Harrington shaped American
perceptions regarding civil-military relations.26 Radical Whigs waged a literary war against the ominous
presence of a standing army. These early writers depicted standing armies as the vehicles of
oppression used by the Crown to control the masses. Cress contends that James Harrington’s
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) marked the beginning of anti-army rhetoric that radical Whigs, and
later North American colonists, adopted. Harrington argued that a landowner’s attachment to his
property gave him a vested interest in the defense of the state that professional soldiers lacked. Radical
Whig ideology glorified the citizen-solider, looking to the militia to curb the oppression of standing armies
and tyrannical leaders.
There existed an ideological war between the radical Whigs and their more moderate counterparts.
Moderate Whigs possessed a liberal view of civil-military relations, arguing that that a standing army,
not citizen-soldiers, provided the best protection for the state. They believed that Parliamentary control
ensured the Crown could not use the army as an abusive tool. This English debate was transplanted to
British North America and remained a lively point of contention among Anglo-American leaders.
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During the early years of North American colonization, Anglo-Americans espoused the moderate
Whig interpretation. Many colonists saw a standing army as both necessary and essential for protection
from Indians and foreign invaders. The Seven Years’ War, however, served as a major turning point in
colonial ideology. The presence of British soldiers in Boston and along the frontier made many colonists
equate military occupation with the taxes imposed by the Crown. In contrast, colonial pamphlets and
essays depicted the citizen-solider, who gallantly fought for his liberty, as the torchbearer of colonial
patriotism. By the revolutionary period, Anglo-Americans embraced the radical Whig interpretation.
Following the American Revolution, American leaders continued to celebrate the merits of the militia
over a professional fighting force. Militia service became one of the cornerstones of republican virtue
and the pinnacle of civic duty to one’s community. In 1793, House deliberations regarding the reduction
of the army reveal sentiments that were emblematic of how many American leaders and their
constituents viewed civil-military relations in the young republic. House members such as Virginia
Representative Josiah Parker preferred citizen-soldiers who had a personal stake in the security of the
country rather than paid professionals who were “collected from the stews and brothels of the cities who
had none of the spirit or principles of the honest yeomanry.” Parker further argued that professional
soldiers fought for monetary rewards and not “with a good cause” like militiamen.27
For advocates of the militia, the Revolutionary War provided sufficient examples of the sacrifice and
success of the citizen-solider. North Carolina Representative John Steele recollected victories at
Cowpens, King’s Mountain, and Hanging Rock, all battles “fought by freemen … men attached to the
Revolution from principle, men who were sensible of their rights and fought for them.”28 For many
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American lawmakers, the citizen-solider not only provided domestic security but protected the republic
against oppressive standing armies.
Governor Claiborne believed that militia service could instill Louisiana landowners with a vested
interest in the republic and further their attachment to the United States. The territory’s Legislative
Council shared his feelings. On April 10, 1805, it took steps to reorganize the territory’s defenses. “An
act for the regulating and governing the Militia of the Territory Orleans” designated twenty-four militia
districts for New Orleans and adjoining parishes that incorporated every free, able-bodied man between
sixteen and fifty. The act also outlined the internal organization of each district. Regiments were to
have at least one company of grenadiers, light infantry, and troop of horse each. Officers were required
to muster their forces anywhere from two to four times a year. Fines were imposed on those who
refused to attend and participate in musters.29 Concomitantly, Louisianans began forming their own
volunteer units. The Legislative Council drafted qualifications and criteria for such companies, requiring
volunteer units to have at least thirty men who supplied their own weapons.30 In November, Claiborne
happily reported the progress the militia made over the preceding months. He gave positive marks to
several companies of Orleans Volunteers and to the Orleans Troop of Horse.31
Once organized and functional, the Orleans territorial militia served as a slave patrol. Militiamen
volunteered for night watches of surrounding plantations, looking for suspicious slave activity. This
short tenure as a patroller exempted a soldier from musters and other militia duties anywhere from six
months to a year. However, slave patrollers were not always enough to ease fears of slave
insurrections. As a precautionary measure, Governor Claiborne called out entire militia units to patrol
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their districts in case of rebellion. On one occasion, he requested that the Point Coupee militia, along
with a small regular force, stay on constant watch to prevent a rumored slave uprising.32
Militiamen in the Orleans territory were not only used as slave patrollers, but also as a police force to
maintain public order. Ethnic feuding in city streets and at seasonal dances made militiamen a
permanent fixture in New Orleans nightlife. In January 1804, Claiborne stationed a militia detachment at
the Ballroom to “tend to the preservation of good order.” 33 This general order followed a disturbance
that occurred at one nightspot. Allegedly, Frenchmen in attendance were offended by the playing of
Contra Danse Anglaise, which they felt celebrated their British foes.34 At other dances, duels often
resulted when song selections seemed to favor one ethnic group over another. To alleviate this
recurring problem, Claiborne stationed militiamen at every public dance, while requiring ballroom
owners to adhere to a strict playlist that alternated French quadrilles, English quadrilles, and waltzes.35
Despite minor successes in militia organization, Claiborne and his advisors still faced many obstacles
in creating an effective defense force. In October 1805, Henry Hopkins, the Adjutant General of the
Orleans territory, reported to Claiborne that the two major problems plaguing the militia were
demographics and ethnic composition. Hopkins contended that geographic constraints restricted the
readiness of militia units. Dispersed settlements and militia districts extending to both sides of the
Mississippi River made musters and organization virtually impossible. Within the city of New Orleans,
Hopkins found that the heterogeneous population posed its own problems, as linguistic barriers
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undermined unity and company cohesion. Cultural prejudice among ethnic groups also hindered militia
camaraderie and strict discipline. Many French and Spanish natives refused to muster with one
another, uniting only in resentment of Claiborne’s insistence that Americans, not Creoles or Spaniards,
serve as brigadier generals.36
Claiborne’s programs intended to foster attachment and provide Louisianans with a vested
interest in the United States. Yet Louisianans’ Americanization process was far from complete.
Washington lawmakers also did their part to assist Louisianans in ascertaining knowledge of
republican principles. As Louisianans protested the 1804 Governance Act, congressional leaders
began to reconsider the hated bill. As early as August 1804, President Jefferson encouraged
American lawmakers to revise the original Governance Act in order to provide Louisianans with
self-government. Jefferson’s request seems quite strange considering his initial concerns
regarding Louisianans’ political capabilities. In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson revealed his
true intentions, admitting that his earlier feelings about Louisianans had not changed. Rather,
Jefferson feared that despite the dangers of extending self-government to an ignorant population,
the alternative was much more threatening to the nation. Jefferson contended that if lawmakers
continued to deprive Louisianans of basic American rights, they would turn away from the United
States, leaving them “the pretext of calling in a foreign Umpire between them & us.” 37 By providing
Louisianans with a representative government, Jefferson hoped to curb discontent among the
Orleans citizenry.
Heeding Jefferson’s urgings, both the House and Senate appointed special committees to draft a new
Louisiana government bill. Although committee debates reveal that lawmakers wanted Louisianans to
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undergo a more extensive naturalization period, they also demonstrate that many congressional
members believed that self-government was necessary.38 More importantly, they, like Jefferson,
believed Louisianans’ loyalty depended on providing Orleans inhabitants with concessions. Selfgovernment seemed an appropriate dispensation. One House member even argued that “by permitting
her [Orleans Territory] inhabitants to form their own regulations, the voice of discontent would be
diminished [if it exists], and the people bound to us by the strong ties of gratitude and interest.”39
Besides curbing disloyalty, congressional leaders realized that self-government would allow Louisianans
to elect competent officials and to participate in American republican institutions.
On February 18, 1805, the Senate sent a revised government bill, modeled after the Northwest
Ordinance, to the House for approval. On March 1, the House passed the 1805 Governance Bill.40
The new bill extended Louisianans self-government through a bicameral legislature consisting of a
territorial House of Representatives with twenty-five delegates elected by the people to work
alongside the Legislative Council, still to be appointed by the President. The act also stipulated
that when the territory consisted of 60,000 free inhabitants it would be admitted into the Union as
an equal state. The 1805 Governance Act, therefore, elevated the Orleans Territory to the second
grade of territorial status and provided guidelines for future statehood.41
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As the new territorial government took effect on July 4, 1805, American lawmakers and
members of the Claiborne administration felt assured that they had created an ideal apprenticeship
period that consisted of a territorial government and Americanization programs that could help
prepare Louisianans for citizenship and statehood.42 Yet over the course of the next few years,
these programs failed to have their intended effects.
The first territorial House of Representatives met on November 4, 1805. Members of the
territory’s ancient population, as discussed in Chapter Three, monopolized seats using their new
political power to forward their resistance agenda. They not only sparred with Governor Claiborne
over the territory’s legal code but ensured Creole dominance of the legislative body.43 Although
designed to align Louisianans with republican values, the territory’s new representative
government only served to polarize the ancients and Americans. As the new Legislative Assembly
often exacerbated tensions within the territory, the education system also fell into disarray. In a
speech opening the second session of the Legislative Assembly in March 1806, Governor
Claiborne indicated that all initial preparations for the school system produced dismal results.
Claiborne blamed the lack of public support for this failure. He also looked to the Legislative
Assembly for assistance, contending that “Those in power should esteem it an incumbent duty to
make such provisions for the improvement of the minds and morals of the rising generation as will
enable them to appreciate the blessing of self-government and to preserve those rights which are

42 Louisiana Gazette, 30 July 1805. Also found in Territorial Papers, IX, 478-480. Actual address given on July 26, 1806.
On July 30, 1805, Governor Claiborne announced upcoming elections for the twenty-four delegates of the newly-formed
House of Representatives. The only men eligible to hold office were those who had resided in an American state or
Louisiana district for at least three years and who possessed at least two hundred or more acres of land. Voters had to fulfill
the same residency requirements, while owning at least fifty acres of land.

Louisiana Gazette, 5 November 1805. Jean Noel Destrehan to the Jefferson, 11 November 1805, Territorial
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destined for their inheritance.”44 Claiborne urged legislative officials to implement educational
programs similar to those existing in states such as New York that placed citizens in charge of their
children’s education.45 Answering Claiborne’s plea, the assembly passed “An Act to provide for the
establishment of public free schools in the several counties of the Territory.” The bill made the
heads of each family responsible for the erection and support of parish schools.46
For the next two years neither the 1806 act nor the University lottery engendered much support or
funds for public education. Judging from advertisements in the Louisiana Gazette, private schools and
individual tutors were more successful than public schools. As early as 1805, Francis Hacket set up an
English school on Bienville Street. His curriculum consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic. He also
provided private lessons for those needing individual instruction.47 Such advertisements were
commonplace in New Orleans papers and provided inhabitants with tutors who catered to all ethnic
groups and trades. In February 1808, the Louisiana Gazette announced the establishment of a new
French School located on South Charters Street. The instructor, M. O’Duhigg, offered French and
English lessons as well as private tutoring.48 Judging by the variety and steady upsurge of these
advertisements, it seems logical to conclude that there existed a high demand for private schools and
tutors. Francis Hacket continued to announce his services in the October 20, 1809 edition of the
Louisiana Gazette, indicating that he experienced at least moderate success in teaching the children of
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the territory.49 It appears that territorial inhabitants looked to private schools and personal tutors,
perhaps seeing American public schools as too financially burdensome. More importantly, many
Louisianans ignored Claiborne’s educational programs, fearing the cultural implications a revamped
American curriculum could have on their French heritage and traditions.
The Legislative Assembly also did very little to advance Claiborne’s educational program. Between
1806 and 1808, the public school system was overlooked as territorial lawmakers focused on the legal
system and the Burr Conspiracy. In 1807 the University lottery was revoked and by 1808 the parish
school program was abandoned in favor of a new education act passed on March 16, 1808. In this act,
the judges of each parish were to appoint a committee of the most respected men in the parish to
organize schools.50 Again this bill generated little results. In an address to the Legislative Assembly in
January 1809, Claiborne himself admitted the failure of his education program, expressing his doubts
that any act would “produce the desired effect.” The only real success of Claiborne’s system was the
University of Orleans. By November 4, 1811, the university opened with an enrollment of seventy
students.51
As Claiborne’s public school system fell short of his initial hopes, the reorganization of the territory’s
militia also brought its fair share of disappointments. Following the militia reorganization act in August of
1805, Claiborne immediately sent orders for all districts to activate their units. Claiborne and Colonel
Henry Hopkins personally traveled throughout the territory to assist each district in setting up its militia
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and commissioning officers.52 In a speech given to the Legislative Assembly in March 1806, Claiborne
expressed satisfaction with the overall progress of militia reorganization. He believed, however, that
fines and punishment for insubordination were much too weak, indicating that there existed problems in
implementing strict adherence to service.53
A few months later, Claiborne’s early approval of the militia was put to the test over a
Spanish/American border dispute. While turbulent negotiations over the exact western boundary
between the Orleans Territory and Texas continued, Spanish Texans crossed into Louisiana threatening
the territory’s peripheral parishes. As a precautionary measure, Governor Claiborne called out the
Natchitoches and Rapides militia units only to find them in utter chaos. Claiborne attributed this disarray
to the ancient Louisianans who failed to display “the same degree of patriotism” found amongst
Americans in these counties. Claiborne expressed his belief that many of these ancients still possessed
strong affection for Spain and that “in the event of War, they would probably be disposed to take a
neutral Stand.”54 These initial worries soon faded as militia units throughout the territory eventually
mobilized to defend the western frontier. The border dispute demonstrated that the newly reorganized
territorial militia, although slow, could meet the call to arms. In contrast to his previous assessment,
Claiborne now praised the efforts of ancient Louisianans who fought their former colonial caretakers,
asserting that “this display of patriotism affords me, much satisfaction, and has rendered this, among the
happiest days of my life.”55
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As the militia remained successful in policing the Orleans Territory and curbing rumored slave revolts
and ethnic feuds, it was not devoid of its defects and weaknesses. Following the Spanish-American
border crisis, Claiborne continued his call for militia reform. He seemed particularly concerned about
the scarcity of arms and the lack of discipline among militiamen. In January 1807, he urged the
Legislative Assembly to impose stiffer punishments and fines for those who failed to attend required
musters and military parades.56 Just two years later, a reevaluation of the Orleans territorial militia
revealed that the territory’s ethnic composition and dispersed settlements continued to inhibit effective
military organization. Henry Hopkins still found problems, insisting that, “in every street you will
encounter native Americans, native Louisianans, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Germans, and
Italians. Let a company of Militia be assembled, & there is no one language in which the word of
command can be given that will be intelligible to all.” 57 Indeed, the same ethnic diversity that plagued
the formation of the education system and hindered solidarity in the Legislative Assembly also made
effective militia organization virtually impossible. Moreover, Hopkins claimed that lax fines and
punishment for insubordination remained persistent problems.58 Finally in 1811, after a major slave
insurrection in New Orleans, territorial officials implemented Claiborne’s proposed reforms by requiring
musters for all militia units and raising fines for insubordination from one dollar to seven. 59
Beginning in 1805, the Claiborne administration implemented key legislation that endeavored to
assist Louisianans in becoming more American. Self-government, public education, and militia service
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were all used as a means to teach Louisianans about republican principles while also fostering
attachment to the United States. These mechanisms, however, yielded dismal results. The bicameral
legislature often exacerbated ethnic tensions existing between Louisianans and Americans. The parish
school system was nonexistent, while the Orleans University struggled to keep its doors open.
Concomitantly, militia organization remained impaired by the ethnic composition and the dispersed
nature of the territory. As techniques of Americanization failed to have their intended outcomes in the
Orleans Territory, American lawmakers grew more frustrated that Louisianans failed to accept programs
that seemed so vital to the incorporation process. By their estimations Louisianans resisted all attempts
to Americanize, leaving many lawmakers to wonder if Louisianans wanted to become true Americans.
****
By American standards Louisianans failed to undergo the proper process of Americanization.
For Washington lawmakers, Louisianans’ apprenticeship to liberty was an all or nothing situation.
For Louisianans, however, it was far from black and white. Louisianans, undoubtedly, resisted
aspects of Claiborne’s programs by choosing to send their children to private tutors or neglecting
required militia musters, but that did not mean that they were indifferent or actively trying to
undermine their assimilation. Rather Louisianans made conscious efforts to accommodate
lawmakers and the Claiborne administration—just not always in the way American lawmakers
desired. As Louisianans adopted the antics of resistance leaders, their political boycotts, critical
editorials, and intense feuds in the Legislative Assembly revealed the extent of their disdain for
many American policies. Such powerful protests and abrasive demonstrations of dissent,
understandably, were tantalizing to national newspapers and troublesome to lawmakers. This
resistance, however, often masked Creole politicians’ more subtle efforts to oblige and cooperate
with Washington lawmakers. The same Legislative Assembly that served as an ethnic
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battleground also passed Americanization programs including the education and militia acts. It
heeded Claiborne’s requests for a public school system and militia and used every legislative
session to improve these institutions. Louisiana lawmakers also took every opportunity to utilize
the conversation of attachment to bolster their claims of loyalty and affection as well as their desire
to be good members of the Union. Where Americans often saw ambivalence, Louisianans saw
themselves using cooperation as a means to ensure that their incorporation promoted their goals
and aspirations and Washington lawmakers’ requests for assimilation.
Creole politicians’ accommodating efforts can largely be attributed to the work of Julien Poydras.
Unlike many ancient Creoles, Poydras believed cooperation, rather than resistance, allowed
Louisianans to shape the incorporation process. His constant urgings and guidance often
countered resistance tactics used by Clark and Livingston and provided Louisianans another
means to negotiate their place in the Union.
Born in France, Julien Poydras made his way to Louisiana from St. Domingue in 1768. Once in
New Orleans he began a small trading business along the banks of the Mississippi River. His
peddling endeavors allowed him to amass a small fortune which he quickly invested in property. In
1784, he purchased a stretch of land in Pointe Coupee. Along with a new plantation, Poydras set
up a merchant store in the small outpost. His good reputation and many business connections
allowed his store to thrive. Between 1784 and 1803, he purchased property in West Feliciana
Parish, West Baton Rouge, and in the city of New Orleans. As the United States took possession
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of Lower Louisiana, Poydras acquired another large stretch of land in Point Coupee that made up
the bulk of his historic Alma Plantation.60
Beyond his merchant enterprises, Poydras was also one of the Mississippi Valley’s largest
planters. His early agricultural endeavors centered on indigo and cotton cultivation. Along with his
massive landholdings, Poydras also invested in slaves. Based on 1820 census records, he owned
over 3,820 slaves on his Pointe Coupee plantation alone.61 In 1795, his Alma plantation was the
site of one of colonial Louisiana’s worst slave rebellions. Away when the revolt occurred, Poydras
was distressed by the matter and disappointed over the loss of some of his most trusted slaves.62
Although Poydras made his home in Louisiana, he remained in contact with family and friends in
France. He even carefully monitored the events of the French Revolution. At one point he became
so distraught over the radical turn of the revolution that he admitted to a friend that “what I have
heard from France, has left me too disgusted to even think anymore about it other than with
horror.”63 His French ties, of course, left Poydras elated by the retrocession of Louisiana to the
French. Upon hearing the news, he took the opportunity to write colonial Prefect Pierre Clément
Brian J. Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 1-16. Poydras served in the French Army when
he was captured by the British. After three years in captivity he escaped by stowing away in a ship bound for St.
Domingue.
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de Laussat to welcome him to his new post and to give him valuable information regarding Lower
Louisiana’s climate and geographical contours. He concluded his letter, affectionately proclaiming
“May this sweet reunion forever tighten the bonds of blood, friendship, and devotion that always
made our homeland dear to us.”64
Poydras’s years in Louisiana failed to dim his attachment to France. He must have been quite
disappointed when France’s tenure in Lower Louisiana was cut short by the Louisiana Purchase. It
would seem only natural that he would resort to resistance against the American government, the
same government that brought his hopes for a French reunion to an end. But he did not. Poydras
emerged as a leading pro-American politician in territorial Louisiana and helped guide
Americanization efforts, believing that cooperation would secure Louisianans statehood while
protecting their French heritage.
By the time the United States purchased French Louisiana, Poydras had made a name for
himself as a trusted leader and businessman throughout Lower Louisiana. His many connections
kept him closely tied to affairs in New Orleans and he soon befriended Governor Claiborne.
Finding Poydras to be a “worthy man, of honest reputation, and good information,” Claiborne
looked to him as a valuable Creole ally.65 Also his proficiency in English allowed Poydras to bridge
the gap between Claiborne and his French-speaking constituents. Hoping to exploit Poydras’s
strengths, Claiborne appointed him to the Board of the Directors of the Bank of Louisiana in
January 1804. At its inaugural meeting, Poydras was elected president of the board, a position he
64 Julien Poydras to Pierre Clément de Laussat, 22 July 1803, Selected Writings of Julien Poydras, ed. Julie
Eshelman-Lee (Fort Collins: Creole West Productions, 2004), 111-112. Poydras hoped to give Laussat insight about
Lower Louisiana since the French “know Louisiana only through word of mouth—in other words not at all.”
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would assume for five consecutive terms. Along with his director duties, Poydras also made efforts
to establish a Chamber of Commerce in New Orleans, hoping to further reinforce the territory’s
financial system.66
Claiborne also looked to Poydras to serve other important government positions. Under the
Spanish regime, government posts were headed by the offices of military and civil commandant
that arbitrated over military, legal, and civil matters. When the United States took control of Lower
Louisiana, lawmakers temporarily maintained this system. In such a chaotic time, lawmakers
looked to competent and trusting men to keep order. Claiborne wasted little time in appointing
Poydras civil commandant over Point Coupee in August 1804.67
Moreover, President Jefferson rewarded Poydras’s initial support of the Claiborne administration
by making the Creole planter a member of the territory’s Legislative Council. While many ancients
declined to serve in the new government, Poydras accepted, admitting that “I conceive it as my
duty to accept …. If those, who have great Interest in the Country, should decline serving it when
called upon, their conduct would be unwarrantable.”68 Between 1805 and 1808, Poydras served as
the president of the Legislative Council.69 In this capacity he worked vigorously to assist the
Claiborne administration and Louisianans in the incorporation process. When the Legislative
66 Frances Pirotte Zink, Julien Poydras: Statesman, Philanthropist, Educator (Lafayette: University of Southwestern
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Council convened in December 1804, Poydras used his first presidential address to encourage his
fellow council members to cooperate with American lawmakers to alleviate the stress of the new
regime change.70 As the Legislative Council’s president, Poydras guided Louisianans through the
Burr Conspiracy and helped them fight for the continuation of civil law. More importantly, Poydras
took the lead in helping the Claiborne administration implement aspects of its Americanization
program. He continuously urged territorial leaders to pass legislation to establish public schools.
He also corresponded with Congress in hopes of securing financial help for the new public school
system.71 Much like his American counterparts, Poydras saw education as the key to Louisianans’
incorporation.
Beyond his assistance in the Legislative Council, Poydras also worked to ensure that
Claiborne’s education system succeeded in his own community. Through Poydras’s constant
encouragement and generous support, members of the Pointe Coupee community met in
September 1808 to begin preparations for the establishment of five parish schools. At the
gathering they crafted guidelines for paying instructors and the curriculum that consisted of
reading, writing, composition, grammar, morals, the catechism, and arithmetic. Furthermore,
attendees decided to fund the schools by levying a fifty cent tax per slave on every planter in the
parish. Community members then selected a board of five directors to oversee the implementation
of their plans. These directors were to select instructors, establish examination methods, and
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handle disciplinary matters. Julien Poydras gladly served on the board and took a formative role in
advancing the school system.72
By the end of 1808, only four public schools existed in the Orleans Territory and all of them were
located in Pointe Coupee. Also through Poydras’s financial support, Pointe Coupee erected an
academy for young women that remained open until the Civil War.73 By 1809, the Pointe Coupee
system was fully functional and received accolades from Governor Claiborne. “In the Parish of
Point Coupee, it is understood, that provisions has been made for the support of two or more public
schools,” Claiborne emphatically bragged. He went on to encourage other lawmakers to emulate
Poydras’s commitment to education, arguing that “Youths are reared into life, become the pride of
their parents, the ornaments of society & the pillars of their country’s glory. You cannot
Gentlemen, but be sensible of the importance of this subject; it embraces the best interest of the
community & mingles with the warmest affections of the heart.” 74
As Poydras made his way to Washington to serve as the territory’s delegate to Congress,
Louisianans looked forward to having such a respected advocate in Congress.75 Claiborne too felt
relieved to have a pro-American representative in Congress, but he also lamented Poydras’s
departure.76 Since the Louisiana Purchase, Julien Poydras proved an indispensable ally to the
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American government. He not only worked alongside Claiborne and Washington lawmakers but
also tried to help his fellow Louisianans to do the same. In many respects he provided Louisianans
an alternative to political resistance and encouraged them to use cooperation to influence the
incorporation process.
Poydras proves a complementary figure next to Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston: Their careers
and influence in the Orleans Territory exemplify two vital strategies Louisianans employed in the political
arena. Resistance allowed Louisianans to oppose unfavorable policies and ensure the maintenance of
their French identity, while cooperation often demonstrated politicians’ commitment to assist their
constituents in fulfilling the requirements for citizenship. In turn, Creole leaders often used them
interchangeably in their dealings with American lawmakers. For instance, the Board of Regents of the
University of Orleans for years attempted to make the institution of higher learning a reality. By 1812,
the university opened its doors largely because the acting regents secured money from both the
Legislative Council and the City Council. They also were successful in obtaining several city lots and
buildings to house the inaugural class in November 1811. The university, however, lacked many of the
necessary provisions to accommodate more students and provide a thriving university community. In
hopes of keeping the university alive, the regents sent a petition to Congress begging for assistance.
They requested money to procure more buildings and to make improvements to provide better facilities
for current and future students.77 To reinforce their request, the memorial explained that Congress
needed to share the burden of public education. The regents, like so many American lawmakers,
believed that education ensured that Louisianans would fulfill citizenship requirements. They believed if
lawmakers intended for these prerequisites to be met, they needed to do their part by “affording the
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means (at least to the rising generation) of understanding the laws and maxims that govern the people
of the United States, in the language in which they are written.” The memorial allowed the regents to
demand that Congress be more accountable for public education, while also showing their own
commitment to the university’s success.78
Providing a cogent argument, the regents’ memorial illustrates that many Creole lawmakers hoped to
see the success of some of Claiborne’s Americanization programs. Even more interesting is the fact
that many of these regents including Noel Destrehan, Pierre Derbigny, Evan Jones, and James Pitot
were the same men that used resistance to combat unfavorable policies. These men resigned their
posts in the Legislative Council, wrote impassioned editorials against the Claiborne administration,
carried the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana to Congress, and exploited the support of
resistance leaders. Yet these men were not always at odds with the American government. At times
they found causes that allowed them to cooperate with American lawmakers and to use their leadership
skills and influence within the territory to promote a successful incorporation. Public education became
one such issue. To them the diffusion of education was necessary for the next generation and an
essential vehicle to help Louisianans learn English and the intricate workings of republican principles.79
Although Poydras undoubtedly influenced the Board of Regents’ copious efforts, their memorial reveals
that cooperation became an essential tool Creole politicians used to shape the incorporation process to
offset their ardent resistant tactics.
The Burr Conspiracy also provides an excellent example of how Louisianans balanced
resistance and cooperation. The early years of the territorial period brought considerable protest
from Louisianans who seemed dissatisfied with the 1804 Governance Act, the ban on the slave
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trade, and the encroachment of English and common law in their lives. Some ardent Creoles even
expressed hope that the Spanish or French would reclaim Louisiana. With such strong dissent it
would appear that the Burr Conspiracy provided unhappy Louisianans the perfect chance to rid
themselves of the American government. Yet Louisianans failed to seize this opportunity. While
prominent political leaders such as General James Wilkinson, Daniel Clark, and Edward Livingston
faced serious accusations of treason, not one ancient Louisianan was indicted or arrested in the
malicious scheme. When given the opportunity to rebel, Louisianans remained loyal, illustrating
their reliance on attachment rather than defiance.
In the months following the Burr Conspiracy, Louisianans did not miss their chance to remind
American lawmakers of their allegiance and attachment during such a chaotic time. In February
1807, members of the Legislative Assembly forwarded Congress a series of resolutions that
professed their bonds of affection, saying that they were:
Assured of the attachment and Devotion of the Citizens of this Territory to the
Government of the United States, to Which under the Auspices of Providence they
are so highly indebted for their present prosperity and Happiness and desiring to
give a solemn testimonial to the World of our firm Determination under all
Circumstances and at all hazards to maintain and support that political connextion
which has united our Destinies to those of one of the freest and most enlightened
people on earth.
The resolutions went on to express Louisianans’ horror over an attempt to cast doubt on their
loyalty and promised that territorial inhabitants would be ready to assist lawmakers in purging any
traitors or those who sought to undermine the American government.80
Louisianans ignored Burr’s cunning plans in order to show their devotion and attachment to the
United States. Their actions proved useful. According to George Dargo, since Louisianans turned
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against Burr, Governor Claiborne felt compelled to give special concessions to his loyal
constituents. He decided to approve the Digest of Civil Code, ending Louisianans’ long crusade to
preserve civil law.81 This experience taught Louisianans the power of attachment and the benefits
it yielded.
Although Louisianans’ professed bonds of affection proved useful during the Burr Conspiracy,
they were far from a new concept. Beginning with his first address to his constituents, Claiborne
stressed the importance of attachment. But what does attachment truly mean? Why was it so
important in the incorporation process? Historian Peter Kastor argues that many historians see
attachment and identity as one and the same. He, however, prefers to use the word “attachment”,
since identity had yet to enter into nineteenth-century Americans’ vocabulary.82 Yet by dissecting
the word attachment one realizes it is infused with significant meaning for American lawmakers and
Louisianans. Identity refers to being similar or exactly alike. More specifically, to identify with
someone means to align one’s interests with his/hers. Although identity describes the
incorporation process, since Americans hoped that Louisianans would become identical to all
Americans and share their values, mores, cultural mannerism, and institutions—attachment goes
much deeper. Attachment means the joining of a group through bonds of affection, loyalty, and
devotion. The incorporation process rested not only on making Louisianans an exact replica of
Americans, but to make them willing Americans. Attachment indicates a choice, a conscious
assimilation not by force but through affection, devotion, and loyalty. Americans, therefore, looked
to bonds of attachment as the glue that bound willing and devoted Louisianans to the young
republic.
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Long before the Louisiana Purchase, Americans spoke the language of attachment. Since the
colonial era, Americans used attachment as a litmus test for citizenship. This, of course,
manifested itself in different ways. Open professions of affection or disavowing loyalty to another
nation often furthered ones’ attachment. At times it came with showing a love and knowledge of
the federal Constitution and willingness to participate in the republican government. More
importantly, many immigrants found that gallant sacrifices on the battlefield transcended rhetoric to
demonstrate their true love and devotion to the United States. By the time the United States
acquired French Louisiana, American lawmakers deemed attachment as essential for
naturalization and assimilation as evidenced a by congressional committee’s conclusion that “only
two modes present themselves whereby a dependent province may be held in obedience to its
sovereign State—force and affection.”83 Americans lawmakers hoped attachment would be
enough and relied on signs of affection as a prerequisite for Louisianans to receive statehood.
Governor Claiborne himself engaged in the conversation of attachment. He filled his letters to
American officials with references to his constituents’ affection and gradual warming to the United
States. Following the dismal failure of Louisianans’ Remonstrance, for instance, Claiborne assured
James Madison that such minor setbacks did not shake Orleans inhabitants’ allegiance to the
United States.84 While discussing tense negotiations between the United State and Spain in July
1806, Claiborne hoped to ease James Madison’s mind by assuring him that “we [Orleans Territory]
are by no means as divided as has been represented, and my firm opinion is, that in the event of
war, many of the Louisianans will be found faithful to the American Standard.”85 Claiborne
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obviously saw the importance of the conversation of attachment. He knew many questioned his
constituents’ loyalty as well as their desire to be affectionately tied to the United States. At times
he tried to convince lawmakers that Louisianans’ opposition was not a result of their lack of
attachment for the Union, but the malice of designing men. On one occasion, he described
Louisianans as a “Mild pacific people,” with a strong attachment to the Union. Yet he found they
were “uncommonly credulous, and may easily be misled by designing Men, of which the Territory
at present, has an abundant supply.”86 Years later, he continued to defend his constituents’
dissent, admitting to President Jefferson that “I attach no blame to the Louisianans; a few men
whose native Language is English, have by their Intrigues, f’omented all the discontents, which
have and do yet exist in this Territory.”87 Claiborne continued to use resistance leaders such as
Clark and Livingston to explain Louisianans’ often less than affectionate attitude towards their new
government.
Claiborne also used the conversation of attachment with his constituents. From his first address
to territorial inhabitants to his many speeches before the Legislative Assembly, Claiborne
constantly urged Louisianans to demonstrate their loyalty and affection. In July 1805, he
expressed his confidence in Louisianans’ attachment, claiming that “My firm belief is, that the
Mississippi will cease to flow, e’er she ceases to behold Louisiana attached to the Empire of
American Freedom.”88 His later speeches aped such feelings. In the opening session of the
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Legislative Council in March 1806, Claiborne felt self-assured of Louisianans’ attachment,
exclaiming that “in peace or in war—the good people of this territory will do their duty!”89
As Claiborne did his part to cultivate his constituents’ bonds of affection, Louisianans took it
upon themselves to engage in the conversation of attachment. The Remonstrance of the People
of Louisiana provided Louisianans a chance to use such discourse to secure important goals. The
opening statement of the memorial expressed Louisianans’ anticipation and joy over becoming part
of the United States, stating that “we passed under your jurisdiction with a joy bordering on
enthusiasm, submitted to the inconveniences of an intermediate dominion without a murmur, and
saw the last tie that attached us to our mother country severed with less regret.” It further
espoused Louisianans’ attachment and dedication to sacred American principles outlined in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.90 Moreover, the Remonstrance reveals that
Louisianans clearly understood that attachment rested on reciprocal bonds of affection, warning
that:
It is the interest of the United States to cultivate a spirit of conciliation with the
inhabitants of the territory they have acquired. Annexed to your country by the
course of political events, it depends upon you to determine whether we shall pay
the cold homage of reluctant subjects, or render the free allegiance of citizens,
attached to your fortunes by choice, bound to you by gratitude, for the best of
blessings, contributing cheerfully to your advancement, to those high destinies to
which honor, liberty, and justice, will conduct you, and defending, as we solemnly
pledge ourselves to do at the risk of fortune and life, our common constitution,
country, and laws.”91
In this concluding remark, Louisianans made attachment a two-way street. If lawmakers wanted
their affection and loyalty, then they needed to give Louisianans reasons to be “bound to you by
89
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gratitude.” Although crafted as a protest by Edward Livingston, the Remonstrance articulates
Louisianans’ acknowledgement and utilization of the conversation of attachment and its
indispensable role in the incorporation process.
Louisianans’ espousals of affection and allegiance continued despite the many disappointments
they faced in obtaining statehood. Creole politicians in the Legislative Assembly did their part to
advance the conversation of attachment with Washington lawmakers. In April 1806, they sent a
letter to Governor Claiborne assuring him that in times of crisis they would defend the country with
the utmost energy and patriotism.92 The Legislative Council went on to send a similar declaration
to President Jefferson, promising him that they would “cheerfully submit whatever sacrifice and
privations may be necessary for vindicating the rights, the honor, the independence of our
nation.”93
As politicians spoke the language of attachment, so too did the territory’s citizenry. On the first
anniversary of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, an anonymous author wrote a poem
to commemorate the monumental day. One stanza emphasized the attachment and union
Louisianans sought to cultivate: “American and French unite, / Like Brothers, should, in love
appear; / Let discord cease, with angry spite, / And hail the glories of the year!” 94 Beyond more
poetic articulations, Louisianans provided assurances of their attachment when Americans needed
it most. In August 1807, New Orleans citizens gathered at the Coffee House to draft a memorial to
the president expressing their thoughts regarding the Chesapeake-Leopard incident that resulted in
the destruction of the American frigate Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia. Appalled and horrified
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by Britain’s blatant violation of American neutrality, Orleans citizens vowed to assist Jefferson in
rectifying such a cruel act by “risking our lives and fortunes in support of the just cause of our
country.” These citizens went on to firmly articulate their loyalty and affection, asserting that “The
inhabitants of the city of New Orleans pray you Sir, to receive the expression they now make of
indignation and wounded pride … of zeal and eagerness to obtain atonement for the injury: of
attachment to the United States, and confidence in the administration of its government.” More
notable than the overt discourse of attachment are the men that wrote such charged words. Daniel
Clark served as the meeting’s chairman, while Edward Livingston was in attendance.95 Although
Clark and Livingston’s part in the memorial exposes their attempt at political damage control so
quickly after the Burr Conspiracy, the other attendees at the meeting must have realized that in
times of crisis their espousals of attachment were required and even more compelling.
Louisianans wasted little time in understanding and exploiting the conversation of attachment.
Whether in angry protests or in the most common petitions to Congress, Louisianans never missed
their chance to express their attachment and loyalty nor did American lawmakers fail to accept and
revel in such language.96 Despite their neglect of key Americanization programs, Louisianans used
this discourse to offset resistance efforts and signs of indifference. Their espousals of affection
and devotion often transcended their neglectful actions that served to frustrate American policies
and interfere with lawmakers’ vision for the incorporation process. Louisianans carved out a place
whereby they could respond positively to certain aspects of Washington lawmakers’ proposals
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while preserving a degree of autonomy in accepting what they deemed necessary for their
assimilation.
****
Long before Clark and Livingston disappeared from the New Orleans political scene,
Louisianans had already learned the intrinsic value of the conversation of attachment. Territorial
lawmakers, through the encouragement of Julien Poydras, used accommodation as a means to
secure citizenship. Their new strategy proved useful in preserving civil law. More importantly, their
cooperation with the Claiborne administration produced major pieces of legislation that promoted
Americanization efforts.
Confident in the territory’s progress, in 1809 the Legislative Council drafted a petition for
statehood. This request proved premature as Governor Claiborne refused to forward their request
on to Congress. Still believing that Louisianans were ill-prepared for self-government, Claiborne
expressed misgivings regarding their capabilities to run a state government.97 Undeterred, in
March 1810 Louisianans submitted a second petition. This time they invoked the conversation of
attachment to prove their readiness, asserting that “The loyalty of the whole population of this
Territory has since been put to trial in circumstances sufficiently critical for you to be Now
convinced that the inhabitants of Lower Louisiana are not undeserving of the Confidence of the
federal Government.”98 Louisiana lawmakers used their loyal actions in the Burr Conspiracy to
convince American leaders of their attachment. Based on the rules of the conversation of
attachment, such affection and loyalty were supposed to show that Louisianans were ready and
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worthy of statehood. Moreover, Louisianans expected Congress to reward their bonds of
attachment by allowing Louisiana to enter the Union.
During the territorial period, Louisianans utilized the conversation of attachment as a means of
negotiation. Soon, however, they would learn that statehood would only enhance their reliance on
this discourse. An impending war with Great Britain altered Louisianans’ relationship with
American lawmakers and ultimately taught them that proving one’s attachment often transcended
mere rhetoric.
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Chapter Four: The “adopted child of a great family”: Private Preservation and
Public Negotiations Among Creole Families in Territorial Louisiana
After marching for over a year, Philogene Favrot felt relieved to see the fort at Mobile Point come
into view. Philogene, a first lieutenant in the 24th Infantry of the United States Army, left Natchez
in September 1813 for what was supposed to be a four-month trip through Mississippi and
Tennessee to gather recruits. Yet the young soldier’s travels took him far off course. His regiment
detoured into Kentucky and then on to Ohio. From there it headed north to reinforce soldiers in the
Michigan Territory. At this point, Philogene’s recruiting duties expanded to combat. At Fort
Michilimackinac, located 350 miles from Detroit, he faced a superior English foe strengthened by
their Indian allies. As his unit retreated he felt the pain of losing nearly sixty comrades.1 Although
his travels introduced him to death and defeat, they also supplied the ambitious Louisianan with
other, less fatal experiences. “Treacherous Cupid seems to torment me everywhere I go,” he
informed his sister, “I hardly arrived here [Fort Meigs Ohio] before he started to attack me.” At
every stop, the handsome Creole fell prey to beautiful ladies. Philogene’s military expeditions also
allowed him to meet Americans from all walks of life. His unit alone exposed him to men from
Pennsylvania to Georgia. In sum, the War of 1812 took Philogene Favrot on a fantastic odyssey
through a country he knew little about.2
Philogene’s travels finally took him to the Gulf South where he watched the sun set on Mobile
Point the day after Christmas in 1814. Although he had never been to the historic fort he knew the
1 Philogene Favrot to Louis Favrot, 11 October 1814, The Favrot Family Papers: A Documentary Chronicle of Early
Louisiana, ed. Wilbur E. Meneray (New Orleans: Howard Tilton Memorial, 2001), V: 225-226.
2 Philogene Favrot to Octavine Favrot, 29 April 1814, Ibid., V: 198; Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard
Favrot, 24 October 1813, Ibid., V: 179. Volume V is filled with Philogene’s accounts of his trek through the United
States beginning with a letter he wrote his mother from Nashville on September 28, 1813, Ibid., V: 175. Also see
Philogene Favrot to Fergus Duplantier, 20 June 1814, V: Ibid., 200-201; Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard
Favrot, 15 July 1814, Ibid., V: 208; Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 6 October 1814, Ibid., V: 221-223.
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significance it held for his family. After his arrival he wrote his father, admitting to him that “You
can imagine the thoughts that came to my mind when I saw Fort Mobile formerly commanded by
you.”3 Nearly thirty years before, Pierre-Joseph Favrot, a captain in the Spanish Army, oversaw
the daily operations at the colonial fort. In many ways, the Favrot Family’s long military tradition
had come full circle. A young son encountered the vestiges of his father’s glorious career and
followed in his footsteps as a soldier. What was different, however, was that Philogene was an
American soldier and the Favrots were now an American family.
The Favrots were one of Louisiana’s earliest families. Philogene’s grandfather, Claude-Joseph
Favrot, came to Louisiana in 1732 as a second lieutenant in the French Army. Pierre-Joseph,
Philogene’s father, continued the family’s military legacy as a captain in the 2nd Battalion of the
Louisiana Infantry under the Spanish. Pierre-Joseph’s duties took him all over Spain’s vast North
American empire. His travels also brought him into contact with Marie-Françoise Gerard, whom he
married in 1783. The Favrot home was one filled with love but also tragedy as the couple faced the pain
of losing five of their eleven children. In 1799, Pierre-Joseph accepted a position commanding troops in
Baton Rouge and soon purchased a plantation near the fort.
In 1801, Pierre-Joseph’s career took an unexpected turn when Spain returned Louisiana to France.
Having sunk his life’s savings into the new homestead, now located in French Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph
ended his military career instead of relocating his family to a Spanish fort. At the age of 57, PierreJoseph Favrot retired to his West Baton Rouge plantation with his family that included his wife and six
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children. In 1803, as the United States took possession of Lower Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph began his
life as a planter, full-time father, and new American.4
The Favrot’s experience was far from unique. Some of Louisiana’s oldest families contributed
immensely to both the French and Spanish imperial military. Many witnessed Louisiana’s first regime
change in 1763 that brought the Spanish to Louisiana. Spanish imperial authorities hoped to integrate
Louisianans into their burgeoning American empire by imposing their language, customs, institutions,
and cultural mores. Yet the predominance of French speakers in the colony made this virtually
impossible. By successfully preserving their heritage under the Spanish regime, Creole families learned
how to maintain French cultural hegemony in Lower Louisiana.
The transfer of Louisiana to the United States, however, engendered new challenges for Louisiana’s
oldest families. American lawmakers and the Claiborne administration expected their newest
inhabitants to politically and culturally integrate into the young republic. Unlike the Spanish, American
lawmakers implemented programs of Americanization hoping to assist Louisianans in making the
desired transition from colonial Frenchmen to American citizens. In many respects, American
lawmakers deemed it necessary for Creoles to relinquish ties to their colonial past which ultimately
challenged Louisianans’ language, culture, and identity. Creoles, however, entertained divergent ideas
of their incorporation process. While they looked forward to participating in Americans’ republican
government and commercial enterprises, they attempted to preserve their French heritage, seeing it as
by no means interfering with their ability to be good Americans.
These varying ideas of American citizenship often created a turbulent relationship between
American lawmakers and Louisianans. Both wanted to incorporate Louisiana into the Union, but
Petition Made by Pierre-Joseph Favrot to King Charles IV of Spain, 15 January 1805, Ibid., IV: 169. When PierreJoseph retired he was a lieutenant colonel and captain of the grenadiers of the Louisiana infantry regiment. See also
Memoir of Pierre-Joseph Favrot’s Military Services, 5 April 1803, Ibid., IV: 26. He was officially released from service
in October 1805.
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they failed to agree on how. Much like their Creole political counterparts, the Favrots tried to
balance resistance to programs that infringed on their French identity, while using cooperation to
accept aspects of Americanization programs to sufficiently earn the benefits of citizenship.
Although not all Louisiana elites shared the Favrot experience or dealt with the Louisiana Purchase
in the same way, the Favrot family’s extensive papers provide a useful case study of how Creole
elites attempted to weave resistance, cooperation, and attachment together to shape the
incorporation process.
One Louisiana politician once described the Orleans Territory as the “adopted child of a great
family.”5 This reference, although about the entire territory, metaphorically illustrates the
precarious situation the Favrots and many Louisiana elites families encountered. When a child is
adopted into a new family, undoubtedly it clings to the familiarity of its former traditions,
mannerisms, and identity. For this child to truly adjust to its new surroundings, however, it must
abandon aspects of its past to embrace its new life. The child, therefore, must find a balance
between its preexisting ties and new family. In many ways the Favrots were the adopted children
of the great American family. They failed to relinquish ties to their French heritage, while
simultaneously Americanizing enough to amalgamate into the young republic. Ultimately, the
same tools of negotiation employed by Creole politicians allowed the Favrots to transition from
adopted Frenchmen into true Americans.
****
The Favrots, like many Creole families, contributed to the growth and development of colonial
Louisiana. Their legacy began with the military career of Claude-Joseph Favrot. Born in
Le Moniteur de La Louisiana (New Orleans), 4 March 1809 ; Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien
Poydras, 33.
5
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Versailles, France in 1701, Claude-Joseph arrived in Louisiana as a second lieutenant in the
French Army. He quickly gained acclaim for his many battles against neighboring Indians. In
1736, he fought several campaigns against the Chickasaw Indians, earning a promotion to full
lieutenant. Three years later, his continuing conflict with the Chickasaws took him to the Illinois
Territory in pursuit of the tribe. In between his many Indian campaigns, Claude-Joseph met and
married Louise-Elizabeth Brusle in 1735.6 The union proved most advantageous for the young
soldier since his new father-in-law, Philippe-Antonie Brusle, was a member of the French Superior
Council and also one of Louisiana’s wealthiest men. Claude-Joseph and Louise Elizabeth soon
expanded their family with the birth of daughter Louise (1737) and son Pierre-Joseph (1749).7
By 1750, Claude-Joseph had served throughout France’s vast territory from Illinois to Mobile and
earned the rank of captain. In 1753, he relocated his family to New Orleans to oversee the small
garrison force in the port city. As Louise-Elizabeth tried to make a suitable home for their small
children, she also dealt with her husband’s long absences. With the outbreak of the Seven Years’
War, Claude-Joseph left his family once again to reinforce troops in the Ohio Valley. In 1754 and
1757, he commanded troops at Fort Duquesne hoping to protect the French fort from an
encroaching British presence.8

6 Gilles-Augustin Payen de Noyan to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 19 October 1739, Favrot Family Papers, I: 49-50.
Marriage Certificate of Claude-Joseph Favrot and Louise-Elizabeth Brusle, 4 October 1735, Ibid., I: 47.
7

Ibid., I: xvii.

8 Ibid., I: xvi-xviii, xix. The patriarch of the Favrot Family, Joseph-Claude Favrot was born in Besancon in FrancheComte France in 1668. He quickly became known for his cartography skills and served as an engineer in the French
Army. His job took him to the German states where he was held captive for many years. His son Claude-Joseph
would serve in France for nearly seven before heading to Louisiana. Henri Louboey to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 16
February 1740, Ibid., I: 51; Jean-Baptiste Le Monyne de Bienville to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 21 July 1742, Ibid., I: 51;
Pierre-Francoise de Rigaud Cavagnal, Marquis de Vaudreuil to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 16 March 1747, Ibid., I: 52;
Louis Billouart, Chevalier de Kerlerec to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 28 September 1753, Ibid., I: 56; Louis Billouart,
Chevalier de Derlerec to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 8 August 1754, Ibid, I: 60-68. When given the assignment to reinforce
troops in the Ohio Valley, Kerlerec claimed that “since the ability, intelligence, and experience of this captain are known
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Following the French defeat in 1763, Claude-Joseph, like many Creoles, faced a pivotal
decision. The loyal Frenchman found it difficult to imagine life under the Spanish regime.
Furthermore, his wife’s onset cancer necessitated that he end his long military career and relocate
his family to France to seek vital medical attention. Upon his return to his homeland, ClaudeJoseph’s fortunes took a tragic turn: French doctors were unable to save Louise-Elizabeth and she
died in Paris in April 1768. Three years later, Claude-Joseph married Madam Goulet, a widow
thirty years younger than him. The marriage lasted only a brief stint before the couple separated.
In 1777, Claude-Joseph Favrot, a decorated officer and esteemed Frenchman, died alone and
impoverished at Senlis Charity Hospital.9
As his father perished in France, Pierre-Joseph Favrot continued the family’s military tradition in
Louisiana. From a tender age, the youngest of the Favrot children was groomed for life as a
soldier. When he was eighteen months old, Louisiana Governor Marquis de Vaudreuil made him a
fusilier cadet in the French Army. At twelve, he was commissioned as a second ensign in the
Louisiana infantry. As Claude-Joseph made preparations to relocate the family to France, PierreJoseph, now eighteen, decided to stay behind. In 1767, he was assigned to a post in Arkansas.
There he undertook a special mission to follow Indian guides through the Illinois Territory in order
to carry news of the arrival of the new Spanish governor Alejandro O’Reilly. On his return trip

to me, I have thought that I could do nothing better for the service than to entrust him with the command of said
convoy.” This statement illustrates Claude-Joseph’s stellar reputation and years of loyal service. Jean-Jacques
Macarty Mactigue to Claude-Joseph Favrot, 25 February 1757, Ibid., I: 68-71.
Death Certificate of Louise-Elizabeth Brusle, 13 April 1768, I: 129; Letter of Madame Goulet de Favrot Regarding
the Pension of Claude-Joseph Favrot, 15 June 1778, Ibid., I: 209-210. Here Claude-Joseph’s estranged wife indicated
that at the time of his death, Claude-Joseph owed money to the hospital and had other outstanding debts.
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home, Pierre-Joseph was captured by Chickasaw Indians and held captive for an unknown period
of time.10
Upon his release from captivity, Pierre-Joseph sailed to France to join his father. There he
secured a new military assignment working at a colonial recruiting station. After his adventures in
North America, Pierre-Joseph quickly found his new duties tedious and boring. He began
petitioning the French Crown for a promotion. He seemed particularly determined to lead a
regiment in either St. Domingue or Martinique. His efforts bore little fruit. Finally, Pierre-Joseph
decided to go back to Louisiana and offer his services to the Spanish Crown in hopes of building a
more lucrative career.11 By 1779, Pierre-Joseph, now Don Pedro Favrot, arrived in New Orleans
as a captain in the 2nd Battalion of the Louisiana Infantry under the Spanish.
Pierre-Joseph wasted little time in becoming accustomed to his new role as a Spanish soldier.
The moment he arrived in Louisiana he found himself thrust into war as the Spanish attempted to
rid the Gulf Coast region of the British.12 In August of 1779, he assisted Spanish troops led by
Governor Bernardo Galvez in securing forts at Manchac and Baton Rouge. Soon after, Governor
Military Commission Issued by Pierre-Francois de Rigaud Cavagnal, Marquis de Vaudreuil to Pierre-Joseph
Favrot, 1 January 1751, Ibid., I: 55. A fusilier cadet or musketeer refers to young soldiers that carry light muskets or
fusil. Military Commission Issue by Louis XV to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 1 October 1761, Ibid., I: 90; Charles-Philippe
Aubry to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 30 December 1767, Ibid., I: 129; Letter to the Minister of the Navy Regarding PierreJoseph Favrot, 14 January 1775, Ibid., I: 166-167. In this letter the minister mentions that while in captivity PierreJoseph’s life was “at stake several times, for everyone knows how cruel these savages are.” Yet it fails to mention the
length of his captivity.
10
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12 Pierre-Joseph to Bernardo Galvez, 15 July 1779, Ibid., I: 235-237. At a council of war, Pierre-Joseph wasted
little time in establishing himself as a trusted officer. Here he presented a plan to help defend Louisiana against a
British invasion, arguing that “I believe that, since their forces seem to be concentrated at Manchac, it would not be
prudent to divide our forces, but to unite the regular troops with the militia of New Orleans, pending orders to march.”
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alert young soldiers to meet the enemy.”
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Galvez rewarded the ambitious Frenchman by appointing him the commandant of Baton Rouge.
At his new post, Pierre-Joseph remained busy securing oaths of loyalty from former British subjects
as well as managing relations with neighboring Indians. His tireless efforts earned the approval of
Galvez who commended his hard work, claiming that “Each day I am more pleased that I selected
you to reestablish that fort. I realize the difficulties you have overcome. You can be sure of my
esteem and trust.”13 While in Baton Rouge, the up and coming officer met Marie-Francoise
Gerard, a nearby resident of Pointe Coupee. The daughter of a prominent French surgeon, MarieFrancoise shared a strong French heritage with her new beau which only strengthened their bonds
of affection. After a two-year courtship, the young couple wed in 1783. In preparation for his life as
a husband, Pierre-Joseph secured several properties in New Orleans as possible homes for his
new bride.14
Pierre-Joseph’s intentions to settle in New Orleans were put on hold as the young newlyweds
made their way to Mobile where Pierre-Joseph accepted an appointment as the acting
commandant of the coastal fort. There he maintained peaceful relations with neighboring Indians
in addition to negotiating vital commercial agreements with English and American traders.15 PierreJoseph’s copious efforts earned him the respect and support of the Mobile citizenry. In 1786, when
13
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he faced a possible transfer, citizens petitioned the governor requesting that he remain at his post.
“We have enjoyed great satisfaction since we have been under M. Favrot’s command,” they
strongly professed. “We have proofs of his justice and fairness. He has been able to keep the
savages quiet and contented.”16 Their request had little influence as Pierre-Joseph was sent to
New Orleans in June 1787 and then on to Fort St. Philip in 1795.
Pierre-Joseph’s new appointment at Plaquemines served as a testament of imperial authorities’
confidence in his job performance. Located at the mouth of the Mississippi River, Fort St. Philip
stood as the colony’s first line of defense. In charge of nearly eighty regular troops, Pierre-Joseph
worked tirelessly to maintain strong discipline while also combating occasional Indian attacks and
rampant disease. His assignment at Fort St. Phillip, moreover, put new demands on the seasoned
soldier. Although Spain enjoyed several years of relative peace in Europe, tense relations with
Great Britain and France made foreign vessels more dangerous fixtures in the Gulf Coast region.
The Mississippi River only added another troubling concern to colonial safety as incoming and
outgoing traffic allowed foreign invaders easy access to New Orleans and adjoining areas. These
realities made Pierre-Joseph’s appointment at Fort St. Philip the most taxing one of his career.17
Monitoring traffic along the Mississippi River became one of Pierre-Joseph’s top priorities. All
incoming ships were required to have papers and passports of clearance. Without such
documentation, Pierre-Joseph was instructed to detain such vessels until further notice from the
governor. Furthermore, his surveillance required him to search for any free or enslaved blacks
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arriving from Africa or other foreign destinations.18 Pierre-Joseph also undertook the task of
revamping the fort’s defenses for a possible invasion. The governor required regular drills and
expected Pierre-Joseph to adhere to a strict training schedule. Along with preparing his troops,
Pierre-Joseph coordinated construction projects to fortify walls and protective batteries at both Fort
St. Phillip and Fort Bourbon, located across the Mississippi River. His renovation duties were
further exacerbated when a hurricane destroyed parts of both forts in August of 1796.19 After
playing a manic balancing act at Fort St. Philip for nearly four years, in March 1799 Pierre-Joseph
was once again reassigned to Baton Rouge. He left his post at Plaquemines with stellar reviews.
Both Governor Carondelet and his successor commended Favrot for the “zeal and exactness” with
which he ran his post.20
In September 1799, Pierre-Joseph arrived in Baton Rouge serving as the chief military officer.
Soon he bought a plantation across the river from the fort with hopes of setting up a permanent
residence for his bourgeoning family. Governor Casa Calvo, however, had other plans. In October
1800, Casa Calvo transferred Pierre-Joseph back to Fort St. Philip. The father of five protested,
hoping to remain in Baton Rouge near his plantation, but the governor failed to relent. In 1801,

18 Proclamation of Francisco Luis Hector Baron de Cardondelet, 19 February 1796, Ibid., II: 184-185. Here the
governor prohibited all “foreign Negroes and mulattoes, whether from Africa or elsewhere.” He went on to declare that
any ship carrying such blacks would be denied entry into Louisiana; Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Francisco Luis Hector
Baron de Cardondelet, July 20, 1796, Ibid., II: 200-204.

Quote found in Francisco Luis Hector Baron de Carondelet to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 22, July 1796, Ibid., II: 206207; Francisco Luis Hector Baron de Cardondelet to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 1 August 1796, Ibid., II: 217-218; Francisco
Luis Hector Baron de Cardonelet to Pierre Joseph Favrot, 6 August 1796, Ibid., II: 226-228; Francisco Luis Hector
Baron de Cardondelet to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 2 September 1796, Ibid., II: 240; Francisco Luis Hector Baron de
Cardonelet to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 3 September 1796, Ibid., II: 242-244.
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Francisco Luis Hector Baron de Carbondelet to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 9 August 1797, Ibid., III: 55. Nearly a year
later the new governor, Manuel Gayoso, continued to praise Favrot, contending that “I am extremely well satisfied with
the painstaking care and zeal with which you manage your garrison.” See Manuel Gayoso de Lemos to Pierre-Joseph
Favrot, 4 September 1798, Ibid., III: 95-96.
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Pierre-Joseph and his family once again relocated to Plaquemines with hopes of returning to their
West Baton Rouge home shortly thereafter.
At the age of fifty, Pierre-Joseph had served all over the Spanish empire and received accolades
for his performance. His successful career, however, took a toll on his family. Marie-Francoise
and their children Josephine, Louis, Philogene, Octavine, and Henri often lived in rugged
conditions far from the comforts of home. While living at Fort St. Philip, young Josephine once
recounted the trials of military life to her friend Helen de Grand-Pre, admitting that “It is common in
this wretched post to contract intestinal trouble as soon as fever disappears, my spleen is as large
as a three-pound biscuit.” She went on to recall the troublesome mosquitoes, claiming that “there
must be a thousand of them around me if there is one …. nothing frightens them. They are
fearless.”21 Illness remained a persistent problem for the Favrot children. While at Plaquemines,
Philogene spent months plagued by problems with urination and fever. At times such sickness
was only exacerbated without proper medical care at the post.22 Furthermore, military life often
exposed the Favrot children to less than desirable characters. Convicts sent by the governor to
assist in the construction projects at Fort St. Phillip, along with foul-mouthed soldiers and
intoxicated travelers, often introduced an unwanted influence in the Favrot children’s lives.
To alleviate such burdens, Pierre-Joseph and Marie-Francoise tried to provide stability for their
nomadic family. Their home was one filled with love and affection. They maintained constant
correspondence with extended family and friends, hoping to ease the burdens of the distance that
separated them. While at Fort St. Philip, Pierre-Joseph also composed his Education Manual for
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Marie-Josephine Favrot to Helen de Grand-Pre, 18 September 1801, Ibid., III: 232-233.

Jean Delassize to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 28 May 1801, Ibid., III: 203; Armand Allard Duplantier to Pierre-Joseph
Favrot, 5 August 1801, Ibid., III: 217.
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his Sons to provide Louis and Philogene a proper education despite their constant mobility and
rugged lifestyle. His manual stressed the importance of subjects such as ethics, arithmetic,
grammar, physical science, geography, and history. He also sought to instill his sons with a moral
education, beginning his work with a section entitled, “The Conduct of a Wise Man.” Here he
catalogued the virtues of selflessness, generosity, humility, propriety, and compassion. PierreJoseph also included a selection addressing the art of fencing in preparation for his sons’ future
military careers.23 Pierre-Joseph’s manual provides an insightful glimpse into the mind of a father
preparing his sons for adulthood. From cultivating their morality to expanding their minds, PierreJoseph hoped his sons would “follow the dictates set forth in this book.” He also aimed to raise his
sons to respect their French heritage by encouraging them to appreciate the French language
while adhering to Catholic doctrine and civil law.24
Beyond education, Pierre-Joseph and his family remained tied to their French heritage. They
spoke French at home and even wore the latest French fashions. At one point Josephine’s aunt
sent her a Roman-style dress modeled after ones worn in Paris. The young girl hoped to secure
black pearls to accessorize her new outfit to truly emulate fashionable French ladies.25 The
Favrots also kept up with the latest news from France. Pierre-Joseph intently monitored the events
of the French Revolution and the ongoing war between France and Spain. As many Louisianans
showed their support for the Revolution by singing French songs in the streets, Pierre-Joseph went

23 Pierre-Joseph Favrot’s Education Manual for his Sons: A Précis of Knowledge for An Eighteenth Century
Louisiana Gentleman, The Favrot Family Papers: Separtum I, ed. Guillermo Náňez Falcón (Tulane: Howard-Tilton
Memorial Library, 1988), 3-4.
24

Ibid., 1.
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one step further. Between 1793 and 1794, rumors circulated throughout Louisiana that Citizen
Genet planned to retake Louisiana for France as he made his way down the Ohio River. Unable to
hide his elation at the idea, Pierre-Joseph wrote Genet an anonymous letter expressing his
approval, stating that:
You arrive in a colony inhabited by Frenchmen like yourself. The same blood
flows through their veins. The same spirit moves them. Long separated from their
mother country, they lament their abandonment in secret. Their eyes constantly
fixed on her, although she seems to have forsaken them. They follow her in her
campaigns and, in silence, they rejoice in her victories. Notwithstanding all
indications to the contrary, they dare to hope that one day they shall return. This
longed-for day has a last arrived, and we have become again the children of
France, our country. Even if we have not shared her dangers, we shall enjoy her
prosperity. We shall be compensated for having been deprived of the honor of
participating in her glory and for having been unable to be in a position to serve
her …. It is under such circumstances, Citizen General, that you are coming to
organize this colony and to reunite the spirit of the people, which Spanish rule
believed it must divide. If, for one moment, one of our countrymen forgot that he
was a Frenchman, remorse will punish him enough for his failing. We shall be as
we once were, before the coming of foreign domination, all relatives and friends.
Those of Europe and those of America will glory equally in the name of
Frenchmen and will acknowledge the obligations that so beautiful an epithet
imposes.26
Such commanding language reveals the strong affection Pierre-Joseph felt for his mother country.
Although a high-ranking Spanish military official, he never relinquished his ties to France.
The family’s strong ties to France were only further reinforced as the Spanish government
negotiated the retrocession of Louisiana back to France. By 1803, as both Spanish and French
imperial authorities made the final preparations for the transfer, Pierre-Joseph, still serving at Fort
St. Phillip, found himself taking on a whole new role. He was the first Spanish official to meet
Pierre Clément de Laussat, the new French Colonial Prefect of Louisiana. Before Laussat’s
voyage to Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph sent several letters to the prefect assuring him of the favorable
26

Anonymous Letter to “Citizen Ge” [Edmond-Charles Genet], 1794, Ibid., II: 158-159.
150

reception he and the new French government would receive in Lower Louisiana. His letters also
revealed his own jubilation over France’s homecoming.27 When Laussat and his family finally
arrived in Plaquemines in March 1803, he found an anxious Pierre-Joseph waiting. Later, in his
memoirs, Laussat recounted his first meeting with Pierre-Joseph who could not hide his euphoria
as “Joy beamed in this good man’s face upon seeing us.” Pierre-Joseph took the prefect on a tour
of Fort St. Philip and hosted a lovely dinner as “endless toasts were accompanied by artillery fire
and French songs with choruses praising love and wine.”28
France’s return to North America fulfilled many of Pierre-Joseph’s longtime hopes; however, it
also threw his military career into jeopardy. Knowing that a high-ranking French commission was
well out of his reach, Pierre-Joseph realized that staying in the Spanish Army meant that he would
have to relocate his family once again and abandon his West Baton Rouge plantation, now located
in French territory.29 In hopes of staying in the army, Pierre-Joseph began petitioning King Charles
of Spain for an appointment close to home. In December 1800, he asked the King to allow him to
command the militia stationed in Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and New Feliciana. Nearly a year
later, he begged to be assigned to either Baton Rouge or the German Coast.30
As he counted on his loyal service to render him influence with King Charles, Pierre-Joseph also
conferred with family and friends. His brother-in-law Armand Allard Duplantier advised him to
27
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continue his efforts to seek a commission in Baton Rouge. Even Duplantier realized that Favrot
was caught in quite a quandary, claiming that “there is no middle way. You must accept your
regiment’s fate, or quit.” Heeding Duplanteir’s advice, Pierre-Joseph continued petitioning King
Charles, yet bureaucratic channels stalled his efforts, hindering his chances of receiving a
desirable assignment. In desperation he even looked to Prefect Laussat for assistance, asking him
if he could secure him a high-ranking French commission. Laussat provided verbal
encouragement, but promised nothing.31 The realities of the retrocession proved bittersweet for
Pierre-Joseph. He welcomed the return of France to Louisiana, but the reunion threatened his
military career and his family’s financial security.
As he faced questions regarding his career, Pierre-Joseph continued his duties at Fort St. Phillip
which included preparing the fort to be transferred to the French Republic. Pierre-Joseph’s
concerns, however, were further exacerbated as rumors circulated throughout Louisiana that
France had sold French Louisiana to the United States. Pierre-Joseph promptly wrote Laussat to
gauge the validity of such talk. Laussat initially eased Favrot’s fears, encouraging him to “not
believe a word of them.” Just weeks later, however, Laussat and Louisianans were shocked to
learn about the Louisiana Purchase. “I could not believe, Sir, in the cession of Louisiana up to the
moment when doubt was no longer possible,” Laussat lamented to Pierre-Joseph. He went on to
express his deep regret over the purchase and thanked Pierre-Joseph for his friendship and
support.32

31 Armand Allard Duplanteir to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 11 January 1802, Ibid., III: 260-261. Pierre-Clément de
Laussat to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 29 April 1803, Ibid., IV: 30. Here Laussat claimed that despite “the unforgettable
welcome you extended us warrants, I cannot give much hope.”

Pierre Clément de Laussat to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 6 August 1803, Ibid., 61-62; Pierre Clément de Laussat to
Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 28 August 1803, Ibid., IV : 76.
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Still in disbelief over the Louisiana Purchase, Pierre-Joseph continued to fulfill his final duties at
Fort St. Phillip. He spent his last few weeks in Plaquemines collecting and compiling inventories of
weapons, supplies, and troops in preparation to relinquish control of the fort to French Frigate
Captain Gilberto Leonard. Finally on December 7, 1803, Pierre-Joseph lowered the Spanish flag
over Fort St. Philip as a twenty-one gun salute played behind him. As he left his longtime post with
the French flag flying high above, Pierre-Joseph deplored the fact that within weeks the American
stars and stripes would replace his beloved tricolors.33
By April 1804, Pierre-Joseph received a leave of absence from the Spanish Crown and headed
home to West Baton Rouge to contemplate his next career move. By June, he received word that
he was to rejoin Spanish forces in Pensacola.34 Immediately, Pierre-Joseph knew that it was time
for his career to end. In a letter to Charles de Grand-Pre, he admitted that he would be unable to
continue his military career, contending that “I believe that Louisiana comprises the whole province,
although the dividing line has separated the western bank of the river on which all of my property is
located. I could not abandon it under any circumstances, because this would mean the ruination of
my entire family.” In January 1805, Pierre-Joseph submitted his resignation to the Spanish Crown,
claiming that his poor health and the loss of his property prevented him from continuing his service.
At this time, he also requested that Louis and Philogene, both serving as cadets, be released from

33 Sébastian de la Puerta Y O’Farril Marques De Casa Calvo to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 2 December 1803, Ibid., IV :
118-119. See also Proces-Verbal of the Delivery of the Forts of Plaquemines to Gilberto Leonard, Frigate Captain and
Agent of the French Republic, By Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 7 December 1803, Ibid., IV: 121-122; Pierre-Joseph Favrot to
Sebastian de la Puerat Y O’Farril Marques, 5 April 1804, Ibid., IV: 153. In this letter Pierre-Joseph sends along three
inventories to complete his work at the fort. By April 17, Pierre-Joseph was back on Baton Rouge with his family as
evidenced by a letter from Manuel de Lanzos to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 17 April 1804, Ibid., IV: 154-155.
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service. By October 1805, Pierre-Joseph and his sons retired from the Spanish Army although
their quest to receive their military pensions would last for several more years.35
After thirty years of military service, Pierre-Joseph began life as a civilian and new American.
For decades the Favrots were a French family living under the Spanish regime. They benefited
from appointments in the Spanish military, but in their daily lives they remained French from their
language to their innermost feelings. Very rarely did Louisianans, such as the Favrots,
compromise their French identity to appease Spanish officials. Yet they soon learned that the new
American government expected them to not only compromise, but to abandon their former French
ties.
****
With the Louisiana Purchase, the Favrot family again faced another regime and a new
government. As American lawmakers attempted to assimilate their newest inhabitants through
vehicles of Americanization, they expected Louisianans to show signs of acceptance and
attachment. Whether Louisianans sent their children to public schools or verbally espoused their
loyalty and affection, American lawmakers monitored them for any indication that they were
becoming more “Americanized.” Undoubtedly, such demands engendered many challenges for
the Favrots. From their language to their cherished traditions, the Favrot family attempted to
safeguard their French heritage while integrating themselves into the young republic on their own
terms.
A glimpse at the family’s extensive papers reveals that during the early years of the territorial
period the Favrots remained more focused on their own domestic security than the external
Charles De Grand-Pre to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 20 June 1804, Ibid., IV: 158; Pierre Joseph to Charles de GrandPre, 20 June 1804, Ibid., IV: 158-159; Petition Made by Pierre-Joseph Favrot to King Charles IV of Spain, 15 January
1805, Ibid., IV: 169-170. Louis Favrot would receive his release from the Spanish Crown in February 1806. See
Leave of Absence issued by Colonel Manuel Artazo to Cadet Louis Favrot, 28 February 1806, Ibid., IV: 216-217.
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presence of the new American government. There is little mention of the actual transfer of Lower
Louisiana to the United States or key territorial events such as the Burr Conspiracy. Instead of
being consumed with political and public issues, the Favrots focused more on matters that directly
affected the family. Pierre-Joseph spent much of his time securing his overdue pension from the
Spanish Crown. He also sold and accumulated property and slaves to enhance the family’s wealth
and status.36 Pierre-Joseph did, however, monitor happenings in East Baton Rogue and Mobile for
any information regarding longtime friends and comrades.37
Besides keeping up with the happenings in the Spanish empire, Pierre-Joseph focused his full
attention on his family and home. As he oversaw his plantation and slaves, life as a civilian
provided him ample time with his family which now included his wife and six children Josephine
(19), Louis (17), Philogene (14), Octavine (9), Henri (6), and Eulalie (1).38 In many ways, PierreJoseph escaped the politically and ethnically charged atmosphere of New Orleans into the private
enclaves of his family. Having learned valuable lessons under the Spanish regime, the Favrots
understood that, despite outside forces around them, the family served as their French sanctuary.
As their children matured, the Favrots’ bonds of affection continued to grow. While on a trip to
New Orleans, daughter Josephine received a heartfelt letter from her mother expressing her

36 Joseph Noriega to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 8 January 1808, Ibid., IV: 256. In this letter Noriega expresses his joy
over the “King having granted your retirement on half pay, as you had requested.” At this point it seems that PierreJoseph’s long struggle to receive his pension ended. Yet other letters indicate that despite the King’s approval he
failed to get any money. See Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Salvador Muro Salazar, 30 September 1809, Ibid., IV: 308-309;
Pierre-Joseph Favrot to The Captain General of Cuba, 1 October 1809, Ibid., IV: 310-311.
37 Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Francisco Caso y Luengo, 16 December 1808, Ibid., IV: 271. Pierre-Joseph did closely
monitor events on the east bank of the Mississippi River as tensions brewed between Spanish and French inhabitants.
His longtime friend Charles de Grand-Pre served as the commandant of the Baton Rouge District. As rumors
circulated about a possible revolution in Spain, Spanish officials in Havana worried about Grand-Pre’s French heritage.
When Grand-Pre died from fever while in Havana, Pierre-Joseph became the executor of his estate.
38
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despair over the distance between them and the “long time it has been since I have kissed you!”
The Favrot children reciprocated such loving sentiments. On one occasion, Louis wrote his
mother, admitting that he could hardly stand being away from her. His solemn letter also asked her
to “give my respects to my dear Papa. I embrace him and my brothers and sisters.” Philogene
articulated similar heartfelt tidings when he informed his mother that “You may be surprised my
dear Mama, that I am not expressing any wishes to you. Alas! The reason is simple …. I am
unable to put all that I mean into words: I have to satisfy myself by embracing you a thousand
times and letting you guess more of my feelings.”39 Letters from Louis and Philogene often were
signed with expressions such as “respectful affection of your obedient son” or “the tenderest wish
of your most obedient child.”40 Favrot family letters expose a deeply devoted and affectionate
family. Having long relied on the family to deal with the rigors of military life and a foreign
government, the Favrots found comfort in their strong family bonds.
Moreover, the Favrots continued to use their home as a place to preserve their French heritage.
They continued to speak French as well as remain in contact with extended family in Spanish
Baton Rouge and France. These ties allowed them to combat the encroachment of the new
American government and reinforce their French identity. Also Pierre-Joseph and Marie-Francoise
continued to stress the importance of adhering to French traditions. In February 1810, PierreJoseph accompanied Josephine and Octavine to New Orleans to receive their first communion. As
his daughters engaged in one of Catholicism’s most important sacraments, they also experienced
another one of France’s sacred traditions—Mardi Gras. Arriving in New Orleans at the heart of
39 Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot to Josephine Favrot, 25 April 1810, Ibid., V: 26; Louis Favrot to Marie-Francoise
Gerard Favrot, 23 June 1809, IV: 299; Philogene to Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, 1 January 1813, Ibid., IV: 112,

Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 29 June 1812, Ibid., V: 76; Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot,
5 August 1812, Ibid., V: 85.
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Carnival, Pierre-Joseph reveled in the fact that his daughters would have the opportunity to attend
balls and partake in the French celebrations.41
As they schooled their children in all things French, Pierre-Joseph continued to implement his
Education Manual. Furthermore, he provided his children with more practical skills about running a
plantation and the planting seasons. Marie-Francoise focused more on her children’s decorum. In
her many letters, she provided snippets of advice regarding manners and proper public behavior.
After she inquired about Philogene’s sleeping arrangements on one trip away from home, the loyal
son quickly replied that “I have not been in any questionable homes. I feel I would find myself out
of place there.” She even instructed her sons on matters of the heart. At one point Philogene
thanked his mother for her opinions regarding the opposite sex, admitting that “nothing is more true
than your remark about the female enemies. I fear them more than any others.”42 Pierre-Joseph
and Marie-Francoise groomed their maturing children to become respectable adults and to be
ready to deal with the challenges of living under a new government.
The Louisiana Purchase did little to change the Favrot’s private lives. Pierre-Joseph and his
wife ensured their home remained a French refuge that safeguarded their family’s colonial
heritage. At times, their efforts put them at odds with the American government. They ignored
Claiborne’s educational program, choosing to school their children at home using Pierre-Joseph’s
faithful manual. The fact that they failed to engage in many territorial debates or weigh in on
important issues, to many lawmakers, served as an indication that the Favrots were indifferent to
41 Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Philogene Favrot, 8 February 1810, Ibid., V: 4-6. Here he tells Philogene that he hopes
that Octavine will have the chance to “take twenty or twenty-five dancing lessons and to go to the theater two or three
times.” Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot to Josephine Favrot, 26 February 1810, Ibid., V: 6-14; Pierre-Joseph Favrot to
Philogene Favrot, 12 March 1810, Ibid., IV: 15. Here Pierre-Joseph admits to this son that he is anxious to see the
communion ceremonies end “because I want to give Octavine eight to ten days of amusement before leaving.”
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the new American government. However, one must not assume that just because the Favrots
failed to mention or discuss such events that they were ambivalent. At times historical participants
reveal much more by what they fail to say. Following the Louisiana Purchase, the Favrots
continued their copious correspondence not only amongst each other but also with friends and
family. Their letters addressed important events from happenings in the Spanish Empire to
mundane details from an occasional fever to the rising cost of sugar. Therefore, it seems safe to
assume that if the Favrots harbored strong opinions regarding the Louisiana Purchase or early
territorial events they would have divulged them in their many letters. The absence of such talk
simply demonstrates that the Favrots’ primary concerns rested within the family. For Pierre-Joseph
and Marie-Francoise, obtaining financial security and raising their children were more important
than the charged debates in New Orleans or the malicious schemes of men like Aaron Burr. The
fact that they did not seem consumed with the new American presence, furthermore, proves that
they had long become accustomed to handling the realities of a regime change. They looked to
the things that had provided them solace in the past. The family supplied the familiarity of their
colonial heritage and ensured their survival in a new environment.
As the Favrots turned to their strong family bonds to ease the transition to life in the new
American republic, they also employed other techniques to shape their incorporation. Much like
Creole politicians in New Orleans, the Favrots often resisted aspects of Americanization programs
that challenged their French heritage. However, they also utilized cooperation and attachment to
demonstrate their willingness to assimilate. After years of isolation, the Favrot family became more
active in territorial issues. This renewed interest might be attributed to Pierre-Joseph’s trip to New
Orleans in February 1810. Although there to chaperone his daughters, this trip was the first time
the aging Frenchman visited the Crescent City since he was a commander in the Spanish military.
158

Pierre-Joseph was amazed by how much the thriving port city had changed, forcing him to admit to
his son that it was virtually unrecognizable.43 Perhaps the realization that Louisiana was changing
as he remained tucked away on his West Baton Rouge plantation prompted him to take a second
look at his new surroundings. Pierre-Joseph’s short time in New Orleans reminded him that he
belonged in the United States and that he needed to prepare his family to be good citizens of their
newest country.
Pierre-Joseph’s new interest was shared by other members of the Favrot family. By the later
part of the territorial period, Favrot correspondence reveals that publicly the family made conscious
efforts to Americanize by showing their growing attachment to the United States. Both Louis and
Philogene joined the military, no doubt at the urging of their father. In 1807, Louis received his first
military commission as an ensign in the 7th regiment of the Militia of the Orleans Territory. Within
four years, he advanced to the rank of captain. Despite his promotion, Louis hoped to advance
even further within the ranks of the Louisiana militia. In May 1813, Governor Claiborne attended a
ball in East Baton Rouge where Pierre-Joseph used this opportunity to speak with the governor
about his son. Within a month, Claiborne made Louis a major in the 8th regiment of the Louisiana
militia. 44
As Louis’s duties kept him near Baton Rouge and New Orleans, his younger brother Philogene
enjoyed a much more eventful military career. At the age of twenty, Philogene received a
commission to serve as an ensign in the 24th Regiment of the Infantry of the Army of the United
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States. His duties included recruiting soldiers which became even more important as the War of
1812 began. His military responsibilities continued to keep him near New Orleans until his
regiment was deployed to Tennessee in September 1813.45
Philogene stayed in Tennessee for only a short time before his regiment continued on to
Kentucky. There Philogene advanced to a second lieutenant and learned that his recruiting duties
were over and that his unit was headed north to reinforce troops fighting near Canada.46 By April
1814, his regiment arrived at Fort Sandusky, located about thirty-six miles from Lake Erie. He
practiced field medicine for nearly a month until his unit crossed over into Malden, Canada, arriving
in Detroit on May 26, 1814. In July, portions of his unit were dispatched to Fort Michilimackinac
located at the junction of Lake Huron and Michigan. On August 4, Philogene faced his first combat
experience as he and 700 men engaged in open battle with the British and their Indian allies.
Although American forces defeated the enemy, sixty-six of Philogene’s comrades died. Following
the battle, Philogene headed back to Detroit where he remained for several days before he
received orders to resume his recruiting duties in Mobile.47 In December 1814, Philogene, now a
first lieutenant, arrived in Mobile where the fighting had largely subsided.
Military service provided Philogene with a chance of a lifetime to see his new country. He
served with men from all over the United States and ventured far from his Baton Rouge home. In
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his unit alone, Philogene served alongside an Irishman from Pennsylvania and several Americans
from different states. He also encountered a variety of unfamiliar Americans customs. In Nashville
he noticed that “duels are such rare events that fathers describe them to their children, who do not
forget them for as long as they live.” He found that people in Tennessee and Kentucky tended to
be more pious, contending that “Papa would spend a great deal of money if he were here because
some judges fine a man fifty cents every time he swears.” He even found that such strong piety
kept women from dancing even on weekdays, something quite strange to a Frenchman long
versed in the art of dancing.48
Philogene’s service in the 24th Infantry also strengthened Favrot family bonds. Upon leaving his
Baton Rouge home to report for duty in New Orleans, Philogene lamented leaving his family. “I
think each minute is bringing me further from the only people who bring life to me; that I am going
to be separated from them for a considerable length of time of unknown duration,” he sadly wrote
in his journal. “Such thoughts throw me into a profound sadness.” His letters continued to become
more affectionate as he spent time away from home. To his brother Louis he signed one letter
“Farewell dear brother. I embrace you with my soul but with my eyes closed.”49
Philogene’s separation was often eased by letters from his family. He and Louis often spoke
about their military service, local gossip, and their future wives. Philogene once wrote his brother
wishing for him a “young wife who is gentle, witty, virtuous, sensitive, and belongs to a good family.
I would not want her to be wealthy, because money does not bring happiness, but I do hope she
would be rich enough to supply the needs of an easily satisfied man like you.” His sister Josephine

Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, 28 September 1813, Ibid., V: 176; Philogene Favrot to
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often disparaged him for allowing his flippant romances to prevent him from writing her more often.
“Really, I cannot understand how three little crickets of Faubourg St. Mary can make you forget
your family,” she scolded, “Confound this vain little girl who is making you lose your head! We
have to believe that when love fires certain hearts it cools off filial love, brotherly tenderness, and
friendship.”50
As the Favrot children stayed well connected with their traveling brother, Pierre-Joseph and
Marie-Francoise continued to guide their son from afar. Pierre-Joseph often instructed his son on
how to deal with Americans, recommending that “if people take you for a physician, it might be very
profitable. If you are mistaken for a lawyer, do like Niveson and make them pay ahead for your
advice.” Marie-Francoise monitored her son’s propriety by always inquiring about his sleeping
arrangements and the company he kept. At one point she must have disapproved of his behavior
as Philogene informed her that “On reaching the part of your letter where you said vous [to show
disapproval] to me, I started to take off my hat, expecting a big scolding.”51
Philogene’s time in the United States Army, although often lonely, served as an Americanizing
experience. In August of 1812, he was passed over for a promotion to serve as General James
Wilkinson’s aide-de-camp. He remained convinced that he failed to advance because he did not
speak English. To avoid missing another such opportunity, Philogene used his military
assignments to learn English. In a letter to his mother, he admitted that “I remain in this service
Philogene Favrot to Louis Favrot, 1 January 1813, Ibid., V: 113; Josephine Favrot, Louis Favrot, and MarieFrancoise Gerard Favrot to Philogene Favrot, 20 July 1813, Ibid., V: 172.
50

51 Louis Favrot, Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, and Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Philogene Favrot, 28 October 1813, V:
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only to learn English.” In later letters, he informed his mother that he often experienced humiliation
“by not being able to speak English.52 As he perfected English, Philogene also became enthralled
with territorial politics. While serving in New Orleans, Philogene observed the hotly contested
gubernatorial race between William C.C. Claiborne and Jacques Villeré. “The Governor’s election
and other elections have greatly agitated the two opposing parties [Creoles and Americans],” he
reported to his brother. He went on to inquire about his brother’s political selections, stating that “I
hope, my dear friend, that being a Creole, you voted for one of your fellow citizens.”53 His short
time in New Orleans exposed Philogene to ongoing ethnic and cultural disputes between ancient
Creoles and American lawmakers. It did not take long for Philogene to feel sympathy for his
Creole counterparts and empathize with their cause.
Philogene’s growing familiarity with the English language and American politics undoubtedly
allowed him to become more acquainted with American life. His military service also allowed him
to cultivate a greater attachment to his country. At one point during his time up North, the Favrot
family received a letter informing them that Philogene was caught in a skirmish where his horse
was killed out from under him as bullets whistled by his head. Upon hearing this news, Pierre-

52 Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 5 August 1812, Ibid., V: 83-84; Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise
Gerard Favrot, 1 January 1813, Ibid., V: 111.
53 Philogene Favrot to Louis Favrot, 25 July 1812, Ibid., V: 77. Philogene went on to inquire about the election
results in Baton Rouge, claiming that “I believe that the county poll will resemble it [city results] a great deal.” Jacques
Villeré was one of Louisiana’s ancient Creoles. His grandfather, Etienne Rio de Villeré, accompanied some of the first
settlers to Louisiana when it first became a French colony. His father went on to serve as the Naval Secretary of
Louisiana under the French. Born in 1761 on the German Coast, Jacques was educated in France and served in the
French Army in St. Domingue in 1776. After the Louisiana Purchase, he accepted several jobs in the territorial
administration, serving as the Major General of the territorial militia, a Police Juror in Orleans Parish, and a Justice of
the Peace for St. Bernard Parish. His longtime service earned him the respect of his peers and he sat alongside Julien
Poydras and others to draft Louisiana’s state constitution in 1812. That same year he ran for governor against
Claiborne, but lost because the Creole votes were split between him and longtime resister Noel Destrehan. Following
his defeat for governor, Villeré went on to command the First Division of the Louisiana Militia in the Battle of New
Orleans. In 1815, his political hopes came to fruition when he was finally elected governor of Louisiana. He retried
from politics in 1824 and died in March 1830.
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Joseph immediately wrote to his son begging him “to resign your commission and come back to
live in the midst of our family, where you will be able to find a good position and live honorably.”
When Philogene received this letter he responded by asking his father, “you don’t mean this do
you? At the moment when my regiment (most of which is here) receives the order to reinforce the
garrison at Mobile; at the moment when my fellow countrymen are called upon to defend their
homes; at the moment when rest would be a torment for me; you want me to renounce my seniority
and rank.”54 Philogene’s letter illustrates a monumental transition. For years, his family served as
an asylum from the changing landscape of Lower Louisiana; however, his military service exposed
him to his new surroundings and aided him in fostering attachment to the United States. When
New Orleans faced an invasion and the United States was in danger, Philogene felt compelled to
do his civic duty. It appears that military service Americanized Philogene Favrot. In turn, his
service allowed him to fulfill one of the most important requirements for American citizenship.
Louis and Philogene’s military service provides an excellent example of how the Favrots
employed cooperation as a means to assimilate into the American Union. At a young age, both
sons joined the Spanish Army as cadets. Thus it is conceivable that they could have easily
rejoined the Spanish Army. With Baton Rouge still under Spanish control and plenty of family
friends in high-ranking positions, the young men could have easily secured decent commissions
within the Spanish ranks. Yet they chose to enlist in the American military. Although both sons

54 Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 6 October 1814, Ibid., V: 221-222. Philogene went on to plead with
his father, “you want me to resign in order to return home (however appealing home is to me) that I may be compelled
to leave before long to serve as a simple militiaman?” He also dispelled the rumors forwarded by Fergus, claiming that
“It is true that I heard several bullets whistling by and that a few men were killed near me.” Philogene Favrot to Louis
Favrot, 11 October 1814, Ibid., V: 227.
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wrote little about their motivation to serve alongside Americans, their hopes of fulfilling their family’s
civic duty must have been a strong motivating factor. 55
The Favrot sons were not the only members of the family to display their growing affection.
Pierre-Joseph, like so many of his Creole counterparts, looked to political participation to
demonstrate his family’s loyalty to the United States. In the summer of 1814, Pierre-Joseph was
elected to the Louisiana state legislature. By December, he arrived in New Orleans to begin his
new appointment. His new political duties soon threw him into the government’s feverish
preparations for the Battle of New Orleans.56 Although many Creoles used political activism to
resist the American government, Pierre-Joseph’s role as a legislator not only sealed his family’s
bond to American republican principles, but also allowed him to help defend his new country in a
moment of peril.
****
Despite their affinity for all things French, the Favrot family invoked several strategies to shape
their incorporation process. At times the private enclaves of the family allowed them to preserve
crucial aspects of their French heritage and their existing colonial ties. This often put them at odds
with Claiborne’s education programs and major territorial debates. The Favrots, however, made
attempts to show their growing assimilation publicly. The Favrot sons’ military service
demonstrated that they were willing to do their duty to their new country, while Pierre-Joseph’s

55 Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, 8 June 1813, Ibid., V: 163-164. In several letters to his
mother, Philogene attempted to explain why he chose to join the United States Army rather than serving with his
brother in the Louisiana infantry. “When I was tempted to join the Louisiana regiment, I did not know that I could be
discharged in peacetime, which might come any day,” he explained. He went on to argue that a commission in the
regular forces was much more advantageous since “it is much more respected than others; furthermore, its officers
remain in cities or forts and are not subject to go on marches.”

Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Philogene Favrot, 16 September 1814, Ibid., V: 219; Neuville DeClouet to Pierre-Joseph
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election to the state legislature revealed that even the most ardent Creole could gradually learn
and accept the principles of the American government.
Outside of the public political arena, Louisiana elites like the Favrots found ways to dictate the
incorporation process. Their home remained a French sanctuary that safeguarded their colonial
heritage and family values. Yet publicly, the Favrots demonstrated their attachment by choosing to
participate in the republican government as well as the defense of Lower Louisiana. Their efforts
often brought them closer together and brought them even closer to their adopted American family.
Where American lawmakers often saw Louisianans failing to assimilate, Louisianans often saw
themselves striking the essential balance between their private preservation and public
negotiations in the Orleans Territory.
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Chapter Five: “The Chosen Men of Color”: Free People of Color in a New Racial Hierarchy
Feeling the effects of the unusually hot weather in his full military gear, Noel Carrier stood in
formation next to longtime friends and comrades waiting in anticipation for the day’s festivities. As
the ceremony began on the afternoon of December 20, 1803, Carrier reflected back on his long
military career in the service of the Spanish Crown. He remembered being promoted to captain of
the morenos in the milicia de color, the many battles with neighboring Indians, and chasing
runaway slaves through the swampy bayous. As he watched the French flag come into view, the
tricolors caused him to pause as he remembered that it was under the French regime that he was
emancipated from slavery and allowed to live as a free man. Finally, as he caught a glimpse of the
ascending American stars and stripes, Carrier remembered leaving his young bride Marianne to
assist Anglo-Americans in the American Revolution. Although many spectators that day celebrated
the transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, Noel Carrier quietly commemorated an
extraordinary life and the accomplishments of Lower Louisiana’s free people of color.1
Lower Louisiana’s racial composition has long been the subject of history and fiction. From the
secret world of the quadroon balls to Congo Dances, many find that Lower Louisiana represents a
racial anomaly. At the time of the Louisiana Purchase, even American lawmakers recognized the
unique racial landscape of their newest land acquisition. As Americans spent nearly two centuries
codifying racial contempt and white supremacy, Lower Louisiana’s colonial history engendered a
special class of free people of color that possessed freedoms unparalleled in nineteenth-century
America.

1

Pierre Clément de Laussat, Memoirs of My Life, 90.
167

The first African slaves arrived in Louisiana in 1719 along with French settlers in John Law’s
Mississippi Company. For the next several decades the slave population grew through natural
increase and direct importation from Africa. Very quickly, slaves in colonial Louisiana assumed a
quite different role than their counterparts in British North America. Louisiana’s first white settlers
were ill-equipped to handle the rigors of the wilderness, forcing them to rely on their slaves for food
and other vital resources.2 The colony’s inadequate numbers also compelled white settlers to use
their slaves to defend against neighboring Indians. By 1739, French authorities created a
permanent company of black militiamen to fight Indians and help build fortifications and levees.
French settlers’ heavy reliance on their chattel provided slaves with privileges that often
undermined regulations established in the Code Noir and ultimately promoted slaves as an
essential group.3
Within a decade of settlement, free blacks appeared in colonial Louisiana. In 1731, Governor
Perier reported that several Indians and “free blacks” had been massacred in a raid. His dispatch
clearly distinguished these victims as free people of color or gens de couleur libre rather than gens
de couleur which designated African slaves. Although little is known about the origins of free
blacks in colonial Louisiana, historians believe that a growing number of manumissions contributed
to their existence. Over time, this group of free blacks took on a dynamic role in colonial
Louisiana.4

2 Jerah Johnson, “Colonial New Orleans: A Fragment of he Eighteenth Century French Ethos,” Creole New Orleans,
32-33. Johnson estimates that over two-thirds of Louisiana’s first settlers were craftsmen with little agricultural
knowledge or skills. See also Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, “The Formation of Afro-Creole Culture,” Creole New Orleans, 61.
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Under the Spanish regime, however, libres thrived. It is estimated that by 1805, 1556 free
blacks lived in New Orleans. Immigration from Haiti and other Caribbean islands as well as natural
increase explain such growth.5 Spanish officials also helped to enhance these numbers by
allowing more slaves to enter the free black population. In addition, Spanish policies promoted
libre rights by allowing them to arrange contracts, own and transfer property, and bring suit in civil
litigation. These new laws allowed many free blacks to accumulate enough wealth to own thriving
businesses and slaves. Besides participating in the commercial activities of colonial Louisiana,
libres served in the Spanish military.6 Spanish policies gradually placed libres like Noel Carrier in a
middle stratum that allowed them to freely interact with white society while having a separate
identity from slaves. By the time the United States took possession of French Louisiana, libres
helped create Lower Louisiana’s unique three-tiered racial hierarchy.
Although the day’s events made Carrier quite nostalgic, they also filled him with apprehension
over an uncertain future. He wondered if the new American presence signaled an end of an era for
free people of color in Lower Louisiana. He worried that Americans’ white supremacist ideology
might undermine the rights and privileges libres enjoyed. Carrier also recognized the irony of the
day’s events. Less than thirty years before he and other free black soldiers fought against the
British in the Gulf Coast, which in turn helped Anglo-Americans secure their independence under
the banner “all men are created equal.” Carrier could not help but wonder if Americans included
Lower Louisiana’s free black population under this Enlightenment idea. Would Americans

5 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 1-2, 12. See also New Orleans in 1805: A Directory and A Census
Together with Resolutions Authorizing Same Now Printed for the First Time From the Original Manuscript (New
Orleans: The Pelican Gallery Inc.,1936).
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acknowledge that every aspect of Louisiana’s founding, growth, and survival depended on free
people of color? Would Americans extend libres the same rights they helped them secure so many
years before?
Carrier’s anxiety was certainly not unwarranted. Governor Claiborne and other American officials
saw Lower Louisiana’s unique racial composition as one of the most pressing issues facing
lawmakers. Over the course of several years, American officials sought to redefine the status of
libres hoping to emulate the strict racial hierarchy found in the United States. Hoping to solidify
white supremacy in the Orleans Territory, the territorial legislature passed a new Black Code. The
1806 act forced free blacks to more subordinate roles, creating a rigid society of whites and nonwhites.7 As the new code attempted to circumscribe the status of free blacks, territorial officials
also sought to diminish libres’ role in the military. Although the militia de color remained in
existence following the Louisiana Purchase, territorial lawmakers systematically neglected the
black corps. By the end of the territorial period, white Creoles and American lawmakers managed
to impede libres’ typical avenues of autonomy and citizenship. Free people of color, like white
Creoles, were forced to adapt to a new American presence and find strategies of negotiation. Yet
they would face a different set of challenges than their white counterparts. Besides maintaining
their colonial heritage and gaining American acceptance, free blacks had to combat a strong white
supremacist ideology that demoted them to second-class citizens.
Dying just one year after the transfer ceremony, Noel Carrier would not live to see many of his
concerns vindicated.8 Rather his son, Noel Carrier Jr., would carry the burden of Americans’ strict

7

Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible, 82.

Noel Carrier Sr. died on December 5, 1804. Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the
Archdiocese of New Orleans, ed. Charles E. Nolan (New Orleans: Archdiocese of New Orleans, 1993-1999), Volume
8.
170
8

racial hierarchy and confront the challenge of securing a place for himself and all free people of
color in the young republic. His life illustrates that libres made substantial efforts to maintain their
colonial rights despite American policies that sought to marginalize them. Through kinship
networks, property ownership, and military service, libres continued to utilize their colonial heritage
and their parents’ legacy as bargaining chips with lawmakers and white Louisianans. Ultimately,
free blacks employed innovative techniques in order to secure citizenship in an increasingly hostile
racial environment.
The men who participated in the milicia de color were often referred to as the “chosen men of
color.” Their status gave them a prominent role in the libre community and colonial Louisiana.
Noel Carrier Jr. and the sons of these chosen men of color would have a much different battle than
their fathers. They did not fight a strong military foe but a government that sought to expunge their
special racial status and destroy Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy. Equipped with the lessons
imparted by their fathers and a strong colonial heritage, Carrier and other libres fought to live as
free men in the United States.
****
It is impossible to comprehend the experience of Noel Carrier Jr. and other libres in territorial
Louisiana without first understanding the role free people of color played in colonial Louisiana. Like
other European colonists, the early founders of France’s southern colony had to contend with many
of the rigors of the North American wilderness. Precarious relationships with neighboring Indians
coupled with environmental challenges made the initial settling of Lower Louisiana an arduous
task. Historians have also found that the composition of the colony only exacerbated these
demands. The first settlers to Louisiana consisted of many gentlemen accompanied by debtors,
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prisoners, and other undesirables from Canada. Lacking any real knowledge of farming, these
settlers established vital relationships with the colony’s Indians. Furthermore, slaves supplied
needed labor to keep the early settlement afloat.9 Besides relying on slaves for food and shelter,
French settlers soon began using them to defend the colony from foreign and Indian threats. As
early as 1729, Governor Perier armed a band of slaves to defend New Orleans against the
Choctaws.10 Throughout the French period, imperial officials counted on slave soldiers in
desperate times. The realities of the wilderness and colonial demands allowed slaves to assume a
special role in colonial Louisiana.
Despite the services slaves provided, white Louisianans sought to create a society that
promoted white supremacy and the institution of slavery. In hopes of solidifying their control over
their chattel, colonial officials drafted and implemented the Code Noir in 1724. Borrowed from the
Caribbean model, the Code Noir restricted slave’s mobility, regulated relationships between slaves
and Indians, and prohibited slaves from carrying weapons or assembling without white supervision.
Although the Code placed many restrictions on slaves and crafted a clear racial barrier, it also
revealed slaves’ unique role in colonial Louisiana. Historian Jerah Johnson finds that the Code
Noir attempted to integrate slaves into the larger community with common social rights. It
stipulated, for instance, that slaves were to be instructed in the Christian faith and receive Catholic
sacraments. Colonial officials encouraged slave marriages and baptisms overseen by masters and
clergymen. Moreover, the Code defined a master’s responsibilities that included taking care of sick
and disabled slaves as well as providing proper food, shelter, and clothing. Although some of the
Code’s provisions seem contrary to the racial contempt that officials intended to engender, early
9
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Louisianans used the Code Noir to control slaves while also acknowledging the valuable role they
played in Lower Louisiana’s survival.11
The Code Noir also helped promote a new class of blacks in colonial Louisiana, the free person
of color. In 1731, Governor Perier mentioned that gens de couleur libre were killed in an Indian
raid. His used of the word libre indicated that these men were not slaves but free black men.
There must have been a small group of libres in Louisiana before this date since the Code Noir
dedicated several provisions to the status of “freed or free-born negroes.” It stated, for instance,
that if a child was born to a slave father and a free woman of color, that the child would “share the
condition” of its mother. This language acknowledges two important realities. First, under the
French a substantial number of slaves were freed from bondage and entered into the libre class.
This can be explained through the Code Noir’s liberal manumission policy that allowed masters to
free slaves for various reasons from loyal service to old age. Colonial officials also contributed to
the growing libre population by granting freedom to slaves who showed valor on the battlefield. On
one occasion, nearly fifty slaves gained their freedom by assisting colonial forces in suppressing
the Natchez Revolt.12
More importantly, the Code Noir illustrates that libres were present in colonial Louisiana as early
as 1724. As more slaves received freedom, they contributed to the strength and numbers of the
gens de couleur libre. Thus by the time the Code was drafted there were enough libres to merit its
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final provision which stated that free people of color were to receive the same “rights, privileges,
and immunities which are enjoyed by free born persons.”13
As the Code Noir served to control Louisiana’s slave population, it remained flexible as the
demands of the colony required. One particular deviation came in arming slaves. Although slaves
were prohibited from having their own weapons, French officials armed them when necessary.
When Indians invaded the Natchez settlement in 1729, Louisianans turned to every able-bodied
man in the colony. The initial attack claimed the lives of nearly 200 settlers and caused the
destruction of farms and crops. Governor Perier had only 400 men available to fight as more
Indians joined the massacre and made their way through the colony. Fearing an invasion of New
Orleans, Perier looked to slaves and free people of color to provide much needed manpower.
Along with white soldiers, slaves and free blacks met Natchez warriors near Point Coupee where
they demonstrated “surprising valor”14 As the conflict continued, Jacques De La Chaise, the
president of the Superior Council of Louisiana, drafted a memorial advocating the formation of a
permanent company of black soldiers to be ready at all times to defend Louisiana. Chaise’s
proposal failed to immediately materialize, but French officials continued to use black volunteers in
their ongoing struggle against the Natchez Indians and their Choctaw allies. In April 1736,
Governor Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville, assembled nearly 140 slaves and free black
troops to take on the Natchez in Mobile. He placed forty-five of these troops under the command
of free black officers. As expeditions against the Indians continued, black recruits increased,
forcing French officials to form a separate negres’ libres company.15
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When French campaigns against the Natchez ended in 1740, black soldiers, both slave and
free, had not only found a new avenue of freedom, but a vital means of establishing a special
status in the community. Many slaves received their freedom as reward for their service, while free
blacks gained valuable experience that would make them even more viable and needed members
of the colony. Although the French never used black troops in any other major engagements, they
had created a distinct black fighting force that would continue long after the French left Louisiana.
When the French ceded Lower Louisiana to the Spanish in the wake of the Seven Years’ War,
Louisianans confronted their first regime change. Libres became willing beneficiaries of new
Spanish policies that enhanced their numbers and group identity. Under the Spanish, the
population of libres continued to grow. One historian estimates that at the time the Spanish
obtained Lower Louisiana free people of color made up about 7.1% of Louisiana’s population. By
1805, just two years after the Louisiana Purchase, this number increased to nearly 33.5%.16
Immigration from the Caribbean and natural increase undoubtedly contributed to such growth.
Spanish policies, however, also promoted growth. Where the French relied on slaves and free
people of color for survival, the Spanish found them useful in combating hostile Frenchmen
resentful of the new imperial regime. Replacing the Code Noir, the Spanish implemented a new
set of provisions known as O’Reilly’s Laws. It is clear that these policies upheld white supremacy
and a slave society, but also served to forge unity between the Spanish government and
Louisiana’s burgeoning free black population. O’Reilly’s Laws codified the practice of coartacion
which allowed slaves to “purchase their freedom for a stipulated sum of money agreed upon by
their master or the Spanish courts.” What made this law so unique is that a slave did not need
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his/her master’s permission to initiate the court proceedings. Furthermore, O’Reilly’s Laws allowed
masters to free slaves without receiving permission from the Superior Court as the French
required. From self-purchase to a third party securing the freedom of a slave, Spanish policies
made freedom the gift of the Crown rather than a benevolent master. In essence, the Spanish tried
to make loyal free blacks, grateful for their new-found freedom, important allies against foreign
invaders and disgruntled white Creoles.17
Spanish policies, moreover, gave free blacks many new privileges that provided them the means
to start thriving businesses and acquire property. O’Reilly’s Laws allowed slaves and free blacks to
receive donations and gifts from former masters and white kin. Don Marcos de Olivares
bequeathed to his slave daughter Maria Josepha not only her freedom but also two thousand
pesos, several pieces of furniture, and silver. Such gifts allowed free blacks to purchase and
possess luxury items and accumulate real estate and slaves. Although libres owned fewer slaves
than their white counterparts, slave ownership became an important means for free blacks to
associate themselves with white society and distinguish themselves from black chattel. Many libres
also used such gifts and donations to help other slaves secure their freedom and join the free black
community. 18
Besides using monetary gifts to acquire real estate and other property, free blacks utilized
favorable Spanish policies to start businesses. In a society of masters and slaves, free blacks
assumed a middle stratum in the commercial hierarchy. Excluded from professional and

17 Ibid,. 25. Sterkx, The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana, 37-39. According to Sterkx, Spanish laws allowed
slaves to become free even if their master opposed the emancipation.
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government positions, free blacks supplied the bulk of Louisiana’s skilled labor as carpenters,
shoemakers, and blacksmiths. Many of these skills free blacks learned while slaves. In turn,
second-generation libres typically worked in the same profession as their fathers and other male
relatives. Libre women also worked in the service sector as seamstresses, laundresses, and even
tavern keepers.19 Spanish imperial officials also provided libres with many employment
opportunities. They hired libres to fix and build levees, bridges, and roads. Juan Bougin, a free
black carpenter, received a handsome salary from the Cabildo for work he did on a bridge in the
Carondelet Canal cemetery. Working for the crown often allowed free blacks to accumulate
property to invest in other businesses or join partnerships. For example, Marie Louise, a free black
woman, had enough money to financially support the business endeavors of a white blacksmith,
Nicholas Duquenay.20 Ultimately, the Spanish provided new channels of autonomy for free blacks,
encouraging them to accumulate property, build important economic partnerships, and create
thriving businesses.
As Spanish officials promoted libre involvement in the commercial sector, they also encouraged
their participation in the military. In 1762, Spanish authorities sought to reorganize their imperial
forces throughout their vast empire. During the Cuba restructuring, officials reorganized the
historic milicia de color by creating two separate companies. The first company consisted of free
pardos or light skinned libres who had traces of white ancestry. The second company, the
morenos (dark-skinned), consisted of black troops more recently freed from bondage.21 In 1769,
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newly-appointed Spanish governor Alesandro O’Reilly arrived in New Orleans to implement the
militia reorganization. Upon taking a census of Louisiana, O’Reilly created four white military units
and a company of libres. Just one year later, he appointed a free black man, Pedro Simon, as the
captain and commander of the free pardo and moreno militia. Along with Simon, several other
prominent free blacks were commissioned as officers in the Spanish Army. O’Reilly also extended
libres the right of fuero militiar which was a set of special military privileges that included retirement
and death benefits, the right to bear arms, as well as equal pay. More importantly, fuero provided
libres privileges that even members of the white community did not possess. As one historian
argues, fuero “placed the holder [libre] above and apart from the rest of society and in effect
constituted the militia as a social elite.” 22 O’Reilly included free blacks in this social elite, elevating
their status in the Louisiana social structure.
In 1779, Louisiana’s reorganized milicia de color received its first orders as Spain declared war
on Great Britain. Louisiana Governor Bernardo de Galvez quickly assembled his forces to expel
the British from the Gulf of Mexico and Mississippi River. Among his new recruits were eighty free
blacks, many with previous military experience under the French.23 These black troops, arranged
into pardo and moreno units led by black officers, marched with Galvez and his forces towards
Baton Rouge where they forced a British surrender at Fort Bute de Manchac. Galvez and his
forces soon turned their attention to Mobile, hoping to secure the Gulf of Mexico. In January 1780,
Galvez strengthened his forces, adding an additional thirty black troops. By March, these brave
soldiers secured Mobile and began heading towards Pensacola. Needing more manpower, Galvez
enlisted slaves to serve alongside the milicia de color. A month later, British forces surrendered at
22

Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 111-112, 118.

23

McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 17.
178

Fort George, thus completing the Spanish conquest of the Gulf South.24 Following these
successful expeditions, free black troops received praise through monetary rewards and medals
from the Spanish Crown.
After the American Revolution ended, black troops in the milicia de color continued to provide
valuable services. Their predominant peacetime role consisted of chasing and capturing runaway
slaves called Cimarrons. These particular runaways flocked to the swampy bayous where they
created slave armies that raided Louisiana farms and plantations. Libre troops also undertook
public works projects along the Mississippi River and throughout New Orleans. By the end of the
Spanish period, free black soldiers grew nearly five-fold as the Spanish took measures to provide
organization and structure to a legitimate milicia de color.25
****
Looking at the lives of Noel Carrier Sr. and other chosen men of color it is apparent that free
blacks utilized the advantages that Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy offered. Noel, born a slave,
entered the libre population during the French regime. Although the exact circumstance of his
manumission is unknown, it is possible he received his freedom through some noble military act.
Soon Carrier became a master cooper in New Orleans and married Marianne Thomas in
November 1778. As he built a thriving business, Carrier became a second lieutenant in the
moreno unit in the newly revived milicia de color. In 1779, Carrier put his leadership skills to the
test as he joined Governor Galvez and other Spanish troops to purge the Gulf Coast of the British.
Leaving Marianne behind, Carrier and his troops followed Galvez where they forced a British
surrender in Baton Rouge and Natchez, securing key posts along the banks of the Mississippi
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River. Along with his comrades Bautista Hugon and Francisco Dorville (lieutenant of the pardo
unit), he received special honors for the Baton Rouge expedition. Carrier and Dorville would go on
to earn more accolades including a bonus of 300 pesos for their efforts in both Mobile and
Pensacola.26
Following the Spanish conquest of the Gulf Coast region, Carrier reunited with his wife and
welcomed his first son Noel. Although he never left home again in the service of the Spanish
Army, his role as an officer in the milicia de color required his constant attention. In 1784, Carrier
and his moreno unit maneuvered through the Louisiana bayous in pursuit of Cimarron rebels.
Moreover, the harsh realities of the mighty Mississippi also consumed Carrier’s role as a military
leader. In 1790, now a captain of the morenos, he oversaw the rebuilding and repairing of a levee
near the city. Working alternately with Bautista Hugon’s pardo unit, Carrier ensured the city’s vital
levee system remained intact.27
Carrier’s career exemplifies how the military served as a tool for libres, giving them the
opportunity to fight for the defense of their homes, but also to demonstrate their worth to society.
The military fulfilled other purposes as well. At times it proved economically advantageous. It is
not inconceivable that Carrier used his bonus from the British campaign to invest in his expanding
business, family, and even property. Some libres even received military pensions that allowed
them to take care of their families into their old age. Beyond monetary gain, the military also gave
libres the opportunity to further separate themselves from slaves. By fighting against Cimarrons,
libres joined with white Louisianans rather than runaway slaves, demonstrating that the safety of
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the colony transcended the empathy they felt for black chattel.28 Furthermore, the leadership roles
libres assumed in the military spilled over into society, allowing black leaders the bargaining power
to request privileges for the entire free black community.
Libres like Carrier took advantage of favorable Spanish policies that provided them avenues of
freedom and a means to forge a separate group identity. Free blacks also employed other
strategies that continued to strengthen their cohesion and position in colonial Louisiana. One
important factor in libre methods was their ancestral connection to white society. French and
Spanish authorities referred to libres as mulattoes (or more specifically pardos and morenos), yet
free blacks themselves created much more complex racial classifications based on one’s degree of
separation from the Caucasian race. It is important to note that not every free person of color had
white blood since so many came directly from Africa as slaves and later earned their freedom.
Many libres did have claims to white ancestry which only enhanced their status. Ultimately, libres
created important racial classifications that emphasized one’s lineage and connection to white
society. These distinctions fell into three phenotypes. The most common in slave societies, the
mulatto designated the offspring of a white and black parent. Generations of racial mixing,
however, engendered even more specific categories. Quadroon, for example, refers to the
combination of whites and mulattoes, while a griffe was a child with a black and mulatto parent.29
These particular racial phenotypes became important in the libre community serving as either
badges of honor, distinction, or denigration. Many libres exploited such ancestry to create
advantageous business partnerships and strong bonds with white kin. Within their own community,
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free blacks adhered to their distinct racial classifications. Colonial marriage records indicate that
many free blacks married within their own phenotype illustrating that one’s link to white society was
worth preserving.30 Such a concern for one’s racial composition and white ancestry illustrates that
many libres hoped that their connection to white society, no matter how distant, enhanced their
position among other free blacks and encouraged favorable relations with white kin.
Beyond the intricate web of racial phenotypes, libres also relied on a variety of kinship networks,
both real and fictive, to protect their status and corporate identity. In Bounded Lives, Bounded
Places, Kimberly Hanger argues that godparenthood joined free blacks together, but also linked
them to white society. The goal in choosing a godparent centered on finding someone of equal or
preferably higher status that would gain one’s children privileges. This included selecting white
godparents, but also libres of status, usually black militia officers.31 Libres used complex kinship
bonds to promote their well being and that of succeeding generations.
Many free blacks looked to white Louisianans to serve as godparents to their children. Colonial
records indicate that between January 1787 and December 1797, nearly 56% of free black children
had at least one white godparent. 32 Such records also reveal that more white males were used as
godparents than white females, indicating that libres hoped to benefit from the influence of white
men. In 1796, Carlos Brule, a lieutenant in the milicia de color, asked Ygnacio Fernandes to
sponsor his daughter Maria. As a second lieutenant in the white Louisiana Infantry, Fernandes’
role as godfather provided Brule with a vital link to the white military and white society. Pierre
Bailly, another lieutenant in the milicia de color, also used white men as godfathers to all of his
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children. For his son Joseph Pedro’s godfather, Bailly chose Joseph De La Pena, a captain in the
white infantry. Later he asked Andres Armesto to sponsor his son Andres. As the secretary to the
governor of Louisiana, Armesto proved an important ally and through godparenthood Bailly forged
a relationship that could later benefit him and his children.33
Libres who did not have connections with white society often turned to prominent free black
leaders to help secure favors and privileges. Many free blacks used officers in the milicia de color
as godfathers. At times this strengthened the camaraderie between fellow soldiers as in the case
of Noel Carrier and Pedro Claver. In 1796, Noel Carrier Sr. witnessed the baptism of Claver’s son
Manuel. Two years later, Claver returned the favor serving as godfather to Carrier’s son Balthazar.
For both men the role of godparent was one that kept fellow soldiers united. Moreover, for Claver,
a lower ranking officer, having Captain Carrier as a godparent strengthened his connection with
other black officers. Claver continued to utilize his relationship with Carrier, asking him and his
wife Marianne to sponsor his son Pedro several years later.34
Besides strengthening external links, godparenthood also solidified the nuclear family. Carlos
Brule often asked female family members to serve as godmothers. He asked his sister Charlotte
Brule to sponsor his son Carlos Savidor. Later he asked his wife’s sister to be godmother to
daughter Margarita. Noel Carrier often used more immediate family members as well. When his
daughter Ana was born in 1796, he asked his wife’s brother and sister-in-law to serve as sponsors.
Carrier also used godparenthood to maintain attachments to more distant, but important relatives.

33

Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Volume 4, 5, 6.

34

Ibid., Volume 6, 7.
183

Linked to the Montreuil family through Fanchon Carrier, Noel asked cousins Bartalome, Descanda,
and Francisco Montreuil to serve as godparents to three of his children.35
Much like the sacrament of baptism, strategic marriages also provided free blacks the
opportunity to make vital connections. Statistics reveal that free blacks preferred to marry within
their ranks rather than having less sanctioned unions with whites and slaves. Marriage allowed
free blacks to dissociate from slaves and enhance a growing libre community. Weddings also
allowed free blacks to solidify special bonds. Libre military leaders often arranged marriages
among their children. Pedro Claver, the son of Augustin Claver, a corporal in the milicia de color,
married Celeste Hugon, the daughter of Bautista Hugon, captain of the pardo unit. Such a union
allowed the libre elite to maintain their status for generations. Many couples also asked military
officers to witness their nuptials. Noel Carrier Sr. and several other officers witnessed the above
union between Claver and Hugon. Carrier witnessed three other marriages between 1784 and
1796. Francisco Dorville’s role as a captain of the pardos also made him a popular witness to
many libres unions.36
Through strategic marriages and godparenthood, libres created an intricate network of real and
fictive kinship bonds that sought to enhance their status among whites, camaraderie in the military,
and cohesion among the libre community. Free blacks, however, went outside the private enclave
of the family to secure their rights and identity. During the colonial era, free blacks maintained an
open dialogue with Spanish authorities through the military. During the Revolutionary War,
Francisco Dorville requested that black troops receive a portion of the wartime spoils. Other

35

Ibid., Volume 5, 6, 7, 8.

36

Ibid., Volume 4, 5.
184

officers petitioned imperial authorities to receive pensions as reward for wartime sacrifices.37 Using
the milicia de color, free blacks collectively received benefits, but more importantly created a
dialogue with colonial officials that allowed libres to demand and obtain certain privileges.38
Libres also used the public sphere of New Orleans as a means to interact with white society and
assert their status. In the city streets, free blacks marched in celebratory holidays and military
musters as well as paraded in costumes during Mardi Gras festivities. Alongside whites, libres
partook in some of Louisianans’ most sacred holidays and cherished pastimes. White and black
men mingled in the many taverns and dance halls throughout the city. Together they bet on
cockfights, horse races, and games of chance. Whites and libres lived in the same neighborhoods
and even worshipped and received the sacraments together at the St. Louis Cathedral.39 Free
blacks attempted to make the streets and facilities of New Orleans a common space for all
Louisianans—a public realm that downplayed racial distinctions and promoted unity among
partygoers, parishioners, gambling men, and citizens.
By the time the United States took possession of French Louisiana, free people of color had
already helped to settle, secure, and sustain Louisiana. Throughout the colonial period, free blacks
employed many strategies that allowed them to strengthen their own community, but more
importantly to downplay race and emphasize their status as citizens. Ultimately, libres contributed
to the unique three-tiered racial hierarchy that would prove problematic for Americans.
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****
Noel Carrier Jr. perhaps felt similar apprehensions as his father when the United States took
possession of Lower Louisiana. He worried about the fate of his property, his business, and even
his status as a solider in the milicia de color. Yet he faced different challenges than his father, not
only having to combat a new American government but preserve the legacy and rights of the
chosen men of color. Throughout the territorial period, Noel and his fellow libres continued to use
the same strategies employed by their fathers in the face of obstacles that threatened their colonial
heritage.
As American lawmakers made preparations for the transfer of Lower Louisiana, they quickly
began to realize they had much more to deal with than border disputes and unhappy Creoles.
They also were confronted with a free black population much more numerous and autonomous
then those found in the United States. Initial reports estimated that nearly one-fourth of Louisiana’s
population consisted of free people of color.40 Just days after the official transfer of French
Louisiana, Governor Claiborne expressed concern regarding the existing companies of the milicia
de color, contending that “to re-commission them might be considered as an outrage on the
feelings of a part of the Nation, and opposed to that Policy which the Safety of the Southern States
has necessarily established.” Here Claiborne illustrates the main dilemma facing American
lawmakers. Maintaining the historic milicia de color violated the rigid racial hierarchy well
established in the United States. Nowhere in the Union did Americans accept or even consider
arming slaves or free blacks, let alone allowing them to form a military battalion. Over time,
Claiborne’s anxiety gave way to practicality as he acknowledged libres’ importance to domestic
Territorial Papers IX: 18, 32-33. Clark and Claiborne initially believed Lower Louisiana had nearly 50,000 to
60,000 people, of which one-third to one-forth were libres. Both mentioned the existence of the milicia de color. Their
estimates have been backed by others in the territory such as Benjamin Morgan.
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security. He feared that alienating free blacks “would disgust them, and might be productive of
future mischief. To disband them would be to raise an armed enemy in the very heart of the
Country.”41 Claiborne faced a precarious situation. Should he protect white Americans’ cherished
racial hierarchy at the expense of libres, thereby risking a possible black revolution? Or should he
protect the rights of the milicia de color at the risk of alienating many of his white constituents?
As Claiborne begged for instructions regarding libres, other Americans reflected on the racial
predicament. Benjamin Morgan, a longtime resident of New Orleans, pondered the race issue with
his good friend Chandler Price. Commending libres’ colonial contributions, Morgan believed that
free people of color could also be useful to Americans especially in dealing with slaves, contending
that “it is worth the consideration of government they [libres] may be made good citizens or
formidable abettors of the black people [slaves] … if they should ever be troublesome.”42 He
concluded that Americans should make free blacks friends rather than enemies. General James
Wilkinson shared many of Morgan’s postulations. He urged American authorities to cultivate good
relations with free blacks, warning that “the People of Colour are all armed.” He believed that by
treating libres with respect and delicacy, Americans averted feelings of resentment that could
“produce those Horrible Scenes of Bloodshed & rapine, which have been so frequently noticed in
St. Domingo”43 Like Claiborne, Wilkinson clearly understood that free people of color were vital to
Louisiana’s racial harmony.
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Contemplating their own precarious situation, free blacks initiated negotiations with territorial and
Washington lawmakers. In January 1804, fifty-four free men of color sent the “Address from the
Free People of Color” to Governor Claiborne. The libre petitioners referred to themselves as “free
Citizens of Louisiana” who possessed a “sincere attachment to the Government of the United
States.” The address went on to explicitly articulate libre views regarding their status in the United
States, stating that:
We are Natives of this Province and our dearest Interests are connected with its
welfare. We therefore feel a lively Joy that the Sovereignty of the Country is at
length united with that of the American Republic. We are duly sensible that our
personal and political freedom is thereby assured to us for ever, and we are
also impressed with the fullest confidence in the Justice and Liberality of the
Government towards every Class of Citizens which they have taken under their
Protection.44
The opening paragraph of the address quickly set the tone for libre interactions with American
lawmakers. First, they invoked the rhetoric of attachment that had become essential in territorial
negotiations. By providing assurances of their affection to the United States, libres hoped to depict
themselves as loyal countrymen. More importantly, the potent language of the address left little
doubt that libres considered themselves legitimate citizens of the United States. Their bold
assertion came in large part from Article III of the treaty between the United States and France that
stated that Louisiana inhabitants would be admitted to the United States “as soon as possible” to
enjoy “all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens.”45 For free people of color this
included them.
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To buttress claims of citizenship, the address reminded Americans of libres’ military
contributions, recounting that:
We were employed in the military service of the late Government, and we hope we
may be permitted to say, that our Conduct in that Service has ever been
distinguished by a ready attention to the duties required of us. Should we be in
like manner honored by the American Government, to which every principle of
Interest as well as affection attaches us, permit us to assure your Excellency that
we shall serve with fidelity and Zeal. We therefore respectfully offer our Services
to the Government as a Corps of Volunteers agreeable to any arrangement which
may be thought expedient. 46
This reference to the colonial milicia de color illustrates that libres were willing to use the legacy of
their ancestors to protect their colonial rights and citizenship. Ultimately, this address served as a
preemptive strike that unveiled libres’ approach in dealing with American lawmakers.
Governor Claiborne’s response to the address proves just as insightful in understanding the
strategy he adopted in negotiating with libres. In a letter to the free black petitioners, Claiborne
promised them protection of their “Liberty, Property, and Religion.” However, when it came to the
issue of military service, he failed to provide any assurances, but rather simply stated that the fate
of the milicia de color depended on Washington lawmakers.47 Claiborne’s letter was even more
ambiguous regarding their status as citizens, failing to address Article III of the cession treaty.
Claiborne treated the “Address from the Free People of Color” with delicacy, instituting an
approach he would use in his many encounters with free people of color.
These early negotiations between libres and territorial lawmakers bore fruit. After waiting
months for a response from Washington, Claiborne finally received instructions regarding the
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milicia de color. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn encouraged Claiborne to renew the black militia
under the strict orders not “to increase the Corps, but diminish it, if can be done without giving
offense.” Also he instructed Claiborne to replace colonial black leaders with white officers of good
character. As a token of the government’s confidence and acknowledgement of the new free black
battalion, Dearborn wanted Claiborne to present them with a flag.48 Claiborne immediately
implemented Dearborn’s orders. In June, he selected Major Michael Fortier and Lewis Kerr as
commanding officers for the new free black battalion. Just days later, Claiborne presented the
Free Color Battalion with an official flag that was “made of white silk, Ornamented with fifteen
Stripes (alternately red and white).” 49
By the Spring of 1804, libres felt confident in their new relationship with the territorial
government. They earned the right to continue their time-honored military tradition and received a
standard of recognition similar to other white units. Soon, black troops patrolled New Orleans
streets and other public facilities on night watches, a job designated to the territorial militia. Libres
also found that the early airing of their grievances proved a useful tactic in engendering an open
dialogue with lawmakers and a vehicle for negotiation. Claiborne abated the “color problem,”
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temporarily appeasing libres without toppling the American racial hierarchy. He happily reported to
Washington lawmakers that the renewal of the milicia de color proved sound policy. 50
Having initial success with lawmakers, free blacks hoped another address could secure them
more privileges. This time they set their sights on political rights. In 1804, as white Louisianans
drafted the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana, they failed to represent the interest of all
Louisianans since free blacks were excluded from the proceedings. A prominent black leader,
therefore, began preparations for a separate meeting for libres to draft their own memorial to
Congress. As a portent for looming racial animosities, city printers refused to print or circulate the
meeting announcement. Hearing of the proposed libre meeting, Claiborne lashed out at the free
black community, calling their actions “reprehensible and of a nature to create anxiety.”51 Several
days later, he met with ten prominent libre leaders hoping to discourage an assembly or petition.
Despite these efforts, however, white Louisianans confronted the prospect of a free black memorial
with scorn. Claiborne reported to Secretary of State Madison that the proposed meeting “excited
some alarm among the white citizens,” and that many white Louisianans wanted him to apprehend
and punish the free man of color who orchestrated the meeting. Ultimately, no one went to jail over
the incident and free blacks abandoned plans for a memorial to Congress. 52
The outcry over a possible libre memorial demonstrates an important undercurrent that often
dictated negotiations between lawmakers and free blacks—white Louisianans. The presence of
Claiborne to Dearborn, 22 June 22, 1804, Letter Books, II: 218. Free black militiamen served for a time as
watchmen as evidenced by an incident when a black solider on watch struck a white man.
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free people of color undoubtedly engendered a volatile situation for all Louisiana inhabitants.
Historically free blacks were important members of society and assisted whites in upholding the
institution of slavery. These contributions, however, did not often merit respect. Rather, for white
Louisianans, free blacks were a serious threat. Despite black claims of citizenship, their skin color
made them more like slaves than whites. Many white Louisianans feared that free blacks would
one day join their enslaved counterparts and incite a racial revolution. Such feelings were only
exacerbated in the context of international affairs. As Americans watched in horror as slaves in St.
Domingue overthrew their white masters, many worried about a similar insurrection in the United
States. Louisiana seemed even more vulnerable to such a revolt due to its close proximity to the
Caribbean. As a large influx of island refugees flooded into New Orleans, white concerns
intensified, fearing that armed free blacks with military experience would be enticed by ideas of
freedom and equality. The Haitian Revolution, therefore, generated scorn and fear and further
strained free blacks’ relationship with Creole and Americans living in the Orleans territory.
There existed an equally, if not more, significant dimension to white Louisianans’ growing
disdain for free blacks. At first glance it would seem that white and black Louisianans faced the
same struggle. Both had to negotiate with American lawmakers to maintain their colonial heritage
and receive the benefits of American citizenship. In actuality, whites attempted to secure American
acceptance by reinforcing white supremacy and Americans’ racial hierarchy. Thus to make their
claims of citizenship more legitimate, white Creoles disassociated themselves from free people of
color. As they fought for a new territorial government, white Louisianans feared that libres would
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only hinder their efforts since most Americans refused to accept the special status of Louisiana’s
free people of color.53
As libres attempted to negotiate with territorial and Washington lawmakers, they also had to
combat white Louisianans who sought to alienate them. At every turn, libres faced suspicions and
scrutiny. In the Louisiana Gazette, one angry citizen called the “Louisianan” criticized Claiborne for
his haste in organizing the Free Color Battalion and for presenting it with a standard similar to that
of white units. Although this disgruntled citizen was disturbed that Claiborne would put black
troops on equal footing with whites, he seemed even more upset at the prospect of armed free
blacks parading in the streets. 54 Slave insurrections also provided white Louisianans opportunities
to depict libres as a dangerous lot. In September 1805, a slave named Celestin exposed a plot
orchestrated by a recent white immigrant from St. Domingue named Le Grand. Celestin produced
Le Grand’s writings outlining his malicious scheme to use blacks to overtake New Orleans. What
was particularly damaging about this rumored insurrection is that Celestin implicated several
prominent free people of color who served as Le Grand’s agents. This incident only further
supported white fears. New Orleans mayor John Watkins, for instance, believed Le Grand’s plot
proved that all free blacks were “political enemies.”55 Creoles failed to see free blacks as fellow
countrymen in a common struggle against the new American government, but rather as foes and
potential threats.
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White Louisianans’ paranoia soon spilled over into the policies of the territorial legislature. As
early as October 1804, the Free Color Battalion was in danger as officials failed to mention it in the
new militia law. This neglect continued when the Legislative Council reorganized the territorial
militia in 1805. As council members created twenty-four new militia districts, they failed to include
the free black corps.56 In this same year, Claiborne surveyed the new territorial militia, giving it
positive marks.57 However, neither the Legislative Council nor Claiborne made any mention of the
Free Color Battalion in this evaluation. In 1806, festivities celebrating the anniversary of the
Louisiana Purchase and the Fourth of July featured territorial militia units. They paraded in the
Place d’ Armes in front of government officials and New Orleans residents. Ignored again, the
Free Colored Battalion was not even invited to participate.58 For nearly two years the Free Color
Battalion only existed in name, as territorial officials deactivated it by omission.
Besides neglecting the Free Color Battalion, territorial officials also sought to circumscribe the
place of free blacks in territorial New Orleans with a new black code. The Black Code of 1806 in
many respects resembled the Code Noir, outlining certain white responsibilities and restricting the
activities of slaves. Concomitantly, the new code redefined the racial landscape of territorial
Louisiana by specifically addressing the status of free people of color. It required any libre carrying
a weapon to produce papers proving his freedom. This particular stipulation certainly demeaned
black militiamen accustomed to having their own guns. The last section of the Black Code,
however, struck the hardest blow to the libre community, stating that “free people of color ought
never to insult or strike white people, nor presume, to conceive themselves equal to whites; but on
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the contrary that they ought to yield to them in every occasion, and never speak or answer to them
but with respect, under penalty of imprisonment according to the nature of the offense.”59 This
particular statement is what made the new 1806 Black Code quite different than its colonial
counterpart. The Code Noir clearly limited slaves and solidified white supremacy, yet it always
remained flexible as colonial realities necessitated. The Black Code of 1806 was quite clear—no
longer did the demands of the wilderness or population concerns make slaves and free people of
color valuable members of the community. Rather the Code stressed the absolute subordination of
slaves and free blacks that engendered a clear racial barrier between black and white. More
importantly, the new Code lacked a blanket statement promising free people of color the enjoyment
of all rights and privileges as citizens. Ultimately, the new Black Code urged free blacks to accept
that their status mirrored that of a slave rather than a white citizen. 60
Despite mounting pressure from the legislature and white Louisianans, Claiborne failed to
permanently abandon the Free Color Battalion. Like so many Louisianans, Claiborne feared free
people of color and their possible interaction with slaves. As early as 1804, he admitted to James
Madison that “at some future period, this quarter of the Union must (I fear) experience in some
degree, the Misfortunes of St. Domingo, and that period will be hastened if the people should be
indulged by congress with a continuance of the African Trade.” Claiborne clung to the belief that
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free people of color could be even more dangerous if ostracized by territorial officials and white
Louisianans. “I remembered that the events which have Spread blood and desolation in St.
Domingo,” Claiborne warned, “originated in a dispute between the white and Mulatto inhabitants,
and that the too rigid treatment of the former, induced the Latter to seek support and assistance of
the Negroes.” 61 As white Louisianans and legislators ignored free blacks’ demands, Claiborne
continued to invoke a delicate approach. He hoped to give libres some concessions to keep them
happy, yet always mindful of white concerns and resentment. One dispensation he hoped to make
to free blacks was the continuation of the free black battalion.
By 1807, Claiborne made efforts to reorganize the black militia and gave orders for military
officials to ascertain the number of free men of color in the territory.62 This particular request fits
into Claiborne’s larger concerns regarding the general state of the territorial militia. Following the
militia reorganization act in August of 1805, Claiborne still believed the territorial militia remained
“greatly defective.” He seemed particularly concerned about the scarcity of arms and the lack of
discipline among militiamen. Inadequate numbers and poor organization contributed to Claiborne’s
concerns that the militia had “hardly sufficient strength to ensure internal tranquility should foreign
intrigue give motion to the disaffected.” 63 External threats proved just as troublesome as American
relations with France and Great Britain deteriorated. Although President Jefferson initially abated
conflict with the unpopular Embargo Act, many believed that war was imminent and Americans
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needed to be ready.64 Nowhere was this readiness more vital than in Louisiana. Fearing that a
war would open the door to foreign intrigue from the British or even the Spanish, many believed
that Louisiana’s security affected the nation’s safety.
Exploiting this precarious situation, Claiborne hoped to kill two birds with one stone by using free
black troops to strengthen the territory’s deficient military. He urged lawmakers to consider
recognizing and using the free black battalion with the regular militia.65 The territorial House of
Representatives agreed to “give to the Battalion of free men of Color the activity which their zeal
solicits.”66 National security brought renewed interest in the free black corps and temporarily
circumvented white fears of libre troops. Yet despite the international situation and assurances of
activating the black militia, the Legislative Council failed to recognize the free black battalion in any
militia laws passed during the territorial period.
****
Despite Claiborne’s efforts and a few empty promises, the milicia de color existed only in name
and in the memories of free people of color. Year after year, the black corps remained absent from
territorial laws and debates. Concomitantly, free blacks dealt with a changing racial environment
as the new Black Code and white hostility marginalized them. The territorial period posed an
important crossroads for free blacks. Severely handicapped by American policies and racism, free
blacks were forced to find ways to combat such obstacles to preserve their colonial heritage and
As early as January 12, 1807, the Louisiana Gazette speculated that war with Great Britain was imminent.
Throughout 1807 and 1808, the Gazette was filled with articles discussing the possibility of war with Great Britain. See
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rights. Noel Carrier Jr. and many other libres continued to use the strategies invoked by their
parents to secure citizenship.
In the colonial era, libres fostered an open dialogue with Spanish authorities to secure military
privileges, pensions, and concessions for the libre community at large. Hoping to achieve similar
success, territorial libres attempted to maintain communication with government officials as
illustrated by the “Address from the Free People of Color.” Besides asserting their citizenship, this
address also revealed the leaders of the territorial libre community. Among the fifty-four petitioners
were officers in the Spanish milicia de color including Captain Charles Simon and Lieutenant Pierre
Bailly. In addition to this older breed of libre leaders, a new generation of free black crusaders
emerged. Many of them were the sons and relatives of former colonial soldiers. Luis Simon, who
signed his name first to the “Address from the Free People of Color,” was related to not only
Charles Simon but also Pedro Simon, the first black commanding officer of the milicia de color.
Pierre Bailly Jr. joined his father in submitting the address, undoubtedly inheriting his father’s
fighting spirit. As the Simon and Bailly names invoked the legacy of the chosen men of color, new
names such as Populus, Fortier, Hardy, and Poree all appeared on the address and introduced the
next generation of libre leaders. These men joined with old breed libres and their relatives to
preserve free blacks’ rights. Over the course of the territorial period, these young men formed
important business partnerships, initiated further political protest, demanded militia service, and
later fought in the Battle of New Orleans.67
As many libre leaders resorted to political activism, some took more extreme measures. In
1806, Stephen, a free black man, informed Governor Claiborne of a possible black revolt. He
Address From the Free People of Color, January 1804, Territorial Papers, IX: 174-175, Hanger, Bounded Lives,
Bounded Places, 130-131, McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 35.
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claimed that libres harbored “hostile intentions” and met nightly making preparations to assist the
Spanish in overtaking Louisiana. Stephen explained that former Spanish governor Marquis Casa
Calvo planned to return with three or four thousand troops to join free blacks in implementing the
massacre. Stephen implicated several prominent free men of color including Francisco Dorville
and Carlos Brule, both officers in the Spanish milicia de color. The validity of Stephen’s sworn
statement is uncertain, however, Governor Claiborne took precautionary measures ordering militia
companies on guard every night for several months. Although a libre/Spanish revolt failed to
materialize, it appears that many free blacks resented new territorial policies. Dorville, for example,
wore a Spanish cockade at all times and continued to sign his name followed by the title
“Commander of the mulattoes during the time of Spanish domination.”68 Dorville’s frustration with
the American government could certainly explain his public display of loyalty to Spain and perhaps
drove him and other chosen men of color to contemplate a possible revolt.
While libres attempted to negotiate with American lawmakers, they also relied on kinship
networks to strengthen their community cohesion. Utilizing tactics employed by their parents,
libres continued to look to godparenthood and marriage to foster vital links amongst each other and
to white society. Free blacks still relied on former military leaders to witnesses their marriages and
baptisms. Francisco Dorville spent much of his time in St. Louis Cathedral. Between 1803 and
1810 (the year of his death), he witnessed seven libre unions. In March 1804, both he and Noel
Carrier Sr. witnessed the marriage of Captain Carlos Brule’s daughter. Dorville and other former
free black officers such as Pedro Claver and Brule continued to serve as godfathers for libre
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children, illustrating that within the libre community old military officers, although ignored by
American officials, remained prominent men.69
The selection of witnesses and godparents also reveals that many libres began turning to the
younger generation of black leaders. In 1808, Vincent Populus asked not only his three brothers,
but also Luis Simon to witness his daughter’s wedding. Simon also was godfather to one of Pierre
Bailly’s sons. Several years later, Simon returned the favor by asking Bailly to sponsor his
daughter Melania. Through religious sacraments, the emerging leaders of the black community
forged fictive kinship bonds that spilled over into their public and military activities.70
Libres also continued to use godparenthood to strengthen real family ties. Brothers Francisco
and Juan Bautista Dauphin chose immediate family members to sponsor all of their children. In
1811 alone, they served as godfathers to each other’s children. Free blacks also tried to maintain
preexisting family bonds. Basilo Montreuil, for instance, asked Marianne Carrier to witness his
nuptials, sealing the connection between the two families that had existed for nearly three
generations. In a hostile racial environment the family served as a safe haven from the harsher
realties of the new American regime.71
Although territorial libres often relied on black godparents more than their colonial counterparts,
many did not abandon hope that white godparents were still advantageous. A glance at territorial
marriage and birth records indicates that Antonio Xerez witnessed many free black marriages and
baptisms. Xerez’s family came to New Orleans from the Canary Islands years before he was born.
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Although his occupation and status are unknown, it is certain that Antonio was a white man.
Between 1812 and 1814, Xerez witnessed four libre baptisms. He also witnessed several
marriages including the union of Carlos Brule’s daughter to emerging black leader Nobert Fortier.
Brule, a former Spanish officer and prominent libre, could have asked many other people, yet
Xerez was in attendance. Many libres must have seen him as an important link to white society
through either his occupation, status, or just the color of his skin. Other white Louisianans agreed
to witness libre sacraments. Noel Dupuy, a white officer in the United States military, served as
godfather to Antonio Foucher’s son Noel. Foucher also made Elisabeth Cap-Grand the young
boy’s godmother. A landowner in St. Domingue, Cap-Grand possibly was a white relative of
Foucher’s wife, also from Port-au-Prince. This choice reveals that Foucher hoped the good
fortunes of his wife’s white kin could bestow rewards to his son and other children.72 Perhaps the
most interesting godparent selection came from Jose Terencio LeBlanc for his son Henrique.
Although he came from a large libre family, Jose chose Henrique St. Geme to be his son’s
godfather. St. Geme was the brother of Louis XVI and made his way to New Orleans when the
French were expelled from Haiti. Upon his arrival he bought a sugar plantation and served in the
Louisiana militia commanding the elite fighting force known as the Dragons of Pied.73 Terencio
chose a white man of great prominence as his son’s godfather in hopes of having a white ally
against the American government.

72 Ibid., Volume 10, 11. Although many white clergymen were present for libre sacraments, it is clear that Xerez
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As free blacks cultivated real and fictive kinship networks, they also utilized the territorial legal
apparatus to maintain their diminishing rights. Although the Black Code sought to marginalize
libres in New Orleans society, these laws failed to change the civil code of law which protected free
blacks. Libres, therefore, exploited territorial courts to protect their property and fight against other
offenses. Alexis Andry, a free man of color, went before the City Court to secure property he
purchased on St. Anne Street from a free woman of color named Babel Bienvenu. Babel sold
Andry a home on the lot under the stipulation that she be allowed to have one chamber of the
home for herself. Eight months later when Andry rented out the apartment to Lewis Pareset, she
refused to allow him to live in the home, claiming it was hers. Andry demanded Babel pay
damages and abide by their original agreement.74
Although many such cases involved disputes amongst fellow libres, the courts also helped free
blacks fight against white Louisianans. Alexis Andry appeared before the First Judicial Court filing
suit against J. B. Brampin, a white man he hired to do upkeep on a house located in the Faubourg
Marginary. Andry believed that Brampin failed to meet the stipulations of their agreement and
sought monetary damages.75 These court cases reveal that many libres continued to uphold their
legal rights despite their military and political alienation. Furthermore, free blacks’ legal activities
illustrate that, much like their colonial counterparts, they owned and accumulated property and
established thriving businesses.
Libres continued to support the New Orleans commercial sector as artisans. In many cases
they carried on the family business. Noel Carrier Jr. worked as a cooper just like his father. Also
many libre relatives worked together in profitable partnerships. Maurice, Juan Baptiste, and
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Vincent Populus were all shoemakers, while their brother Bathelemy worked as a tailor. When
they were not signing addresses to the governor, the Hardy brothers Jacque and Joachim worked
as a shoemaker and a butcher. Many of the emerging free black leaders supplied New Orleans
with skilled labor as carpenters, blacksmiths, and woodcarvers.76
Along with setting up businesses throughout the city, many libres continued to accumulate
considerable property and slaves. At the time of his death, Noel Carrier Jr. owned five different city
lots and nine slaves with an estimated worth of $17,000. His younger brother Balthazar also
owned several adjacent properties, demonstrating that families often pooled their resources to yield
maximum profits. 77 Pedro Claver possessed property throughout the city, including a lot located
between Burgundy and St. Louis Street valued at $1800. He also owned at least one slave which
he bequeathed to his daughter upon his death. Francisco Poree’s inventory demonstrates that
wealth went beyond slaves and land. Among his possessions, Poree had tables, chairs, a liquor
stand, armoire, candlesticks, and a looking glass. Poree also owned tools valued at $290.97. Free
blacks used their skills as master craftsmen to accumulate property throughout New Orleans.
Such properties provided them a higher standard of living, but also allowed them to mingle with
whites in city streets and neighborhoods.78
In many ways free black strategies had one underlying purpose: to bolster claims of black
citizenship. The lynchpin to their methods rested on proving that they had more in common with
whites than slaves. Choosing black colonial officers to witness their sacraments, for instance,
76 Albert J. Robichaux Jr., Civil Registration of Orleans Parish Births, Marriages, and Deaths: 1790-1833 (Rayne
Louisiana: Herbert Publications, 2000), 406, 669-671. This collection of records provides ample evidence that libres
continued to make up a large portion of New Orleans’ artisans. See also Probate Records, City Archives Collection.
77

Probate Records Orleans Parish, City Archives Collection.

78

Robichaux., Civil Registration of Orleans Parish Births, Marriages, and Deaths; See also New Orleans in 1805.

.
203

showcased that many libres had military distinctions that even white citizens did not possess.
Their ownership of businesses and real estate allowed libres to accumulate wealth promoting
lifestyles similar to their white counterparts. Their role as slaveholders made them facilitators of
the institution of slavery and white solidarity. Throughout the territorial period, free blacks
employed any means necessary to differentiate themselves from slaves and to prove that their
activities, wealth, and loyalty mattered more than their skin color.
Perhaps no event reinforced free black claims of citizenship more than Louisiana’s most
widespread and destructive slave insurrection. In January 1811, slaves on the plantation of
Colonel Manuel Andry revolted, wounding the colonel and killing his son. Several hundred slaves
left the Andry plantation and headed towards New Orleans about forty miles away. As they made
their trek to the city they recruited other slaves and destroyed everything in their path. When news
of the insurrection made its way to Governor Claiborne he detached two New Orleans volunteer
units led by General Wade Hampton. Fearful that the insurrection would reach New Orleans,
Claiborne put all militia units under arms including the Free Color Battalion. Hampton met the
slave army at Fortier’s sugar works eighteen miles outside New Orleans. There his forces, along
with reinforcements sent from Baton Rouge, subdued the slaves, killing their leaders and detaining
the rebels for trial. 79 As New Orleanians rejoiced at the successful suppression of the slave revolt,
many praised the efforts of black militiamen who, despite being neglected for nearly seven years,
showed great military prowess in the face of danger. Claiborne applauded libres for their “zeal for
public safety” and their “great exactitude and propriety.” Almost a month later, Claiborne presented
the Legislative Assembly with a message signed by prominent white Louisianans “bearing
Claiborne to Secretary of State, 14, January 1811, Letter Books, V: 100. See also McConnell, Negro Troops of
Antebellum Louisiana, 49-50.
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testimony to the good conduct of certain free men of color during the late Insurrection, and
recommending them to the favorable attention of the Legislature.”80
Free people of color gained attention for their bravery and their willingness to protect New
Orleans. More importantly, free blacks hoped that loyal conduct would trump the race card. By
siding with white Louisianans against slaves hoping to secure freedom, free blacks validated the
institution of slavery while disassociating themselves from slaves. Libres owned property, received
sacraments, worked hard, and fought gallantly just like white Louisianans. Their strategies of
negotiation sought to transcend race and expose libres as viable and necessary citizens of the
United States.
****
In 1811, Noel Carrier Jr. could be assured that his father would have been proud of him. He
established a successful business, owned real estate and slaves, took care of his family, and
volunteered for military service. In many ways he followed in his father’s footsteps. Yet much had
changed in New Orleans that dictated many of the contours of the younger Carrier’s life. Where
his father received military accolades from a grateful Spanish Crown, Noel Jr. belonged to a black
militia that existed only in name. Where his father voiced his concerns and opinions to an open
government, Noel’s political expressions were often described as “reprehensible.” Where his
father lived in a unique racial society where libres assumed a vital role, Noel faced disdain and
resentment from white Creoles and Americans who deemed him more like a slave than a citizen.
Despite such obstacles, Noel Jr. and other libres continued to fight and negotiate with American
lawmakers, unwilling to relinquish the rights and privileges their ancestors enjoyed. With every
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policy, decree, and territorial law, libres hoped to combat marginalization by employing strategies
once used by their parents. These efforts allowed territorial libres to build even stronger kinship
bonds as well as a community centered on survival. Also by invoking the legacy of their fathers,
free blacks hoped to legitimize their claims for citizenship as Americans fumbled to define a class
of people that had little place in their rigid racial hierarchy.
At times, free blacks had little control over their precarious fate. American lawmakers viewed
and treated libres much differently than their colonial counterparts. Although French and Spanish
authorities sought to establish a clear racial divide through policies such as the Code Noir,
necessity often bent the confines of such racial restrictions. Under the American regime, however,
this necessity had largely diminished, making free blacks seem less important for the territory’s
survival. Americans delicately negotiated with free blacks hoping to make them loyal subjects
especially in the face of foreign invasion and possible slave insurrections. As lawmakers remained
careful not to upset the racial balance in favor of free blacks, most territorial policies failed to
protect libres’ colonial rights. In many ways, free blacks maintained aspects of their colonial status
because Americans feared them rather than accepted them.
As a war with Great Britain approached, necessity once again required libres to stand up and
fight just like their fathers. Libre strategies of negotiation sustained free blacks during the territorial
period, but ultimately it would be their efforts on the field of battle that would provide them the
opportunity to secure more of the benefits of American citizenship. Wartime necessity would allow
Noel Carrier Jr. and many libres to become themselves “chosen men of color” and to temporarily
challenge Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy.
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Chapter Six: “Applause of an admiring nation”: Louisianans’ Battle for Acceptance and
Citizenship
On January 23, 1815, Pierre-Joseph Favrot arrived at the Place d’ Armes to find a triumphal
arch placed in front of St. Louis Cathedral. Lining the path from the arch to the cathedral stood
young girls each representing an American state or territory. General Andrew Jackson and several
of his men walked under the arch as two children representing Louisiana placed a laurel crown on
his head. As jubilant music played in the distance, children threw flowers at the general’s feet.1
After weeks of uneasiness and constant preparation, Louisianans finally felt safe enough to
celebrate their stellar victory at the Battle of New Orleans. For Pierre-Joseph, it was a pleasant
relief from the rigors of his new political position. From the moment he arrived in New Orleans in
December 1814 to take his legislative seat, the Creole father and one-time Spanish solider worked
feverishly to procure weapons and fortify city defenses against a British invasion. He also
maintained constant contact with his wife and children in West Baton Rouge in addition to
monitoring the whereabouts of his sons Louis and Philogene fighting under the American flag. Yet
on this morning he simply enjoyed the festivities and took time to reflect upon the importance of the
ceremony and what the recent Battle of New Orleans meant to him. For Pierre-Joseph and so
many Louisianans, this event at the Place d’ Armes marked the end of a battle that took much
longer then the engagement at Chalmette. For on this day, the state of Louisiana, much like the
girls lining the triumphal arch, stood alongside other American states as a received member of the
Union.
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The Battle of New Orleans still holds a secure place in America’s historical memory. Historians
continue to examine aspects of the battle ranging from military strategy to the social implications of
the American victory. The Battle of New Orleans, however, has also been the subject of folklore,
where actual facts often become blurred with myth. According to historian Carol Reardon, memory
often determines what one considers truth or history. Reardon contends that commonly held
values, traditions, hopes, and fears are all embedded in how and what people remember.2 What
one considers truth is influenced by societal mores and individual ideology. Americans filtered the
Battle of New Orleans through their own personal and national aspirations. In the context of the
War of 1812, the victory at Chalmette became synonymous with the success of the citizen-soldier.
Americans had long wrestled over the appropriate form of national defense that could provide vital
protection without threatening civil liberties. Throughout the Revolutionary War and the early
national period, however, militiamen proved an unreliable and inconsistent form of national
defense. In Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812, C. Edward Skeen finds the same militia inactivity
during the War of 1812. States initially failed to meet national quotas, while many militia units were
poorly organized and unfit for war.3 These shortcomings were easily forgotten after the Battle of
New Orleans. Soon victorious militiamen were revered in songs and poems. The “Hunters of
Kentucky,” a song by Samuel Woodward M. Ludlow, exemplifies the postwar image of the militia.
As the lyrics praised the noble efforts of Kentucky riflemen who defeated British professionals, it
also celebrated the virtues of the American citizen-soldier. For many Americans, the service of
farmers who left their homes to defend New Orleans reaffirmed their faith in republicanism.4
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“Hunters of Kentucky” also downplayed the dismal militia defeats that were commonplace during
the War of 1812. This symbolism attached to the Battle of New Orleans reflected early Americans’
faith in the militia over a standing army and the merits of republican virtue.
Another byproduct of the Battle of New Orleans, according to the work of John William Ward,
was the formation of a national exceptionalism. Borrowing ideas from colonial Puritanism,
Americans believed that they were God’s chosen people. Many looked at the victory at Chalmette
as divine intervention.5 According to congressman George McIntosh Troup, “The God of Battles
and of Righteousness took part with the defenders of their country, and the foes were scattered
bare before us as chaff before the wind.”6 Americans saw British defeat as an indication that God
ordained them with His protection and blessing. An integral element to this spiritual myth was
General Andrew Jackson, who many believed served as God’s earthly agent. Ward contends that
Jackson’s heroism in the War of 1812 caused Americans to equate him with God himself and
declare him the savior of Louisiana.7 This exalted image of Jackson largely conditioned his public
image and has often colored historical interpretations of him since. Indeed, historians continue to
cite Jackson’s transcendent character as the major reason behind the victory at Chalmette and the
main reason why Louisianans fought with him.
In 1816, Major A. Lacarriere Latour, a French engineer who accompanied Jackson on his Mobile
and New Orleans campaigns, published his memoir providing one of the first accounts of the
historic battle. Although his work is a valuable source in understanding the day to day operations
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within Jackson’s ranks, it at times inaccurately characterizes Louisianans’ wartime mobilization and
motivation. Latour insists that Jackson’s mere presence was the main reason Louisiana’s diverse
population fought, arguing that “love of country, the hatred of England … fire every heart; -but all
this would have availed nothing without the energy of the commander-in-chief:” Furthermore, he
argued that Jackson’s charisma and military expertise inspired confidence among Louisianans.8
Many historians continue to ape Latour’s conclusions. In The British at the Gates, Robin Reilly
contends that the prewar, chaotic state of New Orleans could only be remedied by Jackson’s
presence, claiming his “boundless energy, apparent confidence, and his ruthless removal of
obstacles” demanded respect and subordination of the disunited Louisiana populace.9 According
to Samuel Carter in Blaze of Glory, Jackson’s “authoritative presence, his bold assurance infected
the people with a spirit of self-confidence that they badly needed.” Carter goes on to argue that
Jackson seemed to have a mystical power to unite Louisianans, asserting that “the jealousies and
suspicions, the cantankerous disputes, began to wain before a common leader and a common
purpose.”10 These few examples of the historical literature demonstrate that Latour’s interpretation
left a lasting imprint on historical memory. Unfortunately, this memory and interpretation are highly
selective and leave many pieces of the story untold.
Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans on December 1, 1814 certainly catalyzed the mobilization
efforts already prompted by Louisiana Governor William C.C. Claiborne. Historians, however, have
treated this too simplistically. They depict Jackson riding into New Orleans and soothing the ethnic
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tensions and political disputes that had plagued Louisiana for years. This popular image overlooks
what really motivated Louisianans to fight and follow Jackson. To ignore this crucial aspect of
wartime mobilization is to neglect the history of the Orleans Territory marked by Louisianans’
ongoing struggle for incorporation and American acceptance.
The diverse ethnic composition of the territory rendered it foreign to many Americans outside of
Louisiana and engendered questions about its loyalty and attachment to the Union. Statehood in
1812 failed to dispel such doubts. As an invasion of New Orleans seemed imminent, Americans
continued to cast dubious glances at their newest countrymen. For Louisiana militiamen, their
obligation as citizen-soldiers went much further than the expectations placed on their neighbors in
Tennessee or New York: They became emblematic of the state as a whole. Their actions or
inactions appeared as indicators of the extent of all Louisianans’ allegiance. American
apprehensions regarding Louisianans’ loyalty made wartime mobilization and the Battle of New
Orleans a crucial event representing Louisianans’ final strategy of negotiation and a true
demonstration of their attachment.
As Pierre-Joseph and other Louisianans celebrated victory at the Place d’ Armes, Louisiana
representative Thomas B. Robertson stood before Congress to convey the impact the war’s final
engagement had on his constituents. He proudly professed that in the Battle of New Orleans
Louisianans displayed “a zeal, a patriotism … which command the applause of an admiring nation.”
In addition, he argued that Louisiana militiamen’s gallant efforts not only defeated British forces,
but dispelled suspicions “derogatory to the history of Louisiana.”11 After years of professing their
affection, resisting unfavorable policies, and cooperating with lawmakers, it was Louisianans’
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sacrifice on the battlefield that showed they were true Americans. From New Orleans to the floor
of Congress, Louisianans celebrated their victory at Chalmette and the end of their long-fought
battle for acceptance.
****
In February 1809, Julien Poydras rode on horseback from his home in Pointe Coupee, Louisiana
to Washington D.C. to take his seat in Congress. The long journey provided him ample time to
think about affairs at home, but more importantly his new government position. Poydras looked
forward to the opportunity to serve his fellow Louisianans and hoped that he could enhance his
constituents’ relationship with Washington lawmakers. He also made it his top priority to convince
fellow congressional members to approve Louisiana’s admission into the Union.12 Despite their
failed attempt in 1809, Louisianans reapplied for statehood in March 1810. Although the territory’s
population failed to meet the required 60,000 inhabitants needed for statehood, Louisianans
begged Congress to grant them special concessions as it did when it “erected in 1802, the territory
of Ohio into a State, long before it possessed the number of inhabitants required by the [1787
Northwest] Ordinance.”13 Due to a congressional recess, Poydras did not introduce Louisianans’
petition to the House until December 17, 1810. At this time he happily reported that since the
petition was submitted in March, the Orleans Territory had reached the 60,000 residents needed
for statehood.14 To Poydras, nothing ought to prevent Congress from admitting Louisiana into the
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Union. He soon found, however, that residency requirements were the last concern on lawmakers’
minds and many of them had yet to shake their initial perceptions of Louisianans. Representatives
continued to question if Louisianans had learned republican principles or fostered the needed
bonds of attachment to the United States.
These debates also revived many constitutional questions regarding statehood and the durability
of the infant nation. Massachusetts Representative Laban Wheaton strongly opposed granting
Louisianans statehood, believing that the Constitution prohibited the admission of a territory not
included “within the limits of the United States when the Constitution was established.”15 John
Quincy Adams continued to express fears regarding the detrimental effect Louisiana statehood
would have on the political and economic power of the old Northeastern states. As he did in the
Eighth Congress, Adams attempted to use the Constitution as a tool to block Louisiana’s
admission, claiming that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to admit new states into the
Union. Failure of congressional leaders to adhere to the confines of the country’s most sacred
document, Adams predicted, would be “a death-blow to the constitution.”16 Federalists continued
their crusade against Louisiana which they still viewed as the agent of their demise. In refutation,
Maryland Republican Robert Wright believed that Louisiana statehood did nothing to undermine
the Federal Constitution, arguing that Article IV, Section III allowed Congress to not only admit new
states, but also to make needed regulations for American territories. Wright considered statehood
as one such regulation. He also countered earlier arguments against extending the original
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borders of the United States, contending that the United States already exceeded its original
boundaries when it admitted Vermont into the Union.17
Beyond constitutional matters, congressional leaders seemed concerned whether Louisiana’s
diverse population had cultivated the political expertise needed to run a state government. Virginia
Representative Daniel Sheffey argued that Louisianans needed more time to ensure that they truly
understood the republican system, urging congressional members to “let them become
accustomed to our Government, before permitting those to govern themselves who had lately
emerged from despotism.”18 Others expressed apprehensions over whether Louisianans were
loyal and had formed the necessary bonds of attachment. To Tennessee Representative Pleasant
Miller, it seemed doubtful that Louisiana’s foreign population would ever sever ties to France. “I
was born in Virginia, sir, and I have not yet lost some of my Virginia feelings,” Miller admitted, “and
I cannot see why we should expect the people of Orleans to act and feel differently from other
people… they [inhabitants] will have some attachments.”19 Washington representatives such as
Miller continued to view Louisianans as adopted Frenchmen who had yet to undergo the proper
Americanization process. Yet several lawmakers came to Louisianans’ defense, arguing that the
conversation of attachment proved their readiness for statehood. North Carolinian Nathaniel
Macon scolded his fellow lawmakers for depriving Louisianans statehood, claiming that they had
“already served a sufficient apprenticeship to the United States.” Macon also contended that
Louisianans had shown their attachment in repelling a Spanish invasion in 1806, as well as by
remaining loyal during the Burr Conspiracy. These acts of affection, to Macon, proved that
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Louisianans “possessed certainly as strong an attachment to the nation as could be expected for
the time they had belonged to it.”20
The Louisiana statehood bill underwent several revisions in both the Senate and the House
before receiving final approval in February 1811. At this time, Congress passed the Enabling Act
which authorized Louisianans to select delegates to prepare a state constitution. In addition, the
act required Louisianans to include certain provisions in their new constitution such as making
English the official language in government and legal proceedings.21
The debates in the Eleventh Congress demonstrate that many congressional members felt that
Louisianans still needed more time to fulfill their apprenticeship to liberty. Yet Washington
lawmakers admitted Louisiana to the Union anyway. Why? What prompted these men to give
statehood to a population that many still deemed politically ignorant and culturally unattached?
Further examination reveals that American lawmakers granted Louisiana statehood not out of
willingness, but rather out of necessity.
The port of New Orleans had become one of the most prominent in North America. To secure
its advantages, American lawmakers needed to align Louisianans’ economic interests with those of
the United States. The territory’s close proximity to Spanish Texas and Florida also made it quite
vulnerable to foreign invasion. Concomitantly, the territory’s diverse population theoretically made
intrigues by European powers more likely. In the event of a war, the British could use Louisiana’s
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population to strike a destructive blow to the United States. Congressional leaders recognized
these important realities. Mississippi delegate George Poindexter saw Louisiana’s economic and
geographic position as vital to the well-being of the republic since New Orleans commanded “the
mouth of the Mississippi and Mobile River” and controlled the outlets of western commerce. Also
Poindexter looked to Louisiana as a needed buffer between the Spanish and the western states of
the Union such as Kentucky and Tennessee. To ensure that Louisianans protected both the
economic and domestic safety of the country, he believed that Orleans inhabitants needed
incentives and reciprocal bonds of attachment between them and their American brethren. These
bonds, he argued, would encourage “the deep interest of the people … and stimulate them to repel
at every hazard an attempt to disturb that intercourse.” In essence, Poindexter contended that
statehood would seal Louisianans’ loyalty and affection to the United States.22 Representative
John Rhea reiterated Poindexter’s assertions. He argued that the Orleans Territory’s proximity to
foreign territory, as well as the danger of a possible war with England, made it extremely
susceptible to invasion. To strengthen its ties and loyalty to the United States, Congress needed to
provide Louisianans with “all the rights of freemen and citizens, to the full extent of the term to
uphold and defend.” According to Rhea, these privileges were the only sure way to secure
Louisianans’ loyalty against foreign invasion. He avowed, “you will make them warriors indeed,
they will fight for themselves and for the United States if invaded, because they will then have
everything worth contending for, their grateful hearts with irresistible vigor will strengthen their arms
to wield the sword against the enemies of the United States.”23
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The Eleventh Congress seemed troubled over Louisiana statehood. Many harbored the same
apprehensions once expressed by their predecessors in the Eighth Congress, while others
believed statehood provided one more means to secure Louisianans’ loyalty and attachment.
Louisianans, therefore, received statehood not because lawmakers deemed them ready to be full
members of the Union or accepted them as countrymen, but out of necessity to keep them loyal
and ensure they remained attached to the United States.
Despite congressional reservations, Louisianans welcomed statehood. On November 4, 1811,
forty-five delegates met at Tremolet’s Coffee House in New Orleans to draft Louisiana’s state
constitution. Having returned from Washington, Poydras assumed the role as president of the
convention that included many ancient Creoles such as Noel Destrehan and Colonel Joseph
Bellechasse.24 Creole delegates wasted little time in speaking out against the Enabling Act.
Destrehan bewailed the provision that made English the official language of the Louisiana
government. He also deplored other aspects of the bill that he believed undermined Louisianans’
French identity. Despites his objections, in January 1812, the convention unanimously voted to
accept the new state constitution.25 To mark this occasion, Poydras spoke to the convention about
their landmark work. He compared Louisianans to a ship navigator who weathered adverse winds
and fatigue only to enter “the port which is the object of his wishes and the hope of his fortune.”26
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On March 3, 1812, Louisiana’s completed constitution made its way to Congress. Following a
close examination of the laws and provisions of the document, it was approved and President
James Madison signed the “Act for the admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union, and to
extend the laws of the United States to the said state” on April 8, 1812.27 After years of pledging
their attachment, cooperating with lawmakers, and employing political resistance, Louisianans’
strategies of negotiations earned them statehood. Louisianans had faced the adverse winds of the
territorial period; now they had safely arrived in port as American citizens. Yet underneath the
merriment and celebration, Louisianans realized that Americans still questioned their loyalty and
affection to the United States. They monitored the congressional debates regarding statehood and
understood that many still looked askance at Louisiana’s diverse population. Little did Louisianans
know that they would have another opportunity to show their attachment and once and for all dispel
such doubts.
****
Louisianans’ statehood fanfare came to a quick end on June 18, 1812, when Congress declared
war on Great Britain. As the Eleventh Congress prepared for war, it soon became evident that its
predecessors failed to provide an effective militia organization or the appropriations needed to fund
major military expeditions. In New York, 1,600 militiamen gathered to fight, but lacked any arms or
supplies for battle. Governors all over the country failed to meet militia quotas issued by Adjutant
General Thomas H. Cushing. Militiamen complained about serving under officers from other states
while other soldiers deserted before their term expired.28 Partisan affiliations also hindered militia
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participation. The Federalist governor of Massachusetts refused to muster his forces,
demonstrating his opposition to the Madison administration and the War of 1812.29
Governor Claiborne faced similar problems as Louisiana’s militia was ill-prepared to engage in a
full-scale war. He found not only a lack of military supplies, but also insubordination among many
of his constituents. In an address to the Louisiana state legislature, Claiborne reiterated Henry
Hopkins’ 1809 critique of the state militia, asserting that the “contrariety of language spoken by the
Citizens of Louisiana; the dispersed situation of settlements” both hindered wartime mobilization.30
These persistent problems created strong waves of resistance towards militia service. To
President Madison, Claiborne admitted that Louisiana’s heterogeneous population rendered the
city militia inefficient, as French descendants refused to fight for the United States. In June 1813,
the worried governor lamented the disorganized state of the city militia, which he described as in
“Great Derangement.”31
Governor Claiborne confronted the same challenges facing other state governors. For many
American lawmakers, however, these common problems carried a different connotation when
occurring in Louisiana. Louisianans’ failure to answer militia calls prompted many to question if
these new Americans were truly attached to the United States. These questions became even
more potent as many turned their attention to a possible invasion of New Orleans. As early as July
1813, Claiborne acknowledged that “Louisiana I fear is in greater danger than the Secretary of War
apprehends.”32 By the next year, Claiborne’s fears were vindicated as an invasion of New Orleans
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seemed imminent. As the southeastern Indian campaign came to a close, both American and
British officers turned their attention to New Orleans. General Andrew Jackson, on March 16,
1814, accepted his new appointment as Major General of the United States Army and immediately
set his sights on Louisiana. Claiborne had little good news to provide the general, admitting that
“there are many faithful Citizens, but I repeat there are others, on whose Attachment to the United
States I cannot confide.” Claiborne cited ethnic tensions and militia insubordination as the major
obstacles obstructing a strong Louisiana front. 33 Months later, James Monroe received intelligence
that revealed that “a British force consisting of twelve or fifteen thousand men would sail from
Ireland early in September for New Orleans and Mobile with the intention to take possession of the
city.”34 General Jackson soon reaffirmed Monroe’s warning, informing Governor Claiborne that a
detachment of a thousand Irishmen were heading for Louisiana in hopes of overthrowing the
American regime.35 Louisianans themselves also entertained notions of a possible invasion.
Pierre-Joseph Favrot cautioned his family that “News from Pensacola states that the English are
making big preparations to capture New Orleans …. It is said that the English want to take back
Louisiana and give it back to Spain, who intends to reoccupy her former possessions.”36 Such
reports and Claiborne’s inability to mobilize military forces made many Americans wonder if
Louisianans would defend their newest country or welcome a foreign invader.
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Questions of Louisianans’ loyalty not only lingered within the United States, but also among the
international community. European powers assumed that Louisianans’ attachment to the United
States rested on a precarious foundation. The Secretary of the Navy intercepted a detailed letter
outlining plans for the Spanish conquest of Louisiana. The letter from Colonel Louis DeClouet to
Spanish officials in Cuba stated that over two-thirds of the state’s population remained loyal to
Spain.37 The British also hoped to use unattached Louisianans to defeat American forces. British
Captain James Stirling saw New Orleans as the key to British domination of the Gulf Coast region,
but more importantly as the ideal place for an invasion because of its vulnerability. Stirling believed
that Louisiana’s distance from the rest of the United States and weak military forces provided the
British easy access to the port city. Moreover, he hoped Louisiana’s population would be a useful
asset since it was “made up chiefly of emigrants from all Nations unconnected by blood or long
fellowship with the other states of America.” He also believed that the precarious political situation
in Louisiana might induce Creoles to support any plan to separate Louisiana from the Union.38
Heeding Stirling's advice and hoping to exploit Louisianans’ perceived disloyalty, in August 1814,
English Col. Edward Nicholls issued a proclamation urging them to join him:
Natives of Louisiana! On you the first call is made to assist in liberation from a faithless,
imbecile government, on your paternal soil. Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians, and Britons,
whether settled or residing for a time in Louisiana, on you also I call to aid me in this just cause.
The American usurpation in this country must be abolished, and the lawful owners of the soil
put in possession… You will have no fear of litigious taxes imposed upon you for the purpose of
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carrying on an unnatural and unjust war; your property, your laws, the peace and tranquility of
your country will be guaranteed to you by men who will suffer no infringement on theirs.39
Nicholls encouraged Louisiana’s ethnic population to retaliate against the United States in order to
return their native soil to its original inhabitants. He also went so far as to attempt to enlist the support
of pirate Jean Lafitte. Nicholls hoped that Lafitte would help him convince Louisianans to join the British
cause in exchange for the rank of captain and land from the spoils of victory.40
Aware that there existed an international consensus questioning their loyalty, Louisianans themselves
took active measures to dispel such doubts and transcended mere rhetoric to show their attachment to
the United States. By the summer of 1814, a new spirit seemed to infect New Orleans and adjoining
parishes. Some historians argue that this was sparked by Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans in
December; however, as early as September Louisianans took a renewed interest in strengthening the
city’s defense and volunteering for military service. One group of concerned Louisianans assembled at
Tremoulet’s Coffee House on September 15, 1814, to form a committee to assist civil and military forces
throughout New Orleans. Edward Livingston was elected the chair of this newly-formed Committee of
Defense while Julien Poydras participated in the proceedings. After years of clashing over Louisianans’
incorporation process, these political adversaries put aside preexisting feuds to help Louisianans
safeguard New Orleans from danger. In a speech opening the meeting, Livingston argued that a
Committee of Defense was essential to ensure protection, but more importantly to show the English that
their assumptions about Louisianans’ disloyalty were grossly erroneous. Furthermore, Livingston
contended that Louisianans owed it “to ourselves to disavow such unfounded and calumnious
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insinuations, and by a prompt and cheerful offer of support, to show the rest of the United States that we
are not unworthy of a place among them.”
Livingston realized that this Committee of Defense provided an opportunity for Louisianans to show
their attachment through their diligent actions. In turn, committee members adopted several resolutions
that revealed that they felt the same. For instance, one resolution stated that “the good people of this
State are attached to the Government of the United States, and they will repel with indignation every
attempt to create disaffection.” The committee also agreed to build up city defenses and rally support
amongst the citizenry.41 Fulfilling its promise, the committee recruited wealthy citizens to donate money
to assist government efforts. Livingston himself gave $400, while many Creoles made generous
contributions to the fund.42 Just days later, the Committee of Defense circulated a public proclamation
to Louisianans that encouraged them to cooperate with government officials and to answer the call to
arms. Moreover, it urged Louisianans to remain steadfast in their affection to the United States, arguing
that “A just idea of the geographical situation of your country will convince you that your safety, and in a
greater degree your prosperity, depends on your being irrevocably and faithfully attached to an union
with the other states.”43 The nine-person Committee of Defense included many of Livingston’s former
Creole cohorts such as Noel Destrehan. In the face of danger and constant suspicion, even the most
fervent ancient stood up to help Louisianans show their attachment.
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Following the lead of the Committee of Defense, the New Orleans City Council also did its part to
prepare the city. On September 20, 1814, Mayor Nicholas Girod and members of the council sought to
set up a government defense committee for the express purpose of uniting civil and military leaders.44
Members of the Louisiana state legislature, including Pierre-Joseph Favrot, also contributed to wartime
mobilization by appropriating $17,000 to repair fortifications and provide needed ammunition. Besides
providing political support, Pierre-Joseph also felt compelled to use his military expertise to enhance
mobilization efforts. In a published memorandum, he suggested how Louisiana leaders could improve
Fort St. Phillip. He recommended that batteries with numerous militiamen and infantry be placed in front
of the fort as well as at the English Turn to prevent British access from the mouth of the Mississippi
River. He also suggested that Fort Bourbon receive six new 18-caliber cannons. By Pierre-Joseph’s
estimates these improvements would take under a week to implement and would ensure Louisianans’
safety.45 Louisianans’ copious mobilization efforts helped ease American apprehensions and prompted
Governor Claiborne to happily report that “a great change has taken place in the Public mind in this
Quarter, and a very Patriotic Spirit pervades the State.”46
As New Orleans’ citizens spurred mobilization efforts, the state’s military forces converged in New
Orleans. The Louisiana Drafted Militia under Alexander DeClouet was the first to assemble in
September 1814. The regiment consisted of men from various units from throughout the state. These
regiments were later dispersed throughout Jackson’s forces. The 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th regiments of the
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Louisiana Drafted Militia also assembled and were stationed at Magazine Barracks.47 Louis Favrot, now
a major in the 8th regiment, was among these troops. Statewide cavalry units also reported for duty
between September and November 1814. On September 29, Captain Jedediah Smith’s Feliciana Troop
of Horse began patrolling the riverbanks near St. Francisville preparing for a possible slave insurrection
or a surprise British attack. In October, Captain Joseph Dubuclet’s Volunteer Troops of Hussars of the
Teche-Attakapas joined forces with Captain Thomas Beale’s Company of New Orleans Riflemen which
consisted of sixty-eight men of prominent families. As these militia and cavalry units gathered in New
Orleans, specialized volunteer companies united with their statesmen to help defend New Orleans.
By November 1814, the Uniformed Battalion of Orleans Volunteers assembled in New Orleans. This
unit included five companies that existed under the French and Spanish colonial regimes. Serving as
the senior company, the Carabiniers consisted of 114 French businessmen from New Orleans. The
Francs, led by Captain Jean Hundry, consisted of artillerymen whose ancestors fought in the French
colonial militia. Captain Henri St. Geme’s company of “Dragons D’Orleans” numbered ninety-nine
Frenchmen, while the company of Chasseurs totaled to eighty-two. The final company of this elite
fighting force was the Louisiana Blues, a unit made up of Irishmen from the city.48 The Uniformed
Battalion of Orleans Volunteers represented the rich ethnic composition of Louisiana’s population and
the long ties they had with their colonial past. Yet these ancient Creoles joined New Orleans’ militiamen
to repel a British invasion and gain national acceptance.
Like their white counterparts, libres also mobilized their own battalions. For years the Free Color
Battalion existed only in name, as black militiamen were ignored by Louisiana legislators. Despite this
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neglect, Governor Claiborne continued his efforts to make a free black battalion a recognized militia unit.
Using libres’ participation in the 1811 slave rebellion as well as the impending war with Great Britain,
Claiborne pleaded with state legislators to activate the Free Color Battalion as a vital military necessity.
In January 1812, state legislators began deliberations on a comprehensive militia bill. In August, House
members debated the section of the bill regarding the free black militia and within a day approved the
measure to allow the governor to enlist certain libres. Louisiana lawmakers included several stipulations
including one limiting the battalion to only four companies. Those libres eligible for service were
required to meet the same property requirements as their white counterparts.49 “An Act to Authorize the
Governor to Enroll Certain Free People of Color” passed through both the House and Senate. On
September 7, 1812, Governor Claiborne signed the bill into law creating the Battalion of the Free Men of
Color. For over nine years free blacks fought for the same military privileges enjoyed by their fathers.
Four companies of the “chosen men of color” carried on their colonial legacy to fight for their country
when it needed them most.
Since 1804, Michel Fortier had commanded the free black battalion. In 1812, he resumed these
duties, heading the 1st Battalion of the Free Men of Color. Major Pierre Lacoste was given command of
several companies under Fortier.50 As libres mobilized for service, General Andrew Jackson sent a
public proclamation to New Orleans addressed to Louisiana’s free people of color. Jackson’s speech
referred to these chosen men as Americans and told them that “your country looks with confidence to
her adopted children for a valorous support, as a faithful return for the advantages enjoyed under her
mild and equitable government.” He went on to promise libres the same benefits given to white soldiers
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in the service of the United States Army, which included equal pay as well as 160 acres of land.51
Jackson’s proclamation was largely a response to Claiborne’s fear that free blacks might be enticed by
the enemy. His concerns were not unwarranted since British Captain James Sterling advocated arming
Louisiana’s free black and slave populations to assist British forces. 52 Free black Louisianans faced
many suspicions regarding their attachment as many feared foreign intrigues might sway their loyalty.
Like their white counterparts, Louisiana’s free people of color looked to the War of 1812 as an
opportunity to bolster their claims for citizenship and gain acceptance in the United States.
With the immense outpouring of libre enlistments, legislators were forced to create a second free
black battalion under the command of Major Louis D’Aqurin in October 1814.53 Prominent
members of Louisiana’s free black community exploited their new opportunity for service. Luis
Simon, Pierre Bailly and his son, Vincent and Maurice Populus, and Charles Poree all enlisted in
Fortier’s battalion. These same men, nearly eight years before, crafted and signed the “Address
from the Free People of Color” begging Claiborne for military service. Pillars of the libre
community, these free black crusaders took their leadership skills to the battlefield. Luis Simon
and Vincent Populus both served as captains in Fortier’s battalion, while Noel Carrier Jr. and
Maurice Populus were commissioned as first lieutenants.54 For years, the old and new generation
of chosen men of color combated Americans’ racist ideology to preserve the rights enjoyed by their
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colonial predecessors. The War of 1812 supplied them another vital means to show their merit as
American citizens.
As Claiborne watched Creole, American, and libre soldiers mobilize for service he felt assured that
state forces were becoming stronger and better prepared.55 In a few short months, civic and military
organizations ensured that New Orleans was prepared for a British attack. Certainly this rapid
mobilization came out of fear of British occupation of the city. Constant questions regarding their
loyalty, however, also motivated Louisianans. For nearly twelve years, Louisianans engaged in a
constant struggle to prove their attachment to the United States. Even statehood failed to secure the
trust and acceptance of fellow Americans. A possible invasion of New Orleans, therefore, provided yet
another opportunity for Louisianans to show their allegiance. Clearly, the members of the Committee of
Defense realized this, justifying their very existence under the banner of attachment and affection for the
United States. More importantly, troops from various backgrounds consolidated their forces in New
Orleans weeks prior to Jackson’s descent on New Orleans.
Upon his arrival in December 1814, General Jackson himself acknowledged and applauded
Louisianans’ profuse efforts. In a series of public proclamations, Jackson assured militiamen and
Louisianans that their enthusiasm and affection would continue to alleviate any doubts of their loyalty.
Moreover, he encouraged Louisiana soldiers to “continue with the energy you have begun,” thus
promising “victory over the insolent enemy who insulted you by an affected doubt of your attachment to
the Constitution of your country.”56 Jackson’s praise of Louisianans countered affirmations made by
Latour and historians such as Reiley and Carter who believed that Louisianans united to fight only after
Jackson had infused the city with his spirit, expertise, and charisma.
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By December 1814, other state units began to arrive daily to help defend the crucial port city. The
Mississippi Territory’s Troop of Horse, General John Coffee’s Tennessee Brigade, and William Carroll’s
division from Nashville joined Jackson on December 22.57 Later that evening a British detachment
reached the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue and by 1:30 the next afternoon advanced closer to the city. A
small skirmish occurred later that evening as Beale’s New Orleans Riflemen penetrated the center of
the British line. Displaying their bravery and skills, Louisiana riflemen killed several British troops and
took several others prisoner. The next two weeks saw only minor exchanges of fire, as both British and
American officers aligned their forces for one last major engagement. On January 4, the Kentucky
militia arrived with 2,230 men ready for what would be the last battle in the New Orleans campaign and
the War of 1812.
A few days prior to the famous Battle of New Orleans, Jackson selected his main line of defense
(Line Jackson) just five miles below New Orleans located between the Rodriguez and Chalmette
plantations.58 On Line Jackson, Louisiana militia and volunteer units were combined with units from
both Tennessee and Kentucky. On the extreme right of Line Jackson stood Captain Beale’s Riflemen
right next to Major Plauche’s Uniformed Battalion of Orleans Volunteers. Located further left was Major
Lacoste’s Battalion of Free Men of Color. 59 Along the main line, artillery was distributed throughout
eight individual batteries. Major D’Aquin’s Battalion of Free Men of Color stood between batteries four
and five. According to Latour’s memoir, the rest of Line Jackson (nearly two-thirds) consisted of
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Tennessee militiamen under the command of Generals Carroll and Coffee.60 Located about 4000 yards
behind Line Jackson were several other Louisiana units including Colonel Robert Young’s Tenth
Regiment, Captain Griffith’s Feliciana Mounted Riflemen, and Smith’s Troop of Horse. These men
stood as a protective wall defending Line Jackson from behind.61
The morning of January 8, 1815, began with a rocket flare signaling the start of British advancement
towards Line Jackson. The bulwark of British troops advanced in columns of sixty men towards Battery
seven. Eyewitness accounts recall the relentless fire coming from Line Jackson.62 As the columns of
British soldiers faltered and were replenished by new troops, the American bombardment of artillery fire
continued. Louisiana units did their part to repel the British advancement. Beale’s Orleans Riflemen
fought off British penetration on the right flank ensuring the durability of Line Jackson.63 When firing
ceased at Chalmette, initial counts estimated 3,000 British killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, while
American casualties numbered no more than thirteen.64
As American soldiers on the left bank of the Mississippi River reveled in their stunning victory,
General David Morgan and his forces suffered America’s one defeat of the New Orleans campaign.
Situated on the opposite side of the Mississippi River, General Morgan’s forces included portions of the
1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th Louisiana regiments, 500 Kentucky militiamen, and troops from the Louisiana
conscripted militia. Morgan’s main line of defense was located about 1,300 hundred yards downstream
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from Line Jackson.65 Here advancing British forces received the same bombardment as their
countrymen on the left bank. Enemy troops, however, successfully broke American defenses through
an unguarded gap between Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen. Kentucky troops withdrew with no way
to regain their position. The retreat rendered Morgan’s other forces ineffective.66 Despite this loss,
British officers sent General Jackson a flag of truce—ending the fight for the Crescent City.
****
As the smoke cleared at Chalmette, Americans rushed to assess the importance and magnitude of
the Battle of New Orleans. Major John Reid, an aide-de-camp to General Andrew Jackson, provided a
friend with the intricate details of the engagement. He explained that British forces drastically
outnumbered American troops. Besides being outnumbered, he argued, that American troops were
inferior in discipline, supplies, and experience. Through a combination of gallant vigor and Jackson’s
military genius, Reid believed that American forces overcame their many inadequacies. What he
witnessed at the Battle of New Orleans made him believe that “this army will have accomplished more
than any other army ever did in the same time, under the same circumstance.”67 Louisiana planter
Duke Summer also expressed amazement over the events of January 8, 1815. He shared many of
Reid’s assumptions regarding the inferior state of Jackson’s forces, arguing that “we have no instance
since the invention of gunpowder of so great a disproportion as that which took place on the 8th.”68
Outnumbered, undersupplied, and inexperienced, American citizen-soldiers defeated British
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professionals as a nation watched with pride and astonishment. For Louisianans, however, the Battle of
New Orleans meant much more.
Louisianans’ participation in the Battle of New Orleans earned them the title of American heroes
along with a new acceptance in the United States. In the months following this historic battle,
Louisiana itself was equated with the efforts of its militiamen. Just days after the battle, Governor
Claiborne wrote to President Madison emphatically expressing that “I glory in the opportunity which
has afforded the people of Louisiana to prove that altho’ the Youngest of the great American
Family, they are not the least in valour and Patriotism.”69 He, more than anyone, understood the
battle’s significance for his constituents. Several weeks later he printed a broadside thanking
Louisianans for their gallantry and loyalty. He also indicated that their efforts earned the gratitude
and acceptance of their countrymen who long doubted them. He hoped that the Battle of New
Orleans would show the rest of the country that “Louisiana has been faithful to the union and
faithful to itself.”70
Andrew Jackson himself expressed praise and admiration for Louisianans. In a letter to Mayor Girod,
Jackson thanked Louisianans for their “unanimity and patriotic zeal” as well as their “love of order, and
attachment to the principles of our excellent constitution. “ He went on to applaud the efforts of the City
Council and the Committee of Defense, as well as New Orleans’ “softer sex” who encouraged husbands
to fight and took care of the city in their absence. Jackson’s comments display the appreciation of a
general who saw Louisianans’ efforts as more than an attempt to defeat a stronger foe, but a means for
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them to strengthen their bonds of affection. He concluded his letter professing that “Seldom in any
community, has so much cause been given to deserve praise.”71
Free black soldiers also received accolades. The Baltimore Niles’ Weekly Register highlighted the
sacrifice of black militiamen, claiming that those “killed and wounded on our part were chiefly of the New
Orleans colored regiment who were so anxious for glory that they could not be prevented from
advancing our breastworks and exposing themselves.”72 Although overlooked by Washington and
Louisiana lawmakers for so long, the Battle of New Orleans gave libres the military recognition they long
desired. Furthermore, it placed them, if only for a moment, on the same footing as other Americans who
fought for their country.
In February 1815, Congress also took time to acknowledge Louisianans’ courage and patriotism with
a series of resolutions commending their brave efforts which “deserve well of the whole people of the
United States.”73 No other state received such attention in Congress, reflecting lawmakers’ surprise
and admiration for Louisianans’ display of honor. To Louisiana Senator James Brown, the Battle of New
Orleans alleviated any doubts concerning Louisianans’, arguing that:
Their conduct on the late trying emergency has been such, as not only to fulfill the predictions
of their friends, and efface the unfavorable prejudices of those who until now were strangers to
their true character… The ties of interest and of affection, which have long attached the
Western States to Louisiana, have now become indissoluble. The purple stream of their best
blood has united and mingled in the same channel, and has at once cemented their union and
that of their country.”74
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Kentucky Representative Solomon Sharp embraced Louisiana as the newest and most patriotic
member of the Union, asking whether “there be an American, whose bosom does not beat high with joy
to call Louisiana a legitimate daughter of the Union, and hail her citizens as brothers?”75
In his memoirs, published in 1816, Latour also realized the great accolades the battle secured for
Louisianans. He lamented the days of the Orleans Territory when “they [Louisianans] were considered,
for a long time, suspicious members of the American family, and as persons who could not be relied
upon.” He contended that “it was not by words that those meritorious citizens vindicated their character;
but by the best proofs of devotion to their country, by defending it faithfully, and by valiantly repelling the
invading enemy.”76 Despite turbulent years with America lawmakers, the Battle of New Orleans
solidified Louisiana’s place as an American state.
As Americans celebrated British defeat, Louisianans quickly began constructing their own
interpretation of the battle’s profound impact. Events in the Place d’ Armes on January 23, 1815 were
filled with symbolism as Louisianans looked forward to being accepted members of the Union. Even the
most resolute Creoles felt the elation that came with victory and acceptance. Just a week after the
Battle of New Orleans, Josephine Favrot sat down to compose a tribute to the soldiers who fought at
Chalmette. She thanked the “invincible Tennesseans” as well as the “illustrious and magnanimous
Jackson.” She boasted that Louisianans’ courage, American patriotism, and French intrepidity proved
the winning combination over the British. Furthermore, Josephine’s tribute demonstrated her own
acceptance of the United States. “Intrepid warriors! In order to defend our country, you sacrificed
without hesitation … how flattering it is for us to call you our countrymen,” she proudly wrote.77 Her
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references to “our country” and “our countrymen” illustrate that she no longer felt like a Frenchwoman in
a strange country, but rather an American enjoying her country’s victory and success. She accepted
her place in the republic and celebrated her new American family. Her mother displayed a similar
transformation, telling her son Louis “May God protect our cause.” Even she saw the American cause
as her cause.78
Year after year, Louisianans continued to celebrate the historic battle. On December 23, 1816, the
Louisiana Gazette reminded its readers of the 1814 night battle, claiming that “It was on this day that the
people of Louisiana first showed their northern and western brethren that they were willing to seal their
blood and the compact that had already indissolubly bound them to the great American republic.”79 On
January 10, 1817, a similar announcement reminded readers of the two-year anniversary of the “Eighth
of January”.80 In 1848, one of Louisiana’s leading citizens, Bernard Marigny, published his Reflections
of the Campaign of General Andrew Jackson, in Louisiana in 1814 and ’15. His Reflections sought to
defend Louisianans who had long been subject to questions regarding their loyalty. He argued that “it
would be impossible for our detractors to cite a single Louisianan, a single Creole, a single naturalized
Frenchmen, who in the moment of danger, abandoned the country or refused to fight.” He went on to
discuss the Committee of Defense that helped to secure money and supplies for the war effort. 81 At
the heart of his pamphlet, Marigny redressed three accusations mounted against Louisianans prior to
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the war by the American press. One American newspaper had reported that the Louisiana legislature
wished to give up the country to the English by capitulation. To this, Marigny replied that its efforts to
fortify the city, procure weapons, recruit soldiers, and assist General Jackson illustrated the blatant
falsehood of such a statement. He also bewailed Americans who had once looked suspiciously at
Louisiana’s diverse population. He simply asked his fellow Americans why all efforts to locate and
implicate Louisiana traitors rendered nothing. Finally, Marigny addressed the long-held assumption that
Frenchmen refused to fight in the Battle of New Orleans. To refute such claims he calculated the
location and participation of several Creole units and found that five were led by French captains. He
also estimated that at least ten or twelve French and Creole soldiers served as cannon operators while
the majority of Line Jackson consisted of ancient Creoles. Ultimately, he concluded that Creoles
“covered themselves with glory and deserve American reverence.”82
Marigny’s Reflections demonstrate how even decades after the Battle of New Orleans, Louisianans
continued to assess the importance of their sacrifices and how the battle allowed them to finally show
their loyalty and attachment. Even today the Battle of New Orleans still holds great significance for
Louisianans. On a tour of Chalmette, young guides inform their audiences that the historic site is much
more than a battlefield: It is the place where Louisianans became Americans.
****
Heading to Café Du Monde to enjoy the splendors of powdered beignets and chicory coffee, tourists
today pass by Jackson Square, discernible by the towering statue of General Andrew Jackson. Most
people walk by only giving a brief glance to the effigy of the American icon who made his career just five
miles below New Orleans. Just as his monument hovers above the Crescent City, so does the memory
of his victory at the Battle of New Orleans. In both myth and history Jackson has been heralded as the
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“savior of Louisiana.” Following the battle Americans referred to him as “God’s earthly agent,” while
historians further reinforce this image in their works on the famous battle.
Although this image of Jackson the hero makes for great stories and biographies, it overlooks
what motivated Louisianans to fight. It fails to address why Edward Livingston, after years of
resisting and stalling Americanization efforts, put aside his hatred for the Claiborne administration
to help his arch rival prepare New Orleans for a British invasion. Or why Livingston joined forces
with Poydras after years of taking such divergent paths. It fails to explain why Pierre-Joseph
Favrot worked alongside other members of the Legislative Council to procure money and supplies
for Louisiana’s military. It fails to clarify why Louis Favrot fought against British forces at Magazine
Battery, while his brother Philogene reinforced troops in Mobile. It fails to elucidate why Noel
Carrier Jr. and other chosen men of color, despite being overlooked and demoted to second-class
citizens, risked their lives to defend Louisianans who often looked at them with disdain and
contempt.
As historians continue to examine aspects of the Battle of New Orleans from the activities of
militiamen to the rise of Andrew Jackson, they must not neglect the history of the Orleans Territory
and Louisianans’ battle for acceptance. The Battle of New Orleans served as a culmination of
Louisianans’ negotiations with American lawmakers. For years they employed strategies such as
resistance, cooperation, and the conversation of attachment to earn a place in the Union on their
own terms. Despite all their tactics, Louisianans’ sacrifice on the field of battle allowed them to
transcend mere rhetoric and actively demonstrate their attachment to the United States. From that
day forward it mattered little if Louisianans spoke French, practiced civil law, or even celebrated
Mardi Gras, because they were American enough when it truly mattered. They fought for their
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country when it needed them most. The Battle of New Orleans gained Louisianans the admiration
of a nation that applauded and honored them as brother and Americans.
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Epilogue: “America’s most European City”: Louisiana’s Franco-American Culture
In March 2007, I packed my bags for a big research trip. Having only a vague idea about my
dissertation topic, I looked forward to finding some lead or inspiration in the New Orleans archives.
As I arrived at my gate at the Atlanta airport to catch my connection to the Crescent City, I learned
that I had been bumped from my flight. Frustrated, I sat at the gate along with seven other
stranded passengers. As we waited for Delta to book new flights, I began making small talk with
my fellow travelers. I soon learned that my new companions were a group of school teachers from
Lafourche Parish, Louisiana, headed home from a conference in Atlanta. One of them asked me
why I was going to New Orleans. After explaining that I was headed there for research, her
husband quickly interrupted, asking me, “What are you studying?” Perplexed, I tried to explain that
I had always been interested in exploring Louisianans’ experiences following the Louisiana
Purchase. I also divulged that I was interested in discovering if and how the existence of a FrancoAmerican culture influenced the Orleans Territory. As I tried to clarify what I meant by a FrancoAmerican culture, one of the teachers stopped me mid-sentence and said “my grandmother
refuses to speak English.” From there she explained that she was a first-generation English
speaker in her family. Much to her grandmother’s dismay, she was not bilingual in both French
and English. One of the other teachers also admitted that her parents and grandparents belonged
to several organizations fighting to keep street signs and government ordinances in French. As I
listened, it hit me—there was a Franco-American culture in the Orleans Territory and it still existed
in the state of Louisiana. When I was bumped from my flight in Atlanta that day, I was angry to
have lost a valuable day of research. What I failed to realize, however, was that by sitting in that
airport with seven Louisiana school teachers I had found the lead and inspiration I was looking for.
I had found my topic!
239

****
In writing a project about the incorporation of Lower Louisiana, one must first understand what it
meant to be incorporated. American lawmakers hoped to integrate Louisianans into the social,
political, and cultural infrastructure of the Union. To achieve this goal, congressional members put
substantial demands on their newest inhabitants. They required Louisianans to accept
Americanization programs that promised to give them knowledge of republican principles and
foster a strong cultural attachment to the Union. To American lawmakers, until Louisianans fulfilled
all of these crucial requirements the incorporation process was incomplete. For Louisianans,
however, incorporation rested more on their political integration and assimilation as they learned
and participated in the republican government. In essence, Louisianans were ready to be an
integral part of the American political apparatus. To them, their cultural ties to their colonial
heritage in no way affected their ability to be good American citizens. These varying interpretations
of the incorporation process conditioned the turbulent territorial period that followed the Louisiana
Purchase.
Historians today have almost as much trouble determining when Lower Louisiana’s incorporation
ended as American leaders and Louisianans did in defining what it meant. Many historians
designate statehood, in 1812, as the conclusion of Louisianans’ incorporation since they were
brought into the Union on an equal footing with other American states. Other historians contend
that Louisianans were incorporated only after 1820 as they fully engaged in national politics.
Immediately following the Louisiana Purchase, Louisianans remained largely focused on local and
regional issues. Yet with the admission of the state of Missouri into the Union, Louisiana
lawmakers, as one historian noted “exchanged regionalism for sectionalism.” Louisianans aligned
themselves with other Southerners to ensure the addition of a new slave state. Louisianans’
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participation in national politics allowed them to foster a Southern identity that made them a
fundamental part of the slaveholding South.1 Although these historians provide cogent arguments,
their disagreements regarding Louisianans’ incorporation process reveal almost as much as their
conclusions. Much like American lawmakers and territorial Louisianans, historians have their own
views of incorporation and when and how Louisianans completed this process.
I tend to judge Louisianans’ incorporation the same way American lawmakers did in 1803. They
wanted Louisianans to be politically and culturally integrated into the Union no matter how much
they protested. In my view, Louisianans never achieved the degree of cultural incorporation that
American lawmakers initially desired. Louisiana did come into the Union as an American state in
1812 and became politically amalgamated by the second decade of the nineteenth century.
Louisianans, however, dictated the degree of their cultural attachment to the United States—
incorporating on their own terms. The fact that today many refer to New Orleans as “America’s
most European city” reveals that there is a unique blend of cultural forces present in Louisiana.2 A
brief stroll through the streets of New Orleans only reinforces this reality as one immediately
encounters the juxtaposition of French and American culture. Jackson Square, one of New
Orleans’ biggest tourist attractions, is located on what used to be the Place d’ Armes that served as
the center of the city where people congregated, celebrated major events, and mustered for
military service. It was also where Noel Carrier Sr. watched the transfer of Lower Louisiana to the
United States. The statue of Andrew Jackson, placed in the center of the square, complements but
in no way overpowers the towering figure of St. Louis Cathedral. The historic church sits on the
site where Louisianans had practiced Catholicism since 1727. It was also in this religious
1
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sanctuary that many territorial inhabitants such as the Favrots received sacraments and adhered to
Catholic doctrine. In Jackson Square alone, tourists encounter the relics of Louisianans’ French
and Americans past.
As the city of New Orleans illustrates Louisianans’ strong French and American ties, Louisianans
themselves support this Franco-American culture. My conversation with the Louisiana school
teachers demonstrates that many Louisianans continue to preserve their ancestors’ colonial
heritage. Today, many Louisianans choose to speak French rather than English. They even resort
to political activism through different organizations to protect the French language in their
communities. More than 200 years after the Louisiana Purchase, their efforts resemble the
strategies of negotiation that territorial Louisianans employed to safeguard their native tongue and
legal systems. These modern-day Francophones certainly prove the success early Louisianans
had in preserving their French culture.
Today Americans celebrate Louisiana’s Franco-American culture. From eating powdered
beignets to catching beads at Mardi Gras, Americans enjoy Louisiana’s many special features.
Moreover, Americans today seem unconcerned by the fact that Louisiana remains the only state in
the Union that practices civil law in addition to having many residents unwilling to speak English.
Today these are just pleasant anomalies that give Louisiana a unique flair and appeal. Yet for
American lawmakers in the nineteenth century, these aberrations engendered apprehension and
anxiety. To them, Louisianans’ preference for civil law and the French language indicated that their
newest inhabitants refused to make the cultural attachments that lawmakers deemed essential and
necessary. So what has changed? What allows Americans today to celebrate Louisiana’s French
heritage when their predecessors agonized over it? The answer rests largely in the Battle of New
Orleans.
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The Battle of New Orleans proved a watershed event in Louisiana history. After years of
negotiation and conflict with American lawmakers, the historic battle earned Louisianans
acceptance. Louisianans’ efforts on the battlefield alleviated doubts regarding their loyalty and
attachment to the United States. From that point on, Americans had a much different perception of
their Louisiana countrymen. No longer did Americans question Louisianans’ allegiance or worry
that they would turn to a foreign power. Louisianans’ willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect
the United States gained Washington lawmakers’ trust and made Louisianans true Americans.
This new-found approval did more than just pacify American doubts regarding Louisianans. It
allowed American lawmakers to acquiesce to Louisianans’ colonial past and their Franco-American
culture. The Battle of New Orleans, ultimately, replaced doubt with acceptance and allowed
Americans to enjoy Louisiana’s unique character and particularities.
****
As the Battle of New Orleans gained Louisianans acceptance as Americans, it served as a
pivotal moment for the characters that comprise this study. The main historical actors featured in
this project followed different paths after January 8, 1815, but all of their lives were profoundly
shaped by the battle at Chalmette. For Edward Livingston, the Battle of New Orleans rejuvenated
his career. When he served as the chairman of the Committee of Defense, Livingston once again
gained the confidence of Louisianans. In December 1814, he was appointed General Jackson’s
aide-de-camp which supplied him a chance to defend New Orleans and his country. His wartime
activities allowed him to revive his political career. In 1820, he was elected to the Louisiana House
of Representatives. By 1822, he made his way to Washington to serve in the House of
Representatives and later the Senate. After twenty years of rebuilding his reputation, Livingston
returned to Washington, not as a political resister, but as a friend of the American government.
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Livingston’s participation in the Battle of New Orleans soon gained him more political prestige.
While serving as Jackson’s aide-de-camp, Livingston fostered a close friendship with Old Hickory
that continued after Jackson’s departure from New Orleans. In 1831, Jackson appointed his
longtime friend as his Secretary of State. Just two years later, Livingston became the American
Minister to France, a position once occupied by his older brother Robert. By 1835, Edward
Livingston retired to his home in New York having restored his reputation and fulfilled his own
personal political ambitions. The Battle of New Orleans provided the one-time political pariah the
opportunity to polish his tarnished image as well as salvage his career.3
Much like Livingston, Julien Poydras found that the Battle of New Orleans satisfied his political
aspirations. A well-respected leader during the territorial period, Poydras continued his successful
career in the postwar years. From 1819 to 1821, he served in the Louisiana state Senate. During
this time Poydras continued to work towards the proliferation of public schools in Louisiana, serving
on the Orleans University Board of Regents until his death in 1824. Beyond his political
contributions, Poydras left an impressive philanthropic legacy. His generous financial support
allowed the Poydras School for Women to remain open until the Civil War. Also his compassion
for Louisiana’s poor and sick led to the establishment of both the Poydras Asylum and Poydras
Home which cared for destitute women and children. The Poydras Home, located in New Orleans,
remains open today. For Poydras, the Battle of New Orleans rewarded his years of political toil to
bring Louisiana into the Union.4
As public figures found the Battle of New Orleans an advantageous event, the Favrot family
used the battle at Chalmette to begin a new family legacy in politics. Following the Battle of New
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Orleans, Louis Favrot retired as a major in the Louisiana militia. No sooner had he arrived home
than Governor Claiborne appointed him tax collector of West Baton Rouge.5 Philogene also
remained in the military for only a short time before he turned his attention to politics. In March
1816, he informed his sister that “since a rumor about my talents has spread around, there is
already talk of my being given the important position of Syndic with the hope of obtaining the
position of Justice of the Peace before long. How important it sounds!”6 Several years later he
became a judge in West Baton Rouge where he remained until he was killed in a duel in 1822.
Louis assumed his brother’s vacant bench after this tragic event. Before his death in 1824, PierreJoseph watched his sons capitalize on their wartime experiences to become American statesmen.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Favrot men contributed to the family’s bourgeoning military
and political legacy. Henri Favrot, Louis and Philogene’s younger brother, received distinction for
his service in the Mexican War. Later, Louis’ son Henry was elected to the Louisiana Legislature
and fought in the American Civil War. In 1898, Louis’s grandson, Henry Louis Favrot, would fight
in the Spanish-American War and go on to be a Louisiana senator. The Battle of New Orleans
propelled the one-time Creole family to the forefront of American politics and fostered a legacy of
public and military service that Favrot descendants have carried on to the present day.7
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The Battle of New Orleans had a positive impact on many of the characters discussed in this
study by providing opportunities for political advancement. For Louisiana’s free people of color, the
battle marked the zenith of their efforts to secure their colonial rights. Prior to the battle, free
blacks finally received the military recognition they long desired and fought alongside American
troops to defend their country. Free blacks, however, were forced back into subordinate positions
as wartime necessities diminished and Americans’ racist ideology intensified. Two months after
the Battle of New Orleans, the Battalion of Free People of Color was placed back under the state of
Louisiana’s jurisdiction. For several years, there was little discussion regarding the fate of the
battalion as its leaders continued to hold regular musters and drills. Larger sectional tensions,
however, put the Battalion of Free People of Color in serious jeopardy. By 1820, the Missouri
Compromise forced the issue of slavery to the center of national politics. As Northern and
Southern politicians wrestled to maintain the crucial congressional balance, they were also
confronted with serious questions regarding the fate of the institution of slavery. Concomitantly,
the mushrooming abolitionist movement posed new threats to the South’s “peculiar institution.”
Ardent abolitionist tracts such as David Walkers’ Appeal, which encouraged slaves to “take their
freedom” by killing their masters, planted the seed of paranoia among Southerners.
In this litigious atmosphere, white Louisianans began to look suspiciously at their free black
neighbors, afraid they might incite slave unrest. In March 1829, Creoles’ fears were only
vindicated when a small slave insurrection broke out forty miles from New Orleans.8 As white
Louisianans, like so many Southerners, solidified their commitment to slavery and white
supremacy, the Battalion of Free People of Color seemed incompatible with their strong racist

8
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ideology. As a result, in April 1829, the Louisiana Legislature passed several acts to redefine the
status of libres. One provision of the new law sought to control and limit the free black population
by prohibiting free people of color from entering the state after 1830. These new laws aimed to
systematically reduce the number of libres and thus the threat they posed to Louisianans’ strict
racial hierarchy.
In 1834, state legislators mounted their final assault on free blacks in a new bill that stipulated
that the state’s militia be composed solely of “white” citizens. This new legislation repealed the
1812 bill that erected the Battalion of Free Men of Color.9 As the country polarized over the issue
of slavery, free black units were disbanded and libres were once again demoted to second-class
citizens.10 Noel Carrier Jr. never confronted the anguish of being stripped of his military privileges,
dying just one year after the passage of the 1834 bill. Yet his life after the Battle of New Orleans
reveals that despite marginalization, free blacks continued to thrive in the commercial sector.
Carrier continued his cooper business which remained steady as more Americans moved into the
bustling port city. Moreover, he used his profits to amass a small fortune. Upon his death, Noel
Carrier Jr. left nearly five city lots, several slaves, and a large sum of money to his beneficiaries.11
Although the Battle of New Orleans failed to render Carrier the same advantages as his white
counterparts, it did momentarily allow him to fulfill his longtime hopes of following in the footsteps of
his father and other chosen men of color.

9

Ibid., 103-104.

10 Ibid., 108-109. Despite the new militia law, several free black soldiers from the Battle of New Orleans received
pensions. Alexis Andry, who lost his eye from a wartime injury, was awarded a pension not long after the battle.
Vincent Populus, Jean Baptiste Hardy, and the widow of Luis Simon would later be awarded pensions by the Federal
government.
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For the individuals featured in this project, the Battle of New Orleans was truly a pivotal event in
their lives. For some it imparted new opportunities for social advancement. For free blacks it
marked the beginning of the end of the Battalion of Free Men of Color and dimmed libre hopes to
live as free men in the United States. Despite the various paths these individuals took in the
postwar years, the Battle of New Orleans earned them acceptance and allowed them to shape the
incorporation process.
****
On my most recent trip to New Orleans, I could not help but be reminded of my characters
everywhere I went. As I walked down Poydras Street to the Public Library or crossed Claiborne
Avenue on my way to Treme, I realized that these major territorial leaders and their contributions
have been preserved in time and honored by the street signs that bear their name. As I passed by
Jackson Square, I wondered how many times Noel Carrier walked by this same spot headed to
church or to a military muster. I also tried to picture the festivities held here on January 23, 1815,
as Louisianans watched Andrew Jackson walk under a triumphal arch in celebration of their victory
at the Battle of New Orleans. While touring the Louisiana State Museum, I was reminded of the
Favrot family’s military legacy as I located Philogene Favrot's epaulette from the coat he wore
when he served as a lieutenant in the 24th Infantry of the United States Army. Truly America’s
most European city provides plenty of evidence of the extraordinary lives and conscious
negotiations of territorial Louisianans who helped create Louisiana’s Franco-American culture.
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